On October 25, 2025, voters in Cote d'Ivoire will head to the polls to elect their next president in a high-stakes election shaped by past controversies and ongoing political uncertainty. A key point of contention remains the potential candidacy of Alassane Ouattara, who has led the country since 2010 and is currently serving his third term despite the Ivorian constitution limiting the presidency to two. The Independent Electoral Commission, led by Ibrahim Coulibaly-Kuibiert, plays a crucial role in ensuring the integrity of the vote, by compiling and revising voter lists, as well as managing elections nationwide.
Recent electoral history in Cote d'Ivoire has been marred by turmoil. The 2010 presidential race, a defining moment in the nation's political trajectory, saw Ouattara challenge incumbent Laurent Gbagbo. Despite Ouattara securing 54 percent of the vote, Gbagbo contested the results, triggering a post-electoral crisis that left over 3,000 civilians dead in violent clashes between rival supporters. A military intervention led to Gbagbo's arrest and subsequent twenty-year sentence by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. In 2015, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), Gbagbo's party, boycotted the vote, claiming the process was rigged, thereby facilitating Ouattara's re-election. In 2020, the sudden death of Amadou Gon Coulibaly, the ruling party's designated candidate, prompted Ouattara to run for a controversial third term. The election, held in a climate of heightened tensions, saw widespread disruptions, the closure of polling stations, and low voter turnout.
As Cote d'Ivoire prepares for yet another electoral test, the issue of national reconciliation--long promised but never fully achieved--has become central to the political discourse. With lingering tensions from past elections and growing concerns over political stability, the 2025 vote is set to be one of the most decisive in the country's recent history.
A Fragmented Political Landscape
While the 2010 election featured fourteen contenders in the first round, this year's vote is expected to see roughly half that number--though this reduction does not necessarily signal a clearer political landscape. With less than a year to go, both declared and prospective candidates are maneuvering for a position in what is set to be a high-stakes battle.
Incumbent Ouattara, in power since 2010, remains the preferred candidate of the ruling Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), confirming he is ready to continue serving his country. However, opposition parties strongly oppose the prospect of his re-election, arguing that a fourth term would be unconstitutional. Among the main opposition figures is former president Gbagbo, who is running under the Parti des Peuples Africains - Côte d'Ivoire (PPA-CI). Although acquitted by the ICC and pardoned by Ouattara, Gbagbo has not been granted full amnesty for his role in the 2010 post-election violence, rendering him ineligible to run.
A similar fate has befallen Charles Blé Goudé, former minister under Gbagbo and leader of the Congrès Panafricain pour la Justice et l'Égalité des Peuples (COJEP). Despite his acquittal by the ICC, Blé Goudé remains convicted in Cote d'Ivoire, preventing him from contesting the election. Another well-known name in Ivorian politics is former First Lady Simone Ehivet Gbagbo, who is running under the banner of the Mouvement des Générations Capables (MGC), which she founded in 2022. For its part, Pascal Affi N'Guessan, leader of the FPI, is focusing his campaign on governance, poverty reduction, and strengthening ties with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This fragmented opposition raises concerns, as the multiple left-leaning candidates from the PPA-CI, FPI, MGC, and COJEP could weaken its ability to challenge the RHDP effectively.
Tensions are not limited to left-wing parties. The Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PDCI-RDA) is grappling with internal divisions over its candidate. Former Credit Suisse CEO Tidjane Thiam has been named the party's official nominee. Jean-Louis Billon, a former Minister of Trade and influential PDCI-RDA member, has rejected this nomination and has declared his own candidacy, criticizing Thiam as out of touch.
An Unstable Climate Conducive to Foreign Interference
It is in this uncertain context, with the electorate still scarred by past electoral violence and a list of candidates unsettled, that the Ivorian electorate will have to choose its future president for the next five years. Meanwhile, across sub-Saharan Africa, a growing tide of pan-African sovereignty is reshaping regional alliances and challenging traditional foreign influence. The withdrawal of French forces from the 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion in Port-Bouët marks another step in the decline of France's military presence in West Africa and comes just months after similar withdrawals from Senegal and Chad. Earlier, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, now members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), ordered the withdrawal of French military forces involved in the fight against regional terrorism for over ten years.
The Alliance of Sahel States: A Revival of Pan-African Enthusiasm
Formed in 2023, the AES is a mutual defense pact promoting sovereignty, Pan-Africanism, and anti-colonial ideals. The bloc has positioned itself as an alternative to the ECOWAS, a fifteen-member organization that includes Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, and Benin. In January 2024, the AES officially broke away from ECOWAS, deepening the divide between the two regional bodies. AES countries have positioned themselves as leaders of this generalized pan-Africanist movement, turning down not only the French presence but, more generally, the idea of foreign economic predation from which African countries have suffered for too long. In August 2024, Burkina Faso's President Ibrahima Traoré rejected an IMF loan, stating that "Africa does not need international financial institutions to develop." Present in Mali since 1976, TotalEnergies recently lost its contract to a new partnership between Malian firm Coly Energy and Beninese company Benin Petrol SA.
Russia: A Quest for Strategic Influence
For some observers, this growing desire for distancing from Western influence in Africa is the result of vast campaigns of manipulation and disinformation orchestrated by powers such as Russia and China. While the existence and impact of these disinformation campaigns remain open to debate, they do raise the question of the extent of such interference during election periods. Two European countries were recently confronted with this type of abuse. In Georgia, the pro-Russian, Eurosceptic "Georgian Dream" party faced accusations of vote-buying and voter intimidation during the 2024 national elections. Similarly, in Romania, Russian actors were accused of backing far-right candidate Călin Georgescu in the 2024 presidential race.
A recent report by the Center for Strategic Studies in Africa highlights Russia's growing involvement in African electoral processes, with the democratic scores of thirty-one African nations declining over the past five years. The analysis reveals that Cote d'Ivoire has already been targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns, particularly in support of Gbagbo. In a context where the PPA-CI is struggling to establish itself on the Ivorian political scene (winning two communes out of 201 and no region out of the thirty-one in the 2023 local elections), the hypothesis of a rapprochement with Russia raises questions about the influence strategies at play. The interests of the two parties seem to converge.
Russia's influence in Africa has expanded through military and economic cooperation, particularly with the AES. Through the Africa Corp (formerly Wagner Group), Russia provides military equipment, training, and security services to these nations. In January 2025, AES countries signed a Telecommunications and Remote Sensing Satellite Agreement with Russia aimed at enhancing border surveillance and disaster monitoring. For his part, Gbagbo has been a vocal critic of ECOWAS, accusing it of promoting French interests in West Africa. In an interview with AFO Media, he expressed a willingness to normalize relations with AES states should he return to power. While some analysts view this as a continuation of his long-standing rivalry with Ouattara, others see Russia's potential backing of Gbagbo as a strategic move to increase its foothold in Cote d'Ivoire and the broader West African region.
China: A Key Economic Partner
China has solidified its position as a major player in the region, becoming 2023 Cote d'Ivoire's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $5.28 billion--an increase of 21 percent from the previous year. Beijing also maintains strong ties with AES nations. In June 2024, Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali's Head of State, emphasized the benefits of the AES, which has enabled its members "to move away from facade and ineffective partnerships towards sincere partners" such as Russia and China. A few months later, he even declared that Mali shared "the same principles and values with the People's Republic of China, namely respect for the sovereignty of our States, the defense of the interests of our peoples, non-interference in internal affairs, but above all the rejection of manipulation linked to human rights issues."
China's influence extends to strategic sectors such as energy and infrastructure. In Niger, the China National Petroleum Corporation operates the Agadem oil field--the largest in Africa. Amid growing security concerns, Niger has also tasked China with protecting its energy assets. The potential return of Gbagbo to power could shift Cote d'Ivoire further away from Western alliances, particularly with France and the United States, given Paris' backing of Ouattara during the 2010 post-election crisis.
France: A Contested Historical Partner
France maintains long-standing historical and economic ties with Cote d'Ivoire which it inherited from the colonial era. On the commercial front, France remains Cote d'Ivoire's top trading partner within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). In 2023, Cote d'Ivoire accounted for 38 percent of all French exports to WAEMU while also being the region's leading exporter to France.
However, these economic ties do not shield France from mounting criticism from Ivorian public opinion. The retrocession of the Port-Bouët military camp, perceived by some as a symbol of national sovereignty (and by others as a win-win deal between Cote d'Ivoire and France), comes at a time when anti-French rhetoric is gaining ground in French-speaking Africa. As journalist Alain Foka noted in a May 2023 analysis, younger generations born after independence are questioning the economic and military influence France continues to exert over its former colonies, seen as predatory rather than beneficial.
On the other hand, analysts suggest that military cooperation between Paris and Abidjan is far from over. Political expert Seidik Aba predicts that Ouattara, while formally ending France's direct military presence, may pursue a different model of collaboration, focusing on training programs and intelligence sharing rather than deploying troops on Ivorian soil. Billon could also be seen as a candidate whose election could stabilize relations France and Cote d'Ivoire. A prominent businessman and former Minister of Commerce, Billon ran the Société Immobilière et Financière de la Côte Africaine (SIFCA)--one of Cote d'Ivoire's largest agro-industrial firms, founded by his father in 1964. SIFCA's financial ties with France are significant. Over the past decade, Société Générale and Proparco (a subsidiary of the French Development Agency) have invested 85 million euros in SIFCA's development projects. Billon's leadership in agriculture and industry positions him as a pro-business figure with strong international connections, particularly in France, Senegal, and Nigeria. However, Billon is not yet an official candidate for his party, the PDCI-RDA, which is currently chaired by Thiam.
Thiam has long-standing ties with France and international financial institutions. In a 2009 interview with the Institut Montaigne, he declared that "France will live. France will continue to shine. My France is an idea, and ideas never die." Graduated from the École Polytechnique the Mines de Paris, the former Crédit Suisse executive maintains close relationships with French and Anglo-American financial circles. More recently, Thiam suggested international funding for Cote d'Ivoire's electoral commission to facilitate the updating of the electoral roll.
The United States and Israel: Waning Influence or Strategic Shift?
The direction of US foreign policy in Africa under the second administration of President Donald Trump remains uncertain. Alhaji Bouba Nouhou from the Michel de Montaigne University in Bordeaux suggests this could pave the way for emerging powers like Iran to deepen their involvement in AES countries, particularly in technology and defense cooperation.
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A long-standing ally of the United States, Israel also plays a strategic role in West Africa, with Cote d'Ivoire serving as a key partner for Tel Aviv. In October 2024, an agreement was signed for the sale of a patrol boat manufactured by Israel Shipyard. A framework agreement also links the two countries, granting Ivorian access to Israeli expertise in cybersecurity, agriculture, and water management.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Israel has announced a reduction in military exports to Cote d'Ivoire, aiming to prevent its weapons from being used in potential election-related violence. A re-election of Ouattara could be favorable for Washington and Tel Aviv, reinforcing Western influence in the region against Russian, Chinese, and Iranian interests.
A Decisive Ballot
The prospect of foreign interference in Cote d'Ivoire's 2025 presidential election remains a sensitive issue. As of now, there have been no confirmed efforts to manipulate or destabilize the election process, making any claims of such interference premature. While international actors may hold strategic interests in the country, reducing the election to a mere battleground for external influence risks oversimplifying Ivorian's complex political landscape, its electoral autonomy, and the ability of candidates to run independent campaigns free from overt propaganda. A pragmatic and evidence-based approach is crucial in addressing the issue--avoiding conspiracy theories and the blanket demonization of any side. Should foreign interference emerge in Cote d'Ivoire's elections, its true impact will only become clear once the facts and electoral dynamics unfold.
That said, electoral interference is not a theoretical concern. Last year, the United States faced attempts of influence from Iran during its 2024 election, while Canada condemned Chinese interference targeting its own electoral process, serving as stark reminders that such risks are real.
In this fragile context, ensuring stability and sovereignty are the watchwords for a nation striving for national reconciliation, still bearing the scars of past crises and the hopes of a brighter future. As a strategic crossroads in West Africa, Cote d'Ivoire is both a stakeholder and a player in this dynamic. The outcome of this election could redefine its relations with its international partners and influence the equilibrium of the balance of power in the region.
In 2025, Cote d'Ivoire will not only appoint a new leader, but it will also make a decisive choice about the democratic path it wishes to take. Between security concerns, economic transformations, and political tensions, this election will be a defining moment--one that reveals both the progress made and the challenges that lie ahead.
Arthur Palix currently monitors Operational Risks within the French Bank Société Générale in Montreal. He graduated in Competitive Intelligence from the Sorbonne University and the School of Economic Warfare in Paris. With a strong background in Political Science and Geopolitics, his research focuses on the dynamics of influence between nations, with a particular emphasis on Africa and the Middle East.
