Tensions are rising in South Sudan as the president manoeuvres to anoint an apparent successor and dissolves the bargain that ended the post-independence civil war. African leaders with the president's ear should work together to ward off a devastating new upheaval in the world's youngest country.
What's new? South Sudan is on edge. President Salva Kiir, with his health in visible decline, has upended his regime and dismantled a 2018 peace deal, all apparently to push aside any rival to the political neophyte Benjamin Bol Mel in competition to be his successor.
Why does it matter? South Sudan was already straining under pressure from the war in neighbouring Sudan, including the loss of most of its oil revenues and rising insecurity along its northern border. Amid the turmoil, the country risks plunging back into the devastating civil war that ended in 2018.
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What should be done? To stabilise the situation, a concert of African countries should urge an immediate end to violence and sponsor a new forum for dialogue among South Sudanese elites about the country's future, lest they turn their knives on one another first.
I. Overview
South Sudan, the world's youngest country and among its most violent, is on the brink of renewed upheaval. The ailing President Salva Kiir has turned his regime on its head to clear the way for Benjamin Bol Mel, a business associate who is politically inexperienced but is now number two in the government and heir apparent to the top office. In so doing, Kiir has dismissed or sidelined numerous senior officials, including vice presidents, security chiefs and ruling-party leaders. He has also jettisoned a 2018 peace deal that ended South Sudan's post-independence civil war, arresting former rebel leader Riek Machar, the first vice president, and launching attacks on Machar's military positions across the country. The brutal war in Sudan, just to the north, adds to the country's woes as it struggles to export the oil on which it is heavily reliant through pipelines leading to terminals on the Sudanese Red Sea coast. With many anxious about a return to bloodshed, African powers that historically have had influence with the country's elite should intercede with a collective plan to ease tensions and ensure a peaceful succession.
The jockeying in the South Sudanese capital Juba is already fuelling conflict. In February, Kiir fired a governor named by Machar and ordered attacks on his troops' positions, sparking violence the next month in Upper Nile state, as an opposition militia with ties to Machar overran an army base in Nasir, a major town on the South Sudan-Ethiopia border. Arguably more worrying are the fissures within Kiir's own camp caused by deep disquiet over the president's manoeuvres to place Bol Mel in position to succeed him. Both Kiir and Bol Mel are Dinka, the country's largest ethnic group, while Machar is a Nuer, the second largest. If Kiir fails to bridge the divisions stemming from Bol Mel's rise, fighting could erupt once he leaves office. The most dangerous scenario is that the Dinka-dominated state forces would fracture, with Nuer and other opposition elements then entering the fray. Fear of that eventuality is likely behind Uganda's large military deployment, upon Kiir's request, to South Sudan to bolster the government.
To stave off broader conflict, African allies that backed South Sudan's bid for independence from Sudan, namely Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa, should pool their efforts. First, they should press President Kiir to halt attacks on opposition forces. They should also push for a forum where key South Sudanese elites can discuss the country's future, including the question of who will replace Kiir, to avoid the all-out power struggle for which many South Sudanese are preparing. These talks should also aim to resolve Machar's fate. Ideally, Kiir should be encouraged to allow Machar to return to his previous role as first vice president, in line with the 2018 peace agreement. Given its garrison in South Sudan and close ties to the president, Uganda needs to play the leading role in steering Kiir away from confrontation and helping manage a peaceful succession.
II. Troubled from the Start
Though Kiir has ruled South Sudan for two decades now, many South Sudanese still consider him an accidental president. Kiir was the long-time deputy of John Garang, the charismatic founder of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), who led the decades-long fight that culminated in independence from Sudan. In mid-2005, just six months after signing a landmark peace deal with Khartoum that paved the way for South Sudan's 2011 independence, Garang died in a helicopter crash. The factious SPLM, in a state of shock, rallied around Kiir, thus averting an untimely succession dispute.[1] Yet many saw Kiir, who had served as a military and intelligence chief for the guerrilla movement but never finished a formal education and had little experience in politics or international affairs, as an interim leader. Underestimating him, many laid plans to challenge Kiir for the top position, setting the stage for later power struggles.[2]
Larger cleavages in the independence movement were one source of opposition to Kiir. The SPLM was the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which took up arms against Khartoum in 1983, starting the second Sudanese civil war that ended in the 2005 accord. The SPLM members were united by shared grievances related to their racial and cultural subjugation by the authorities in the Sudanese capital. They were otherwise divided, however, including along ethnic and regional lines.
[1] For background on Kiir's appointment as SPLM chair, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, 31 March 2006.
[2] Crisis Group, "As South Sudan Quakes, An Heir Apparent Rises", The Horn (podcast), 9 June 2025.
Dissension has dogged the [People's Liberation Movement, SPLM] for decades.
Dissension has dogged the SPLM for decades. The party split violently in 1991, with Riek Machar leading a Khartoum-backed breakaway group based in Nasir, Upper Nile state. The rift healed only in 2002, allowing Garang's peace negotiations with Khartoum to proceed.[1] Then, in late 2004, just weeks before the final deal, the SPLM almost splintered again amid a Garang-Kiir dispute, resulting in a rare emergency leadership meeting in Rumbek, capital of Lakes state, that managed to hold it together after days in which members aired grievances.[2] In 2008, after Kiir took Garang's place, another crisis occurred when top officials, including Machar, said they would contest Kiir's position at a party convention, before agreeing to punt leadership questions until after the 2011 independence referendum.[3] Afterward, Kiir quelled dissent through a two-pronged strategy: first, he doled out patronage, greased by billions in petrodollar revenue. Secondly, he broadened the movement's political tent by bringing in non-SPLM figures and stressing the need for unity vis-à-vis Khartoum.[4]
Not surprisingly, that unity imploded almost as soon as South Sudan achieved independence. With a succession battle already under way among senior SPLM figures, Kiir ordered a major government shakeup in 2013, notably sacking Machar as vice president. The intra-party tensions mounted, with a number of senior officials, including Machar as well as the party's secretary-general, Pagan Amum, openly challenging Kiir for the SPLM leadership, pushing for an open contest under party rules in advance of South Sudan's first elections. This power struggle led to civil war in December 2013. After violence erupted in Juba, South Sudan's army and ruling party shattered into several competing factions, largely along ethnic lines, kicking off catastrophic fighting that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced nearly half the population. Most of the battles pitted Kiir's Dinka ethnic group against Machar's Nuer.[5] Uganda stepped in to back Kiir, while Sudan supported Machar's movement.
A 2018 peace accord brokered by the same two regional powers - Sudan and Uganda - helped bring Machar back into government as the country's top vice president in 2020. The deal promised to reunify Kiir's forces, Machar's and other armed groups into a national army, after which the country would hold fresh elections.
[1] For background on the SPLM split, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°236, South Sudan's South: Conflict in the Equatorias, 25 May 2016. After reunification, the party's hierarchy (in descending order) was John Garang, Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and James Wani Igga.
[2] "Minutes of historical SPLM meeting in Rumbek 2004", Sudan Tribune. 10 March 2008.
[3] "Sudan's Kiir faces two contenders for the SPLM chairmanship", Sudan Tribune, 14 May 2008.
[4] Kiir forged links with non-SPLM groups partly to counter his rivals within the SPLM. His new allies included anti-SPLM armed groups that previously had fought on Khartoum's side. In 2006, after the peace deal with Khartoum, he made Paulino Matip, the leader of the most powerful of these groups, his deputy commander-in-chief.
[5] See Crisis Group Africa Report N°217, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, 10 April 2014.
III. An Ailing Kiir Clears the Deck for an Heir Apparent
South Sudan has been stuck in a perpetual transition ever since. Elections due in December 2022 were pushed back to December 2024 and then postponed again to December 2026. Little progress has been made on the key preparatory steps, including not just unifying the army but also approving a new constitution and conducting a census.
With elections continuously delayed, South Sudanese elites - a collection of influential political leaders, wealthy business tycoons, senior civil servants and state security officers - shifted their focus toward jockeying over the eventual presidential succession. The 73-year-old Kiir's health has been in visible decline in recent years.[1] Many feared that Kiir's passing could herald a violent free-for-all among competing factions, given the questions about who might succeed him and the lack of mechanisms for managing the competition. Such a development would be hard on the country under any circumstances, but South Sudan is at a particularly vulnerable moment - still suffering from the aftermath of the devastating civil war, including widespread displacement, chronic hunger and brutal, systematic conflict-related sexual violence. Amid widespread donor fatigue, a severe humanitarian funding shortfall has been exacerbated by the Trump administration's substantial cuts to U.S. foreign assistance.[2]
The war in neighbouring Sudan, which erupted in April 2023, has heightened these challenges. In February 2024, the South Sudanese economy suffered a critical blow when the main oil export pipeline, which runs through Sudan to the Red Sea coast, burst. The fighting in Sudan had prevented access to the pipeline for routine maintenance, causing the breakdown. It also blocked repairs for months on end, during which South Sudan lost the bulk of its state revenues.[3]These petrodollars have long been the adhesive holding the state together, enabling Kiir to manage elite competition through patronage.[4] Meanwhile, the conflict in Sudan has divided many of the South Sudanese political and military leaders into opposing camps, with some tied to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti" and others to its adversary, the Sudanese army. Many South Sudanese went north to fight in the Sudanese civil war, some on one side and some on the other, even as refugees and small arms poured south.
Weakened by the fiscal strain of the lost oil revenue and rumours that his health is failing, Kiir began making a series of bold personnel moves in his regime that at first appeared designed to reconsolidate his control.[5] In October 2024, he fired his long-serving intelligence chief Akol Koor, who was widely considered the second most powerful figure in South Sudan. He also dismissed other top security officials, including the heads of his presidential guard and the army. Then the president turned his attention to the highest levels of government. In February 2025, upon returning from a visit to the United Arab Emirates, Kiir sacked two vice presidents, James Wani Igga and Hussein Abdelbagi, and appointed Benjamin Bol Mel, a confidant and family business partner, to the more powerful of these vice presidency positions.
[1] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians, senior officials and elites, Juba, July and October 2024; Nairobi, March and April 2025.
[2] See Joseph Falzetta, "Aid cuts push South Sudan into uncharted territory", The New Humanitarian, 29 April 2025.
[3] For analysis of the impact of Sudan's war on oil production in South Sudan, see Crisis Group Statement, "South Sudan on Edge as Its Neighbour's War Disrupts Oil Exports", 15 May 2024.
[4] See Crisis Group Africa Report N°305, Oil or Nothing: Dealing with South Sudan's Bleeding Finances, 6 October 2021.
[5] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese officials, Nairobi, March and April 2025.
[Benjamin] Bol Mel's rapid ascent has raised eyebrows, given his limited political and military experience.
Bol Mel's rapid ascent has raised eyebrows, given his limited political and military experience. Originally from Bahr Al Ghazal in the country's north-western corner, Bol Mel first gained prominence as a businessman, securing lucrative public contracts and assisting the president's relatives with deals of their own.[1] The U.S. placed him under sanctions in 2017 for alleged corruption, describing him as Kiir's private secretary and "principal financial adviser".[2] His political rise began in late 2022, when Kiir appointed him to the SPLM National Liberation Council and as a presidential adviser. In 2023, Kiir named him deputy secretary-general of the SPLM. By May 2024, Kiir had promoted him to the rank of lieutenant general in the National Security Service and named him to the SPLM's Political Bureau.
After he made Bol Mel vice president, Kiir moved against Riek Machar, his long-time rival and the country's first vice president under the 2018 peace deal. The stage had been set in the preceding weeks. On 10 February, Kiir fired a governor Machar had appointed and ordered government troops to attack positions held by Machar's forces. In response, on 4 March, a Nuer militia loyal to Machar overran a government post in Nasir in Upper Nile state. The next day, soldiers surrounded Machar's home in Juba and arrested several of his key allies, including the petroleum minister and the deputy army chief. As fighting continued in Upper Nile, a high-ranking Dinka officer was killed at the Nuer militia's hands. Kiir retaliated by arresting numerous other Machar allies and escalating on the battlefield. He invited the Ugandan military into South Sudan to take his side. As the violence got worse, he took the decision on 26 March to put Machar under house arrest, rendering him incommunicado. Some in Kiir's administration suggest that Machar could face criminal charges.[3]
Having shoved aside the country's top vice president, Kiir elevated Bol Mel in the SPLM once more, seemingly putting him in the line of succession. On 20 May, Kiir replaced the three SPLM veterans who were his deputies in the ruling-party hierarchy, namely Wani Igga, Kuol Manyang and Daniel Awet, making Bol Mel the SPLM's deputy chair, the position Kiir had held when Garang died.[4] This final move appeared to confirm speculation that Kiir's motive in upending his regime was to get rid of possible rivals to Bol Mel.
The haste of Kiir's moves to clear the deck for Bol Mel, despite their destabilising nature, has led most South Sudanese elites to conclude that Kiir felt under pressure to empower his confidant, perhaps because he needed to take leave for medical reasons.[5] Numerous South Sudanese and foreign diplomats who have met with Kiir in 2025 to date have expressed alarm at the decline in his mental and physical state, though reports are inconsistent, with some saying he has appeared to be better on more recent occasions.[6] Meanwhile, prominent South Sudanese and others who speak with Bol Mel say he talks as if Kiir has already delegated substantial authority to him.[7]
[1] His companies, including ABMC Thai-South Sudan Construction, ARC Resources and Winners Construction, landed substantial, non-competitive government contracts to build infrastructure.
[2] "United States Sanctions Human Rights Abusers and Corrupt Actors Across the Globe", U.S. Department of the Treasury, 21 December 2017; "Treasury Issues Sanctions on International Anti-Corruption Day", U.S. Department of the Treasury, 9 December 2021.
[3] "Machar will face legal process, says VP Taban", Radio Tamazuj, 12 May 2025.
[4] Kiir's moves appear to run afoul of the SPLM's own bylaws. The SPLM's constitution was amended in 2016 to provide that only a national party convention can elect a new chair or deputies, by secret ballot. See Article 16, section 1(d) of the 2008 SPLM constitution (amended in 2016). Copy on file with Crisis Group. Even notwithstanding the 2016 amendment, Kiir's actions would appear to violate party rules. Article 25.1(a) of the 2008 constitution requires the chair to nominate three candidates for deputy who must then be endorsed by the National Liberation Council. A Council member said Kiir followed no such process in naming Bol Mel. Crisis Group interviews, June 2025.
[5] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians, senior officials and elites, Juba, October 2024; Nairobi, March-June 2025.
[6] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese elites and Western diplomats, 2025. Among Kiir's close associates, reports differ about the reasons for the apparent fluctuations in his mental state. According to some, Kiir's entourage gives him stimulants, colloquially known as "boosters", so that he can stay sharp during public appearances. Others, however, assert that any episodes of confusion are merely side effects of the analgesics he takes to alleviate pain in his legs. Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians, Juba, Nairobi and by telephone, March-June 2025.
[7] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians, Nairobi and by telephone, March-June 2025.
IV. Worrying Fallout
Kiir's moves have pushed the country into turmoil. The rise of Bol Mel has sown rancour throughout South Sudan, with numerous powerful factions already lining up against him. Bol Mel appears to have few friends within the SPLM or the security establishment, both of which Kiir has gutted.[1] His ascent has angered the ruling party's ageing old guard.[2] Prominent Dinka have criticised Bol Mel publicly, indicating that he lacks support within Kiir's main power base, while Dinka elders are privately admonishing the president to drop him.[3] His elevation has also increased tensions with other ethnic blocs, including within Kiir's camp, since many South Sudanese hoped that the country's next leader would be a non-Dinka.[4] Opposition groups blame Bol Mel for escalating the violence in Upper Nile, including indiscriminate airstrikes on Nuer localities that killed civilians. Bol Mel has given the impression in both speeches and private meetings that he was behind the military operation, while criticising Machar.[5] Even some members of Kiir's family are said to oppose Bol Mel.[6]
Compounding the disquiet is Kiir's decision to jettison the 2018 power-sharing arrangement with Machar. Prior to the moves to push him aside, Machar was already a diminished political force but appeared to be biding his time, with the aim of jostling for power in Juba upon Kiir's exit.[7] Now, under house arrest and following Kiir's assaults on his military positions, he appears further weakened. His top lieutenants have mostly fled Juba, including Oyet Nathaniel, who was South Sudan's deputy parliamentary speaker and is now acting as leader of Machar's party from a neighbouring country. Others among Machar's generals have escaped to the bush to prepare for war.[8]
Meanwhile, troops are mobilising in Nuer areas, including Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states, partly in response to the spiralling violence. While the South Sudanese army, following an aerial and artillery bombardment, retook Nasir in April without ground fighting, clashes followed in eastern Upper Nile and northern Jonglei in May and June, suggesting the potential for more hostilities. Violence also spread to Central and Western Equatoria, not far from Juba, with the government appearing to gain the upper hand.
Though Machar's group remains influential, other armed opposition factions are also active inside the country. The National Salvation Front, led by Thomas Cirillo, clashed with Kiir's forces in Central Equatoria state in late March.[9] Persistent intercommunal violence in Jonglei could also trigger large-scale mobilisation by the Lou Nuer militia, one of the most powerful Nuer forces. Other disaffected elites and former top security officials in Juba are also seeking external support for a rebellion, in expectation of a multi-sided power struggle. At present, none of the opposition movements, including Machar's, appears to have found an outside country willing to supply it with a significant flow of arms. If that were to change, violence would quickly escalate.
[1] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians and security leaders, Nairobi, March-May 2025.
[2] People who interact with the three SPLM deputies dismissed in May say these leaders were not consulted in advance. Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians and security leaders, Nairobi, March-May 2025.
[3] At a ceremony welcoming the new governor of Warrap state in early June, the outgoing governor, General Aleu Ayieny, accused Bol Mel of "behaving as if he were already the president". General Ayieny remarked that Wani Igga, despite having served for twelve years as vice president, had never given the impression that he sought to succeed Kiir. Speech by General Aleu Ayieny Aleu, South Sudan Eagles Media, 6 June 2025. Aleu's remarks sparked a firestorm. Prominent elders from Bahr Al Ghazal have privately expressed grave concerns about Bol Mel to Kiir. Crisis Group telephone interviews, South Sudanese politicians, June 2025. Dinka activists have also been posting videos opposing Bol Mel's rise.
[4] Kiir's unceremonious dismissal of Wani Igga, an ethnic Bari from Equatoria, was seen by many Equatorians as a humiliation. Crisis Group telephone interviews, elites from Equatoria and other South Sudanese analysts, May 2025. See also Crisis Group Africa Report N°300, Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan, 10 February 2021.
[4] Crisis Group telephone interviews, South Sudanese analysts, May 2025. See also Crisis Group Africa Report N°300, Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan, 10 February 2021.
[5] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese elites, Juba, July 2025.
[6] Crisis Group telephone interviews, May 2025.
[7] Crisis Group interview, senior official in Machar's party, 2025.
[8] Machar's party is actively trying to secure arms from Sudan to sustain a rebellion. Crisis Group interviews, Machar party officials, 2025. Thus far, it does not appear to be receiving significant external support.
[9] For background on Cirillo, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°169, South Sudan's Other War: Resolving the Insurgency in Equatoria, 25 February 2021.
V. Major Questions, Existential Risks
South Sudan is entering a dangerous, uncertain new phase, and facing a confluence of grave threats exacerbated by the succession crisis and its fallout.
Major questions loom. For one, few know the prognosis for President Kiir's health, despite rampant speculation. At 73, Kiir is still younger than many African heads of state. Few appear to be privy to Kiir's thinking, either. Some believe that he felt he needed to empower Bol Mel so he could leave for extended medical treatment abroad. Kiir returned on 2 July from a ten-day trip to the UAE. It was his second visit to the country in the year to date and the longest foreign sojourn of his presidency, leading many to surmise that he went there for health reasons - though he likely had a political and economic agenda as well.[1] While he was gone, Kiir appeared to leave Bol Mel largely in charge.
But while Bol Mel looks positioned to replace him, Kiir has a history of dramatically changing course when it comes to potential successors. Since he has not discussed his plans in public, a reversal would require little explanation. He could also hedge his bets by bolstering other power centres inside his regime, as he has done before.[2] Any such development could lead to even greater and more open jostling among powerful figures over the succession, especially should concerns about Kiir's health persist.
A related question, should Kiir stick by him, is whether Bol Mel will be able to consolidate power if Kiir's capacity diminishes or the president exits the political stage. For now, Bol Mel is under the protection of Kiir and, by extension, the Ugandan military. Both men may be dependent on Kampala for some time: the divisions among the South Sudanese elites are wide and the army, which has weakened over the years, pays soldiers irregularly; its officer corps often has divided loyalties and could implode at any moment.
Bol Mel does have some things working in his favour. He seems to have substantial financial resources at his disposal, despite South Sudan's fiscal collapse. In addition to his apparent closeness with Uganda, many believe that Bol Mel has friendly ties with the UAE, in part given that Kiir started the reshuffle that promoted Bol Mel in February, upon returning from his week-long trip to the Gulf country.[3] While, as noted, some of Kiir's family members are reputed to oppose him, Bol Mel appears to have the support of a number of the most powerful ones.[4] His defenders point to his spectacular rise as proof of his political cunning; they also see an advantage for him in Kiir's moves to curb the danger of an unmanaged succession, arguing there is more to fear in the prospect of chaos than in the prospect of Bol Mel taking power.[5]
[1] Kiir visited Abu Dhabi with Bol Mel in February. The two trips to the UAE are particularly notable given that Kiir avoided foreign travel for much of his presidency, partly, it seems, due to fears of a power grab in his absence.
[2] The recent appointment of Kiir's daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, to a top job has triggered speculation that the president may be weighing his political options again. Adut has been named special presidential envoy for special programs, the same position that Bol Mel held before his elevation to vice president.
[3] Bol Mel himself spends considerable time in the UAE, where his businesses have major financial dealings. He was also Kiir's key negotiator with Abu Dhabi, the RSF's main outside patron, after South Sudan's oil export pipeline burst in RSF-held territory in early 2024. Crisis Group telephone interviews, former state minister, former national minister and MP, August 2025. The UAE has constructed a field hospital in Bol Mel's village of Madhol in Aweil East county, Bahr Al Ghazal, near the Sudanese border. People living there suspect that the hospital, which is now providing care to the locals, was intended to treat injured RSF fighters. Crisis Group interviews, residents, Madhol, July 2025.
[4] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese security officials, April 2025.
[5] Crisis Groups interviews, South Sudanese officials and elites, May and June 2025.
[President] Kiir has built South Sudan's political system - ad hoc and repressive as it is - around his personal strengths. Whoever inherits it will face turbulence.
Yet the risks of instability are obvious. It is not clear if Bol Mel or anyone else will be able to hold South Sudan's political system together after Kiir departs, especially if the transition is imposed without consultation or consensus among powerful factions. Kiir's background as an intelligence chief has made him adept at political survival. Deeply suspicious of others, ruthless about reshuffling people in top jobs and pragmatic about accommodating his opponents, the president has confounded rivals who expected he would flounder after his unlikely rise to the SPLM leadership. He has also always been able to fall back on his Dinka power base from Bahr Al Ghazal to fill the most sensitive positions. Among South Sudan's neighbours, Kiir's guarded transactionalism has made him few friends but also few enemies, enabling him to wait out rebellions by starving them of external support. Over twenty years in power, in other words, Kiir has built South Sudan's political system - ad hoc and repressive as it is - around his personal strengths. Whoever inherits it will face turbulence.
The Ugandan intervention and spillover from the war in Sudan further cloud the picture. It is unclear how long Kampala can afford to keep its troops deployed. If the Ugandans exit the scene, Kiir or Bol Mel could be in trouble. Yet a longer Ugandan mission would also carry risk, creating the perception that Juba is reliant on a foreign power, serving to further corrode the government's legitimacy among South Sudanese and inviting intervention by other regional countries that might want to check Kampala's influence in South Sudan.[1] Kiir's balancing act may also become untenable as the war raging in Sudan polarises the region. While Kiir has thus far managed to walk a tightrope between the Sudanese army and the RSF, it is not easy. Proxy activity along and across the Sudan-South Sudan border, sponsored by both the army and the RSF, is almost certain to grow.
South Sudan's dire fiscal straits pose still further challenges. In early May, Juba announced that oil exports through the main pipeline had resumed the previous month, likely enabled by shifts at the front in the Sudanese civil war. RSF drone strikes on Sudanese army strongholds in Port Sudan and Kosti later in May, however, signalled that the conflict to the north could once again disrupt the flow of oil.[2] South Sudan also will struggle to protect its oil from theft by both the RSF and the Sudanese army.[3]
Add it all up, and South Sudan's slide back toward civil war makes for an alarming picture. South Sudanese elites, whether in Kiir's camp or outside it, are nearly unanimous in their assessment that the young country may be facing a moment of existential peril. Many speak of the possible disintegration of the state.[4]
[1] Sudan has long competed with Uganda for influence over South Sudan. Kenya and Ethiopia also have substantial economic and security interests in the country. If Uganda's intervention seems to be threatening their interests or further instability, any of these three countries might choose to get involved by taking a side.
[2] See Shewit Woldemichael, "Drone Attacks on Port Sudan Mark Dramatic Escalation", Crisis Group Analyst's Notebook, 7 May 2025.
[3] See Crisis Group Statement, "South Sudan on Edge as Its Neighbour's War Disrupts Oil Exports", op. cit.; and Crisis Group Report, Oil or Nothing: Dealing with South Sudan's Bleeding Finances, op. cit.
[4] Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese politicians, Juba, July 2025.
Instability in [South Sudan] could manifest itself through several scenarios. First is a looming struggle over succession should Kiir suddenly leave office.
Instability in the country could manifest itself through several scenarios. First is a looming struggle over succession should Kiir suddenly leave office. Kiir's apparent nod to Bol Mel as a successor has prompted other heavyweights in the president's camp to start preparing for a showdown. But in the alternate scenario that sees Kiir trying to stay in power for many years to come, there could be trouble as well: the reshuffling has left a trail of bruised egos and battered ambitions that will be difficult even for the president to manage. Divisions could burst into the open in unpredictable ways, possibly including infighting within the army or between different parts of the security sector, including the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, the National Security Service, the presidential guard and the police.
Exogenous factors are also worrying. South Sudan could get increasingly drawn into the war in neighbouring Sudan, especially should Kiir grow more reliant on the UAE. As Abu Dhabi backs the RSF, the Sudanese army could react by restarting arms supplies to opposition forces in South Sudan, as occurred during South Sudan's earlier civil war. Another scenario could involve one of the main competing outside powers in Sudan - such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia or Egypt - getting behind a particular faction in Juba with the aim of pulling South Sudan toward one side in Sudan's civil war, thus compounding the power struggle.
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VI. A Collective Rescue Plan
To get through the treacherous period ahead, concerted action is required from President Kiir and relevant African and global powers.
The priority should be to prevent an immediate escalation of violence. Those with influence over Kiir's government, including countries like Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania, should urge restraint and a pause in military action to give dialogue between the government and opposition groups a chance. Kenya, Ethiopia and South Africa should also press Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to desist from backing new attacks by government troops on Machar's forces.
Resolving Riek Machar's fate is delicate but critical. Ideally, Kiir should be pressed to allow Machar to return to his previous duties as first vice president. Other options are fraught with risk. Indefinite confinement of Machar in Juba would be inflammatory. So, too, would involuntary exile: Machar's prolonged detention in South Africa in 2016, after a 2015 peace deal collapsed and Kiir's forces chased him into the bush, led to an intensifying insurgency that killed many people before the parties finally entered talks once more. For now, Kiir seems intent on preventing negotiations over what happens to Machar. Juba has denied numerous envoys access to Machar since his house arrest, including former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga and an African Union (AU) delegation. Kiir seems keen to keep Machar under detention in Juba or in a friendly outside country, to prevent him from either participating in elections in 2026 or trying to organise an all-out revolt.
Regional capitals with historical ties to the SPLM and that supported its independence ... should seek common cause on a rescue plan.
Negotiations over Machar's fate may need to be subsumed under broader discussions about South Sudan's future, including the tensions over succession and Bol Mel's rise. Regional capitals with historical ties to the SPLM and that supported its independence - namely Kampala, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam and Pretoria - should seek common cause on a rescue plan for staving off broader infighting or collapse. Elements of such a plan could include a forum that reflects the diversity of South Sudan to talk about how to manage an eventual presidential transition. Even if Kiir is set on naming Bol Mel as his successor, dialogue could enable the various players to negotiate over how to share power rather than resort to violent competition for it. Concerted opposition to Bol Mel in such a forum could also push Kiir to adjust his strategy, if compromise is elusive.
South Sudan's African friends are divided over the best approach, though they are well aware of the deteriorating situation. Ethiopia, which shares a porous border with Upper Nile state, home to a large Nuer population, has sought to convince Juba to recommit to the 2018 peace deal as a means of preventing civil war. Kenya is still interested in continuing its approach under the Tumaini initiative - an attempt, hosted by Nairobi since May, to bring other holdout opposition groups into the Kiir-Machar coalition government.[1] South Africa, which chairs the AU's C5 committee on South Sudan, prefers restarting efforts to reunite the splintered SPLM, including Machar's faction, as a means of managing the disputes.[2] Uganda, which appears to be closest to Kiir, is most concerned about maintaining its influence in Juba. Currently, it also prefers to stitch the SPLM back together, but without Machar.[3]Tanzania hosted the "Arusha process" to reunite the SPLM after the 2013 outbreak of civil war, but it has not been especially active on the file of late.
Given the urgency of the situation, the AU and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (the Horn of Africa regional bloc), in collaboration with global partners, should support convening a forum. While the main focus of such a forum should be to avert immediate conflict and a violent power struggle, doing so may also require resolving thorny disagreements over adopting a founding constitution, holding national polls or even restoring internal SPLM elections. In such a forum, regional leaders could also revive quiet efforts to push for the simultaneous exit of both Kiir and Machar, as many South Sudanese advocate, though such efforts have foundered in the past and would face steep obstacles now.[4]
While Kiir is likely to resist these external efforts, a united front could give them a better chance. Ugandan leadership would seem to be the key, given Museveni's ties to Kiir and given the substantial leverage Kampala has with the South Sudanese president after its military intervention on his behalf.
The UN, with its large mission in South Sudan, should support these efforts and take proactive measures to protect civilians by providing safe havens should ethnic violence escalate. On the diplomatic front, the UN can play a quiet but leading role as a champion of broader coordinated action, including by African powers, to try to knit the South Sudanese polity back together. Donors should provide adequate funding to address the urgent humanitarian needs exacerbated by political turmoil, climate shocks, the fighting in Sudan and recent aid cuts.
Lastly but hardly least, South Sudan's fate is hard to separate from that of its neighbour to the north, which remains gripped by full-blown war. Halting that horrific, two-year conflict remains critical for South Sudan and the broader region - all the more reason for Western, Arab and African powers to put aside their differences and work together for peace.
[1] Tumaini could be expanded to include a broader swathe of South Sudanese, including those in exile, to discuss the future of South Sudan. For more, see Daniel Akech, "High Stakes for the South Sudan Talks in Kenya", Crisis Group Commentary, 13 September 2024. Kenyan President William Ruto called for resuming the Tumaini initiative in late May.
[2] Crisis Group interviews, South African officials, Pretoria, May 2025.
[3] Crisis Group telephone interviews, South Sudanese politicians, April 2025. Museveni "hates" Machar, viewing him as a traitor for accepting Khartoum's support in the 1990s and allegedly helping the Lord's Resistance Army, the Uganda-based insurgency under Joseph Kony. Crisis Group interviews, officials and diplomats, 2025. Museveni is also running for re-election in early 2026 and his focus will likely be on domestic matters rather than crafting a political deal in Juba.
[4] South Sudan's 2017-2020 National Dialogue, launched by Kiir, found a strong grassroots desire across the country for both Kiir and Machar to step down from leadership roles in order to give the country a fresh start. The Dialogue's steering committee recommended the same. "Final Report", South Sudan National Dialogue Steering Committee, December 2020. Both men rejected the recommendation.
VII. Conclusion
South Sudan is teetering on the edge of interconnected calamities, which the acute uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession has made more likely. The dismantling of the 2018 peace deal, a deep fiscal crisis, escalating civil strife and the spillover from the war in Sudan have created a perfect storm even by the standards of a country so accustomed to instability. Without immediate action by President Kiir's government to de-escalate and more unified intercession by regional and international partners, the country's odds of facing a debilitating power struggle and even deadlier violence are too high. Despite the fatigue among African and other outside powers with efforts to address South Sudan's many maladies, the risks of this moment are too great to ignore. It is more imperative than ever to forge greater consensus among South Sudan's elite if this young nation is to survive.
Juba/Nairobi/Brussels, 1 September 2025
Appendix
A. Map of South Sudan
