Liberia once again faces a familiar crossroads, where the potential of petroleum wealth clashes with painful memories of exploitation, institutional weakness, and opaque decision-making.
The new Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) presented to the Liberian Senate by Oranto Petroleum and TotalEnergies were expected to mark a fresh start for the country's long-dormant hydrocarbons sector. Instead, last week's hearings revealed structural flaws in the negotiation process, concerning gaps in due diligence, and, most troubling, the return of an oil company whose record across Africa is characterized not by drilling or development, but by long periods of inaction, speculation, and abandonment.
Liberia has seen this story unfold before. In 2007, Oranto Petroleum acquired offshore blocks but never drilled a single exploration well. It did not build infrastructure, create sustainable jobs, or contribute to any long-term national development. Instead, the company secured a lucrative farm-out deal with Chevron, reportedly earning over US$100 million. Liberia, the resource owner, received nothing of material significance. For a country that has repeatedly seen its natural resource potential wasted by weak oversight, that episode served as an early warning about the risks posed by speculative operators.
Follow us on WhatsApp | LinkedIn for the latest headlines
The concerns go beyond Liberia's past experiences. Throughout the continent, Oranto and its parent company, Atlas Petroleum, have built a troubling track record that raises serious red flags about their operational credibility. In Uganda, the company failed to drill a single well on the Ngassa block over nearly a decade, leading to the government canceling the license. In Senegal, Oranto has held the Saint Louis Offshore Profond block without conducting meaningful exploration. In Equatorial Guinea, a similar pattern appears: long periods of inactivity, minimal seismic work beyond initial commitments, and repeated extensions without concrete results. These are not isolated incidents. They reflect a business model based on acquiring acreage cheaply, holding it, and then flipping it once a profitable opportunity arises.
Liberia, a frontier basin with substantial geological risk, cannot support such operators.
Even more concerning are the fiscal terms of the proposed PSCs. The signature bonus, advertised as US$3.75 million per block, conceals a much weaker reality. The contract mandates Oranto to pay only US$1.25 million per block within 120 days of ratification, with the remaining US$10 million loosely linked to seismic milestones that experts say might not be achieved for years. Without a fixed timeline, the company can postpone payments indefinitely, extending obligations into future political cycles and weakening Liberia's negotiating leverage. This setup reflects the same tactics that have allowed Oranto to obtain block extensions in other African regions without performing significant work.
The Senate hearing aimed to clarify these concerns but instead made them worse. Government witnesses arrived without key documents, including complete and properly signed PSCs. Some lawmakers didn't even get copies with President Joseph Boakai's signature. Worryingly, senior officials couldn't confirm basic facts, like where Oranto's Liberian office is or if the company has paid its taxes here. Senator Abraham Darius Dillon asked a simple question, "Where is Oranto based in Liberia?" but the answer was vague and inconsistent. The fact that such basic details weren't checked before these agreements were sent to the Senate is very troubling.
The lack of due diligence was further revealed when witnesses could not produce documentation on Oranto's operational history elsewhere or verify the length of TotalEnergies' involvement in other regions. Senator Edwin Snowe, chairing the committee, voiced frustration that government officials were examining "massive petroleum agreements" without presenting the original signed documents.
Against this backdrop, Senator Amara Konneh's written memorandum stands out as one of the most significant contributions to Liberia's petroleum policy discussion in recent years. He questioned the rationale for accepting a signing bonus of only US$300,000 per block, when countries like Ghana, operating in deepwater environments, demand up to US$20 million. Konneh pointed out that Liberia's fiscal terms are not only uncompetitive but also reflect a lack of imagination, ambition, and proper governance. He further argued that these PSCs undermine the very concept of national development by settling for returns insufficient even to build a modern hospital in the counties adjacent to these oil blocks.
Konneh also pointed out a painful irony: Liberia spent millions starting in 2011 to train petroleum engineers, lawyers, economists, and geoscientists to negotiate complex oil deals. Yet those experts were nowhere to be seen during the negotiation of the Oranto and TotalEnergies agreements. The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee did not provide evidence that these trained Liberians were involved or even consulted. There is no database of their skills, no formal system for using their expertise, and no explanation for why the government bypassed the very people it had invested in to avoid mistakes like these.
When a deal excludes national expertise, lacks clear fiscal benchmarks, fails the due diligence process, and invites operators with a history of nonperformance, the only responsible action is rejection.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
Article 34 of the Liberian Constitution requires the Legislature to approve concessions only when they serve the national interest. This authority cannot be exercised recklessly or delegated to inadequately prepared negotiators. The PSCs currently under review do not meet that constitutional standard. The process has been flawed, the terms are weak, the operator lacks credibility, and the risks to Liberia's future are too significant.
The Senate must not ratify these contracts. It should send them back to the Executive--firmly, unequivocally, and without recommendation for amendment. Liberia needs to reopen bidding with stricter prequalification requirements, clear financial guarantees, and full involvement of its trained petroleum specialists. The revival of the oil sector will not happen by lowering standards or engaging companies known for inactivity. It will come from insisting on partners who drill, invest, and produce.
Liberia has waited too long for a transparent, credible, and transformative hydrocarbons sector. Accepting these contracts risks repeating past mistakes. Rejecting them is the first step toward a future rooted in integrity, expertise, and national ambition.
The Senate must reject the Oranto PSCs--not as political theater, but as an act of national responsibility.
