- Liberia's billion-dollar infrastructure deal with Ivanhoe Atlantic faces increased scrutiny as detailed evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shows a company that repeatedly gained advantages through alleged forgery, irregular licensing decisions, politically connected middlemen, and secret government interventions. The revelations, thoroughly outlined in a 2022 Sentry investigation, heighten domestic concerns that Liberia may have entered a long-term agreement without fully understanding the risks posed by a multinational whose African expansion has been marred by controversy.
The Boakai administration's decision to sign the 25-year Concession and Access Agreement (CAA) in near secrecy, late on a Sunday night, without public notice or press access, immediately unsettled civil-society groups. That unease has since grown into deeper concern as Liberians learn how Ivanhoe built its dominance in the DRC. The leading question in Monrovia is no longer just about transparency or timing. It is about whether Liberia can trust a company whose operating plan in the DRC, according to investigators, repeatedly involved actions that broke legal norms and exploited weak institutions.
The Sentry report describes a intense territorial conflict between Ivanhoe's predecessor, African Minerals, and Anglo American's subsidiary, Anmercosa. It was a fight that lasted nearly ten years and uncovered ongoing irregularities. In 2007, the Congolese government's interministerial Mining and Quarry Rights Validation Committee made a shocking public claim, stating that Ivanhoe had "resort[ed] to forgery and fraud in an attempt to defend illegitimate claims to the disputed land."
The committee found that government officials had repeatedly acted in Ivanhoe's favor, at times improperly, even when available evidence supported Anmercosa. One finding noted that after Congo's Ministry of Mines approved Anmercosa's contract, the company later discovered that "two zones claimed by African Minerals had mysteriously been cut out of the text," a development the committee could not credibly explain.
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When the DRC's new Mining Cadaster began operations in 2003, both Ivanhoe and Anmercosa applied for overlapping mineral rights. The Cadaster again sided with Ivanhoe, but the Validation Committee later determined that the agency had acted without legal authority. According to the report, cadastral officials "had improperly adjudicated the dispute themselves rather than referring it to the Validation Committee" and had justified their decision using "the wrong date on a form," even though evidence clearly showed Anmercosa filed first.
This pattern of irregular state actions benefiting a single foreign investor is one that Liberian pundits now view with increasing concern.
Another element of Ivanhoe's DRC playbook involved politically exposed intermediaries. The Sentry report highlights the role of Jean-Claude Mahuku, a well-connected businessman with ties to Zoe Kabila, the brother of then-President Joseph Kabila. Ivanhoe insisted there was no connection between its dealings and political influence, dismissing criticism as "contrived innuendo."
However, investigators found that Mahuku later held a sizable 31 percent stake in a company providing blasting, tunneling, and construction services at Ivanhoe's Kakula site. The Sentry notes that "as of November 2019 at the latest, Mahuku held a 31% stake in Jimond Mining Management Company SARL... performing blasting, tunnelling, and construction" at Ivanhoe's most important Congolese operation.
For Liberians wary of patronage networks and political privilege shaping major concessions, this finding rings uncomfortably familiar.
One of the most revealing episodes in the DRC involved the restructuring of the government's stake in Ivanhoe's Kamoa copper project. Ivanhoe initially announced it would sell the government an additional 15 percent stake at commercial rates. In later communications, however, the company dropped any reference to a sale and instead described the deal as a "transfer." The Sentry report described the shift as suspicious, observing that "it is unclear why the intended commercial sale of a company asset morphed into its transfer for a nominal amount."
Ivanhoe's own 2016 annual report acknowledged that the stake had been turned over "for a nominal cash payment and other guarantees," a far cry from the competitive, market-rate transaction initially promised.
In return, the Congolese government pledged not to challenge Ivanhoe's mining titles, guaranteeing what the company described as the "peaceful enjoyment" of its rights.
To Liberia's growing chorus of civil-society critics, these episodes form a coherent pattern. The company has repeatedly thrived in environments where public oversight is weak, legal protections are malleable, and political connections can smooth out obstacles. Liberia, whose concession history has been marked by renegotiations, overpromising, environmental damage, and institutional fragility, may present the kind of environment in which Ivanhoe has historically excelled.
This is the context in which Liberia's CAA was signed. The agreement grants Ivanhoe Atlantic long-term access to the country's most strategic infrastructure assets, the rail line from Yekepa to Buchanan and the deep-water port itself, under terms that remain largely unseen by the public. Government sources have not released the full financial model, benefit-sharing framework, or environmental and social baseline data. Yet these omissions are precisely the areas in which Ivanhoe's past conduct in the DRC raises the most serious red flags. The Congolese case illustrates what can happen when a company secures early advantages: governments can find themselves locked into terms they later cannot contest, constrained by agreements they did not fully negotiate in the public interest.
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Economic advisers privately concede that Liberia may have underestimated its leverage in the negotiation. Several emphasize that, just as in the DRC, Ivanhoe's priority is securing logistical pathways for ore, in this case Guinean ore, rather than advancing Liberia's own industrialization or mining output. A senior environmental expert noted that Liberia's regulatory institutions lack the capacity to enforce complex environmental safeguards on a project of this scale, adding that "if Ivanhoe operated the way it did in Congo, Liberia is not ready."
The United States has openly promoted the deal as part of a broader strategy to enhance American commercial influence in African critical mineral corridors. Diplomats familiar with the negotiations say Liberia was encouraged to act quickly so the agreement could be highlighted at the U.S.-Africa summit. That timing created conditions under which a detailed review was unlikely.
In the DRC, Ivanhoe's rise was aided by weak institutional oversight, political patronage networks, and legal irregularities. Liberia's institutional weaknesses, including incomplete contract transparency and limited regulatory capacity, create an environment where similar patterns could develop. The quiet signing process, the lack of a detailed public briefing, and heavy external involvement all heighten fears that Liberia has entered the early stages of a long-term arrangement it does not fully control.
