The respected Brussels-based think tank, the International Crisis Group, has identified three conflicts in Africa as among the 10 world-wide which – following a violence-wracked 2025 – are expected to continue and which should receive most attention in 2026. The ICG's list of "conflicts to watch" include those affecting Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea and Mali and Burkina Faso. The following is the group's analysis of the conflict which plagues Sudan. (Read the ICG's over-arching commentary on the 10 conflicts here: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2026 )
Gruesome footage from Darfur, where the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) went on a killing spree after seizing the town of El Fasher in late October, should spur greater efforts to end a war that remains largely ignored. Thus far, though, President Trump's pledge in November to personally help end the war has yielded nothing.
Sudan's latest civil war erupted in April 2023, triggered by a struggle within the junta that took power after dictator Omar al-Bashir fell four years earlier. It pits the Sudanese army, together with an array of Islamist militias and former rebels, against the RSF, which is allied with other ex-insurgents and backed by foreign mercenaries. In the Bashir regime's waning days, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo, grew into a paramilitary force that could rival the army, enriched by trafficking gold and battling the Houthis in Yemen.
Today's fighting, which started in the capital Khartoum and soon engulfed other parts of the country, has created the world's worst humanitarian calamity. Millions of people have been displaced, and millions more need life-saving aid. The UN has reported pockets of famine throughout the country, especially in territory held or besieged by the RSF, as both sides block aid delivery. The UN has also documented widespread sexual violence, especially against women and girls.
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Momentum has swung back and forth. Early on, the RSF grabbed most of Khartoum, advanced into Sudan's riverine heartland and looked as though it might march on Port Sudan, the army's de facto headquarters. Emirati backing was pivotal. While the United Arab Emirates denies its involvement, extensive reporting has documented arms flows from the Gulf country to Sudan's battlefields. Abu Dhabi is close to Hemedti and suspicious of the army's ties to Bashir-era Islamists. It seems to believe that backing the RSF will strengthen its foothold in Africa.
Despite this support, the tide turned in late 2024. Egypt and Türkiye, frustrated by Emirati meddling, and Iran, looking to shore up its influence, upped arms sales to the military, which, as Sudan's internationally recognised government, could also purchase weapons on the open market. Saudi Arabia, which had mostly stayed neutral, lent the army stronger backing. An army offensive recaptured Khartoum in March 2025 and pushed the RSF back west of the Nile into Darfur and the Kordofan region.
Any hope that battlefield shifts might yield calm faded fast. The RSF doubled down, with the UAE seemingly pouring in heavier weapons. Long-range RSF drones struck as far east as Port Sudan. The RSF, joined by civilian politicians, set up a parallel government in Nyala, in Darfur's south. While they aspire to be a rival to the army-appointed administration, most of the RSF-backed officials are in exile and have little authority.
In October, the RSF overran El Fasher, the army's last redoubt in western Sudan. This operation deepened Sudan's de facto partition, with Darfur and much of Kordofan in the west held by the RSF and the center and east controlled by the army. Many Sudanese have suffered during the war, with the army shelling civilian areas and both sides engaging in ethnic cleansing, including mass killings, especially when towns change hands. In El Fasher, RSF fighters slaughtered civilians, often filming themselves doing so. Satellite images appeared to show pools of blood visible from space.
The El Fasher atrocities ought to galvanise outside powers that thus far have given the war too little attention. During a White House visit in November, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked Trump to help resolve the conflict. Trump envoy Massad Boulos (who is also the father-in-law of Trump's daughter Tiffany) had already spent the summer negotiating a truce in conjunction with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
But those efforts are now stuck, as fighting rages in Kordofan and the army continues to reject the ceasefire proposal. The idea of talks faces fierce resistance within the army command and among its allies. Powerful Islamists from the Bashir regime and former Darfuri rebels fear a truce will cement the RSF's grip on western Sudan. Hemedti is more amenable to negotiations but continues to escalate, even after officially accepting the ceasefire. Prickly Saudi-Emirati relations pose another obstacle: in early December, Emirati-backed forces in Yemen seized territory from Saudi-backed rivals, compounding friction between the two countries over Sudan.
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Trump is best positioned to halt the war. If he can get Abu Dhabi to stop sending arms to the RSF during a truce, then Riyadh and other capitals would need to persuade the army to accept the U.S. proposal and limit supplies to their ally as well. Ideally, that would create space for permanent ceasefire arrangements and a process aimed at reunifying Sudan and establishing a new civilian-led transitional government. Sadly, it is difficult to imagine a lasting peace that does not offer a political role to the current belligerents – however unpalatable that may be for many Sudanese. It will be a tall order to piece Sudan back together after this devastating war, but a truce is the first step.
