The respected Brussels-based think tank, the International Crisis Group, has identified three conflicts in Africa as among the 10 world-wide which – following a violence-wracked 2025 – are expected to continue and which should receive most attention in 2026. The ICG's list of "conflicts to watch" include those affecting Sudan, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The following is the group's analysis of the situations in Mali and Burkina Faso. (Read the ICG's over-arching commentary on the 10 conflicts here: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2026 )
Since September, jihadists have imposed a partial blockade on Mali's capital , Bamako, heralding a new phase in the Sahel's broader war. Militants probably want to consolidate their hold on rural areas and squeeze the country's military authorities rather than seize the city. But in both Mali and neighbouring Burkina Faso, the risk of regime collapse and further chaos is growing.
Some fourteen years ago, militants linked to al Qaeda, together with mostly Tuareg separatists, overran cities in the north before the jihadists sidelined their erstwhile Tuareg allies. French and African forces stopped the militants' march south. But since then, fighting pitting the army and its foreign backers against jihadists has torn up the countryside in central and northern Mali as well as in much of Burkina Faso. The most powerful militant group today is an al-Qaeda affiliate called Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), headed by former Tuareg rebel Iyad Ag Ghali, though a small Islamic State branch is active in the region, too.
Follow us on WhatsApp | LinkedIn for the latest headlines
The war has also upended Sahelian politics. Popular discontent with civilian leaders and French-led foreign forces' failure to contain militants helped fuel coups in all three central Sahel countries between 2020 and 2023. New military regimes have severed ties with the Economic Community of West African States regional bloc and with most Western partners. Their anti-French discourse and calls for state sovereignty have resonated, especially among young people still furious at overthrown elites. Burkinabé leader Ibrahim Traoré has become something of an anti-imperialist folk hero for young people throughout Africa.
Like their ousted predecessors, though, military leaders have utterly failed to beat back insurgents. Today, they partner with Russian forces – former Wagner Group paramilitaries rebranded as the Africa Corps – not France or other European governments. But their offensives, shorn of any effort to win over locals, have replicated earlier governments' mistakes but with even greater harm to civilians.
In Mali, insurgent fighters have made striking gains over the past two years. Assaults on key infrastructure, army bases and checkpoints have killed dozens of troops. The army tried to restrict access to fuel in the central and western countryside to handicap the jihadists. Militants, in turn, escalated their attacks on supply lines, disrupting routes to Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, whose ports handle the vast majority of landlocked Mali's trade.
Then, in early September, militants turned up pressure on Bamako, disrupting fuel supplies while imposing gender segregation on travellers and veiling on women going to and from the capital. Kidnapping has long generated revenue for Sahel militants, but an estimated $50 million ransom allegedly paid for two abducted Emiratis has left JNIM especially flush.
In response, the Malian army and Russian forces have tried to protect main highways. Military escorts accompany long fuel truck convoys, while air and ground offensives hit militant positions. By late November, several convoys were making it through under military protection, which reduced queues at gas pumps and slightly improved the electricity supply, particularly in Bamako.
JNIM's goals are likely twofold. First, it wants Malian forces bogged down in cities and along major roads so it can extend its rural ties. It particularly wants to make inroads among southerners, who are mostly from the Mandé-speaking majority rather than the Tuareg, Arab or Fulani minorities who currently fill most of JNIM's ranks. Secondly, it hopes that pressure could topple the authorities. Jihadists show little appetite for a fight over the capital itself. But if discontent at the authorities evolves into protests, then the instability would weaken Bamako and perhaps even yield a new government that is less hostile and more willing to recognise JNIM's influence.
After four years in power, the Malian authorities are under increasing strain. Having already shrunk the country's civic space, they constricted it further in 2025, dissolving political parties, arresting two former premiers and forcing numerous activists into exile. An alleged coup attempt in August, followed by purges, suggest friction within the military. The authorities' initial hope that minerals, including gold and lithium, could refill state coffers is fading. For all their promises, they have done little to ease the difficulties that many younger Malians feel.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
As Mali's south and west become new battlegrounds, fighting continues in northern Mali and across much of Burkina Faso. The Burkinabé authorities' decision to arm thousands of civilians, often putting them on the front line against jihadists, has raised the death toll. In 2024, before JNIM appeared to bring in fighters from Burkina Faso to reinforce cadres in Mali, the group laid siege to some 40 towns and villages. Now, it is threatening to cut off supply routes to Ouagadougou, where Burkina Faso's military regime is arguably even more susceptible than Mali's to another coup.
Absent drastic change, things look bleak. In Mali, military leaders should consult a wider array of social and political forces about the country's future. The fuel crisis highlights Mali's dependence on cordial relations with its West African neighbors and the importance of repairing ties. The authorities need to contemplate dialogue with insurgents, too. It is an uncertain course. Jihadists have used ceasefires in the past to consolidate their control of captured regions, and negotiations would require painful compromises from the government. But few other options remain. The window for diplomacy is narrowing, but it is not yet closed.
