West Africa: Sahel - Ecowas Anti Terrorism Brigade

analysis

According to ECOWAS figures, more than 450 attacks were recorded in West Africa in 2025. They caused nearly 1,900 deaths, in addition to the dramatic displacement of populations. Meeting in Abuja on December 15, 2025, for their 68th Summit, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government decided to put an end to the attacks by JNIM, ISGS, and Boko Haram and its splinter group, Lakurawa.

To that end, they decided to establish a brigade of 1,650 soldiers by the end of 2026.On the spot, they allocated US$2.85 million to each of the five coastal member states most affected by terrorism: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.

The ECOWAS region and its neighbors in the Economic Community of South Africa (ECSA) are enduring terrorist attacks and armed violence, resulting in deaths, population displacements, disruption of local economies, and weakening of political stability. This security tension is particularly noticeable in Mali, which has been subject to a partial fuel embargo imposed by JNIM since early September 2025. That fuel shortage is disrupting populations' daily lives, paralyzing activities, and causing famine, further inflaming the country's social and political climate. It is also exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, as aid workers are also hampered by the fuel shortage. Movement restrictions, robberies, and illegal checkpoints have led to the suspension of some relief operations.

A regional brigade

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To halt this deteriorating situation, ECOWAS announced, at the opening of its 68th Summit, the creation of a 1,650-strong counter-terrorism brigade by the end of 2026. That future structure will benefit from integrated intelligence systems and coordinated border operations. ECOWAS emphasizes the link between security, governance, education, employment, and community resilience. That combination is expected to be effective in addressing the root causes of extremism. This regional brigade will also be tasked with preventing unconstitutional changes of power. ECOWAS still vividly remembers the coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau on November 26, 2025, as well as the failed coup attempt in Benin on December 7, 2025. Finally, it will have to counter any destabilizing forces within the sub-region. It will complement existing mechanisms such as the multinational forces deployed in certain sensitive areas, while ensuring better coordination between the various stakeholders. It will also be designed to intervene rapidly throughout the sub-region and to strengthen collective security.

There are precedents

The Accra Initiative, created in 2027, had already gained momentum with Operations Koudanlgou I, II, III, and IV, which took place between 2018 and 2021. Koudanlgou IV, conducted from November 21 to 27, 2021, was carried out jointly by 5,728 members of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) of Burkina Faso (2,050 soldiers), Ghana (1,851), Côte d'Ivoire (800), and Togo (969). Significant resources were deployed: 881 vehicles and six aircrafts. The results: more than 300 suspects apprehended, including several already wanted by the police; 53 firearms and ammunition, explosives, dynamite used to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs), narcotics, drug fields, defused IEDs, and, finally, foiled ambushes. During the third operation, 700 people were arrested and weapons seized.

The Accra Initiative's budget was $550 million, or 275 billion CFA francs, for a contingent of 10,000 soldiers. It was supposed to expand in November 2023. However, the reluctance of the three states that would create the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023 hampered this expansion. ECOWAS resumed its work in August 2025, announcing the establishment of:

- A 260,000-strong rapid-deployment counterterrorism brigade to strengthen the fight against terrorism in the sub-region. This project requires annual funding of $2.5 billion. It can be considered that this initiative led to the announcement of the creation of a 1,650-strong counterterrorism brigade, with more modest ambitions. ECOWAS explained at the time that this brigade would complement the African Union Standby Force, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The organization emphasized that the Sahel had become the epicenter of global terrorism, accounting for 51% of terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024.

Resource Mobilization and the Challenge of Cooperation with the ESA.

In July 2024, ECOWAS estimated it would need $ 481,000 to mobilize 1,500 soldiers. That gives an idea of the cost of the future brigade. How will it be financed, given these enormous figures? On this subject, the Nigerian Minister of Finance stated in 2024 that these figures underscore the gravity of the task. He believes it is imperative to critically examine all options, taking into account the current challenges facing the sub-region and the financial concerns of member states. He suggested that each state could contribute in proportion to its resources. Equally monumental is cooperation with the ESA. As the epicenter of terrorism and a transit point for various illicit trafficking activities, the ESA is inevitably affected by this future brigade, although not an integral part of it. The Conference therefore instructed the ECOWAS Commission to maintain and intensify its cooperation efforts with these three countries. The problem is that the future brigade will be fighting against unconstitutional changes. These countries are, in fact, governed by regimes that came to power through military coups. There is a significant risk that they will reignite the same mistrust that was evident between November 2022 and 2023, which crippled the Accra Initiative. Indeed, ECOWAS is based on a principle of functional interdependence.

This cooperation will run up against a psychological, ideological, and political barrier. And yet, the strategic partner of the Economic and Social Affairs Group (ESA), Russia, and the United States are urging both organizations to overcome these kinds of differences in order to combat the real tragedy unfolding in the region. During discussions at the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, held in Cairo, Egypt, from December 19-20, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Ali al-Turay. Lavrov was reportedly direct: faced with armed attacks, the movement of terrorist groups, and border instability, a minimum level of dialogue between the ESA and ECOWAS is essential. In his view, priority must be given to pragmatic exchanges focused on concrete responses to terrorist threats. Lavrov emphasized the need to identify joint actions to counter insecurity in the Sahel, setting aside institutional considerations, which he deemed secondary given the urgent security situation. Despite the separation between the ESA and ECOWAS, the geographical and security realities remain. Terrorist groups operate across borders, making any strictly national or bloc-based response unrealistic. Almost simultaneously, the United States urged the Sahel states and their West African coastal neighbors to set aside their differences and seek a coordinated response to terrorism. Furthermore, in their view, this response must respect the rule of law and human rights. It will also involve military cooperation and intelligence sharing. These recommendations were communicated by their ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, on December 23, 2025, three days after Russia's appeal. Previously, on August 7, the acting U.S. representative to the United Nations, Dorothy Shea, issued the same appeal. She commended the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) for its mediation efforts between the parties, particularly on the economic, political, and security issues that divide the region. In August 2025, Russia's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Dmitry Chumakov, called for global support for the Economic and Social Affairs Corporation (ESAC) to combat terrorism more effectively. Four months later, his Malian counterpart, Issa Konfourou, echoed this call for a genuine renewal of regional and international cooperation in this fight.

Will the creation of the ECOWAS regional brigade bring it closer to the ESAC? It won't be easy. The failed coup attempt in Benin revealed the depth of the rifts between the two sides, who clashed violently on social media.

[1] Koudanlgou signifie « amitié », en goulmacema, langue de populations éponymes vivant dans trois pays voisins : Bénin, Burkina Faso et Niger.

[1] Lutte contre le terrorisme : une force multinationale de l'initiative d'Accra de 10 000 hommes en soutien au Burkina Faso - Toutes les actualités d'Afrique

[1] Afrique de l'Ouest: CEDEAO - 2,6 milliards de dollars par an pour établir la force antiterroriste - allAfrica.comLutte contre le terrorisme : une force multinationale de l'initiative d'Accra de 10 000 hommes en soutien au Burkina Faso - Toutes les actualités d'Afrique

[1] Afriquinfos Éditeur 23 décembre 2025 Afrique de l'ouest : Appel pressant des USA aux côtiers et sahéliens pour faire face au djihadisme

[1]Sahel-CEDEAO : 8 août 2025 Malijet - Sahel-CEDEAO : Les USA prônent un front commun pour la paix

[1] Par Nicolas Beau - 15 décembre 2025 La lutte fratricide entre les États du Sahel et l'Afrique de l'Ouest - Mondafrique.

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