As the risk of jihadist influence grows in southeastern Senegal, the digital dimension must be integrated into terrorism prevention strategies.
On 9 December 2025, Senegal's gendarmerie arrested a Malian man in the Tambacounda region bordering Mali for glorifying terrorism. A forensic analysis of his digital activity revealed that he was administering a WhatsApp group used to disseminate narratives justifying violent extremist actions in the Sahel.
A month earlier, investigators uncovered a network of seven WhatsApp groups sharing jihadist content, including videos glorifying attacks across the Sahel. A Malian who played a central role in circulating this material was subsequently arrested.
These cases suggest a pattern that has been gradually emerging in Senegal for years. In 2021, four people - including a Senegalese national - were arrested in Kidira near the Malian border for promoting extremist ideologies and having digital ties with Katiba Macina, a faction of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
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These incidents don't point to active operational cells in Senegal, but they highlight the growing penetration of jihadist propaganda, particularly in the country's southeastern regions bordering Mali. Unaddressed, this trend could contribute to the emergence of local support networks for violent extremist groups.
For over a decade, concerns about dormant terrorist cells in Senegal have surfaced. In 2013, then foreign minister Mankeur Ndiaye acknowledged their existence. Judicial proceedings in 2018 revealed plans to establish links with Boko Haram and potentially form local networks.
A 2021 United Nations (UN) Security Council report noted that JNIM elements - including Katiba Macina, supported by radical Islamist influencers - had extended their reach into parts of northeastern, eastern and central Senegal.
Extremists' use of digital tools is well established. From the early 2000s, groups like al-Qaeda relied on websites and online forums to disseminate propaganda. Since the 2010s, the strategy has shifted to social media and encrypted messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram. These are used to distribute content, identify receptive audiences and maintain discreet communication with sympathisers.
Digital platforms are now key vectors for adapting narratives to local contexts, identifying recruits and running decentralised support networks.
JNIM's media strategy follows this approach. Through its media outlet al-Zallaqa, the group uses encrypted platforms to circulate claims of attacks, videos and calls to jihad, bypassing traditional monitoring mechanisms.
This strategy is effective in the Sahel, where using local languages has strengthened the group's influence and, in some cases, facilitated community acceptance. By positioning itself as a unifying alliance and professionalising its media output, JNIM has expanded its social base, diversified recruitment and consolidated a multi-ethnic network.
In Senegal, there is no current evidence of large-scale recruitment. Rather, the trend points towards early-stage efforts to disseminate ideology and establish connections that could evolve into more structured forms of adherence.
In response, Senegal has adopted a multidimensional approach combining prevention, community engagement and enhanced intelligence.
Efforts to structure and monitor the schooling environment through modernising Quranic education and expanding awareness programmes have been key. These initiatives rely partly on the involvement of Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tijaniyya, Mouridiyya and Qadiriyya, whose social influence is central to promoting cohesion and countering these narratives through religious guidance.
At the same time, Senegal is strengthening its cyber and intelligence capabilities. The National Cybersecurity Strategy (2022) centralises cyber monitoring, protects critical infrastructure and fosters cooperation with the private sector and international partners to detect and respond to harmful online content. These efforts are complemented by the Interministerial Intervention and Coordination Framework for Counter-Terrorism Operations, which enhances coordination across government agencies.
Operational measures have also been reinforced. Rapid Action Groups for Surveillance and Intervention, deployed since 2022 along eastern border areas such as Kidira and Saraya, address terrorism and cross-border crime. Joint patrols with Mali and Mauritania support border security and limit the infiltration of armed groups.
International partnerships are vital to these efforts. Capacity building conducted with organisations such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has strengthened national expertise in cybersecurity and cybercrime prevention. In 2025, Senegal's National Agency for Information Systems Security and its Ivorian counterpart cooperated on exchanging automated detection tools and cross-border alert mechanisms.
But while these security measures may prevent the infiltration of groups, the risk of jihadist influence persists in eastern Senegal. Continuing structural vulnerabilities suggest that non-security responses must be improved.
Mali's porous border facilitates the movement of people, goods and ideas. The comparatively weaker influence of Sufi brotherhoods in border areas also limits religious and social prevention efforts. Socioeconomic conditions exacerbate these risks. The southeastern region's economy - largely based on agriculture, livestock, artisanal gold mining and cross-border trade - offers limited opportunities for a young population facing high unemployment.
Taken together, economic precarity, perceived marginalisation and porous borders could facilitate the expansion of criminal networks and jihadist influence.
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A territorially targeted approach is needed that better integrates the digital dimension into prevention strategies. This includes mobilising local actors - traditional authorities, community leaders, educators and civil society organisations - to promote awareness and develop counter-narratives tailored to local contexts. Digital platforms can amplify these efforts, reaching younger audiences and the wider community.
Such an integrated approach must build on existing frameworks, including the Interministerial Intervention and Coordination Framework for Counter-Terrorism Operations. Coordination of government agencies should span security, education, employment, digital policy and religious affairs.
Digital radicalisation is not a marginal phenomenon, but an early indicator of an evolving threat. Signs in Senegal should be treated as a warning. Addressing them early and in a coordinated manner could prevent them from becoming entrenched security problems.
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Maryam Sow, Junior Research Fellow, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
