An unusual alliance between armed groups in Mali could embolden others in neighboring countries and put Russia's foothold in the region at risk.
Ebenezer Obadare is Douglas Dillon senior fellow for Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Nathan Schoonover is a research associate at CFR.
Thousands of armed fighters belonging to the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ethnic Tuareg separatists under the umbrella of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks on multiple cities in Mali on Saturday, April 25. They targeted Bamako, the capital, as well as Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Sevare--all sites of major military bases in the northern and central regions of the beleaguered country. If the military government of Assimi Goïta has gotten used to sporadic attacks by JNIM militants--who have effectively imposed a fuel blockade on Bamako for the better part of a year--it seems to have been caught off guard by the alliance between JNIM and FLA, and by their rare decision to target several cities simultaneously.
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From the standpoint of the emergency allies, the attacks were a success, as they managed to kill Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara at his residence in Kati, a garrison town eleven miles from Bamako. Furthermore, reports suggest the armed groups have taken control of several cities, including the northern town of Kidal, where they secured the withdrawal of Russian Africa Corps mercenaries following the reported intervention of Algeria, Mali's northern neighbor. The Russian Defense Ministry has since confirmed the withdrawal.
A rise in violence and attacks
Mali has not been at peace since then-Colonel Assimi Goïta led the self-described National Committee for the Salvation of the People in ousting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in August 2020. Goïta further consolidated his hold on power in May the following year after forcing out interim President Bah Ndaw. The country has admittedly had a checkered political history since gaining independence from France in 1960, with brief periods of civilian rule more or less an exception since the first successful military intervention in 1968. But recently, Mali has been buffeted by two conjoined headwinds.
First, the country has faced attacks by JNIM jihadists who, since the group's establishment in 2017, have sought to overthrow the Malian government and replace it with an Islamist state under the auspices of Sharia law. Second, Tuareg separatists, united since November 2024 under the flag of the FLA, have led further incursions.
While FLA primarily seeks autonomy for the northern Azawad region, which first unilaterally declared independence from Mali back in 2012, it is instructive that some factions of the group also favor an Islamic state governed (moderately, they say) by Sharia law. The JNIM-FLA alliance means that more personnel and resources are being wielded against a central state, which is increasingly spread thin across a vast land mass (the country is nearly twice the size of Texas), and whose collaboration with Russia has so far failed to produce the anticipated military benefits.
Mali as a keystone of the region
Mali is an increasingly important theater of great power competition in the Sahel and Africa more broadly. Since expelling the last of French troops in August 2022, the Malian junta has pulled closer to Russia, whose Africa Corps (the successor to private military company Wagner Group) has an estimated 1,500 to 2,500 personnel deployed across the country. Apart from being a geopolitical bridge between North and sub-Saharan Africa (Mali shares borders with seven other North and West African countries), the country boasts a wealth of natural resources, including bauxite, gold, iron ore, lithium, manganese, phosphate, and uranium. This year, Mali is projected to be Africa's second-largest lithium producer.
Mali is also one of several Sahelian states that have come under repeated attacks by various jihadist groups that have been active across the region for some time now. Such groups watching the latest developments from Mali will likely be emboldened in their ambition to destabilize other states, especially in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria. According to the 2026 Global Terrorism Index [PDF], the Sahel region, which currently accounts for "one in five attacks from militant groups around the world and 51 percent of deaths," is "the global epicenter of terrorism."
In the wake of these attacks, the continued coordination by jihadist and separatist forces could threaten the status of Mali as one of the three military-led states that exited the Economic Community of West African States in September 2023 to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Niger and Burkina Faso have teamed up with the Malian armed forces to carry out air strikes against jihadist targets on Malian territory since the April attacks.
A clouded picture of public opinions
While the government has sought to reassure the public that the situation is "under control," there is still a lot of uncertainty about what happens next. Significantly, the fact that Mali is under the thumb of a military government that has shown no inhibitions in cracking down on civil society makes any assessment of the current public mood practically impossible.
Since taking power, Goïta has moved to dissolve political parties and suspend civil society and media organizations, while human rights groups have credibly accused the government of human rights abuses. Following the attacks, the junta appears to be intensifying its clampdown on civil society. For example, prominent lawyer and critic of the military government, Mountaga Tall, was abducted from his home in Bamako on the night of May 2.
In Niamey, the capital of neighboring Niger, demonstrators shouting slogans such as "down with the imperialists," "down with the terrorists and their sponsors," and "long live the AES" have organized rallies ostensibly "in solidarity with the Malian people."
Mali's relationship with Russia under strain
Russia has been scrambling to repair its image following its humiliation in Kidal, where it was outmatched by the JNIM-FLA fighters even though it reportedly had warning of the coalition's movements. In the days following the attacks, Russian state-owned media agency Sputnik has sought to put the blame on Ukraine and its Western allies, accusing them, with little evidence, of "practicing state terrorism by proxy."
All told, Moscow's operations in Mali and across the Sahel have not gone as planned--the killing of Defense Minister Camara, a trusted ally in the administration, is a huge blow--and it remains to be seen whether the military government will continue to invest in a partnership that has brought it slender gains and much acrimony. For its part, Moscow will have a decision to make if its military assistance continues to be largely ineffective. Given Mali's location and resources, it would not be a surprise if the Kremlin decided to tough it out.
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The future of U.S. ties, regionwide
Under the Trump administration, the United States has sought to close ranks with the Malian junta. In February, the White House lifted sanctions previously imposed on senior Malian government officials accused of having "ties with Russian mercenaries" and has been working on a deal "that will allow Washington to resume flying aircraft and drones over the West African country's airspace to gather intelligence on jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda."
The recent attacks give credence to the administration's concerns captured in the National Security Strategy [PDF] about "resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa." Insofar as the attacks demonstrate the scale and seriousness of the jihadist threat across the Sahel, the situation in Mali in particular also highlights the potential difficulties in doing business with an unstable regime with questionable political legitimacy.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
