Guinea's response to the growing threat must consider domestic risk factors, not just the threat from neighbouring Mali.
Guinea has so far been spared attacks by violent extremist groups, but the risk of terrorism spilling over from neighbouring Mali is now on the rise. The March indictment of 11 suspected Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) members in Guinea's gold mining region bordering Mali shows the country's vulnerability to the instability affecting the central Sahel.
Attacks by militant groups in Mali near the Guinean border have become more frequent in the past two years, with strikes against a police checkpoint, customs outpost and Chinese-run mining sites near Guinea's border.
This year, the Yanfolila checkpoint in Mali, 50 km from the Guinea border, was targeted on 16 March. On 4 July, JNIM raided the Kéniéroba prison, where several suspected terrorists are reportedly held. And since early May, JNIM has been disrupting cargo convoys along the Bamako-Kourémalé transit route to Guinea.
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| Guinea and neighbouring countries |
Guinean authorities are taking the terrorist threat seriously. On 22 April, President Mamady Doumbouya established an interagency Special Operations Command centre to prevent and counter the spread of terrorism. This is part of a proactive strategy that began with the creation of the Special Forces Group in 2018 and expanded to include the Rapid Intervention Forces Group in 2021.
These important security initiatives assume the threat is an external phenomenon to be neutralised by force when it crosses borders into Guinea. This approach overlooks the country's inherent internal vulnerabilities, some of which require non-security interventions to prevent armed groups from gaining a foothold.
Three issues in northwestern Guinea deserve attention: ongoing intercommunal conflict, weak governance of artisanal mining and entrenched trafficking networks. Border insecurity exposes each of these vulnerabilities and could foster a breeding ground for extremist infiltration.
Along the poorly demarcated 858 km Guinea-Mali border, recurring communal tensions are fuelled by disputes over abundant gold resources. On 12 April, clashes erupted between gold miners from the Malian village of Danka and those from Sèkè Kolenda in Guinea's Siguiri prefecture following a dispute over a mining site. The confrontation resulted in the decapitation of a young Guinean hunter, triggering widespread unrest among local women.
Similar incidents have occurred in the past, and although not the primary mechanism for terrorists to establish a foothold, they serve as a catalyst for the spread of violent extremism. This dynamic mirrors the Institute for Security Studies' findings in other contexts across the region.
Another structural vulnerability is the Guinean state's weak regulatory control over artisanal and small-scale mining. Artisanal gold made up 69% of the country's total exports in 2025, totalling 49.6 tonnes, with much of it sourced from this border region. Many informal miners are drawn to the area, mostly from Burkina Faso and Mali.
Like in Burkina Faso near the borders with Benin, Niger and Côte d'Ivoire, this zone risks becoming a financial hub for violent extremists who exploit the illicit gold economy and intertwined smuggling channels.
Illicit arms trafficking and smuggling networks, which are highly prevalent in this border region, present a tangible security risk. Capitalising on porous borders, violent extremists could plug into these illegal economies to sustain their own logistics requirements, mirroring a pattern documented across the wider region.
Mali's supply crisis has also driven a surge in fuel smuggling. Since September 2025, JNIM has been obstructing traffic on vital trade routes linking Mali to Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, hoping to strangle Bamako economically by depriving the capital of critical commodities.
Due to persistent insecurity along the main Dakar-Bamako and Abidjan-Bamako axes, the Conakry-Bamako corridor is now being positioned by Malian authorities as an alternative supply route. This shift could lead JNIM to expand its activities along the Bamako-Kourémalé axis.
In light of these internal vulnerabilities, Guinea must re-evaluate how it perceives the threat. Responses must move beyond a purely military approach to prioritise the fragilities that could foster violent extremism. This requires first developing a comprehensive understanding of the scale of these risks.
A holistic national counter-terrorism strategy that integrates military operations with broader governance reforms is needed. Under the auspices of the new Special Operations Command, this strategy should, in the immediate term, fortify border security and scale up surveillance to neutralise dormant cells and block terrorist infiltration.
Enhancing cross-border security also requires revitalising military partnerships with Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Intelligence sharing and expanded joint patrols will be critical to cutting off illicit transborder trafficking networks.
A key challenge to regional security cooperation is the tension between the Economic Community of West African States and the Alliance of Sahel States. However, the Senegal River Basin Development Organization, which fosters economic development, could kickstart military cooperation between Guinea, Mali and Senegal.
Local communities need to play a proactive role in grassroots surveillance and information-sharing networks. Achieving that requires stronger civil-military cooperation that builds trust relations and involves locals in pre-empting the threat.
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In the longer term, these security measures should be complemented by efforts that target the structural conditions extremist groups exploit. An important starting point is the formalisation and oversight of artisanal mining. The ministries of mines, security and civil protection, and defence must jointly tighten regulation and monitoring to control financial flows and prevent these zones from becoming sources of terrorist revenue.
Given that these dynamics transcend borders, Guinea must work with Mali to harmonise informal mining regulation. Better oversight could both reduce opportunities for extremist financing and mitigate the intercommunal tensions driven by gold extraction.
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Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
Paulin Maurice Toupane, Senior Researcher, Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
Felix Fodé Bongono, Bosch Research Fellow, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
