Addis Abeba — The guns may not yet have returned to the scale seen during Ethiopia's devastating 2020-2022 war, but the warning signs are becoming impossible to ignore. Tigray is once again caught in a dangerous political and military confrontation, while the unresolved issues left behind by the Pretoria peace agreement continue to deepen.
Recent clashes and reports of military mobilisation in and around Tigray have revived fears of a return to full-scale war. The danger is not confined to Tigray. Ethiopia is already grappling with armed conflicts and political crises in several regions, while instability in Sudan, tensions with Eritrea, and growing competition over the Red Sea are creating a volatile regional environment.
Addis Ababa tourismDiscover morePolitical commentary forumnewsStream History Documentaries The central question is no longer whether Ethiopia can afford another war. It is whether its political leaders and international partners are willing to act before another conflict becomes unavoidable.
Unfinished peace, renewed political fault lines
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The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) of November 2022 was a historic achievement. It ended the most destructive phase of the war in Tigray and created an opportunity to address the political questions that had brought Ethiopia to the brink. But a cessation of hostilities was never the same thing as a political settlement.
The agreement required more than silence on the battlefield. It envisioned a process through which contested political and constitutional questions could be addressed, displaced people could return, institutions could be restored, and Ethiopia's political crisis could be managed through dialogue rather than force. Much of that process remains incomplete.
Read Political News The unresolved status of Western Tigray is perhaps the clearest example. Human Rights Watch reported in April 2026 that authorities and security forces in Western Tigray continued to subject Tigrayans to arbitrary detention, restrictions on movement and employment, and other abuses. The organisation also reported that more than 740,000 people displaced from Western Tigray remained unable to return safely.
This is not simply a humanitarian problem. It is a political and constitutional problem, and leaving it unresolved creates a permanent incentive for confrontation.
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A cessation of hostilities was never the same thing as a political settlement."
The crisis has also been aggravated by the breakdown of political trust between Addis Abeba and Tigray's political leadership. In May, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) announced the restoration of the pre-war regional government, including the reinstatement of its legislative council and Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president. The move directly challenged the post-Pretoria political arrangement and deepened the dispute over who should govern Tigray and under what authority. The federal government and Tigrayan leadership have presented competing interpretations of the peace agreement and the political order that should follow it.
This situation is precisely why the crisis cannot be solved by military pressure. When political disagreements are converted into questions of military strength, every concession becomes a defeat, every compromise becomes a threat, and every political dispute becomes a potential trigger for war. That is how peace processes collapse.
Addis Ababa tourism From ceasefire support to peace enforcement
The international community played a critical role in bringing the war in Tigray to an end. The African Union, with the support of regional and international partners, helped facilitate the Pretoria agreement. But the same level of urgency did not continue during implementation.
The European Union has recently warned that developments in Tigray could jeopardise the Pretoria agreement and called for immediate de-escalation and political dialogue. That warning is welcome. But statements alone will not prevent another war.
Read Political News International actors must move from crisis response to conflict prevention. They should establish a sustained mechanism involving the Ethiopian federal government, Tigray's political authorities, and other relevant stakeholders. The purpose should not be to reward one side or punish another. It should be to create a political process capable of addressing the disputes that military force cannot resolve. The international community should also insist on independent monitoring of human rights and civilian protection in contested areas, particularly Western Tigray. Accountability cannot remain an afterthought to peace.
Join Diaspora Networks A peace agreement without accountability creates incentives for future abuses. A peace agreement without implementation creates incentives for renewed war.
There is another uncomfortable question that international partners must confront: how should financial and diplomatic support to Ethiopia be conditioned?
Foreign assistance is intended to support development, humanitarian protection, and institutional stability. It should never become an indirect subsidy for policies that deepen conflict or undermine human rights.
This does not mean abandoning the Ethiopian population. Quite the opposite, humanitarian assistance should be protected and expanded where civilians need it most. But governments providing financial support to Ethiopia should also demand measurable progress on human rights, political dialogue, civilian protection, and implementation of peace commitments.
Supporting the Ethiopian people and holding the Ethiopian government accountable are not contradictory objectives. Indeed, they are inseparable.
From northern front to regional crisis
The consequences of renewed conflict would not stop at Tigray's borders. Ethiopia sits at the centre of an increasingly fragile Horn of Africa. Sudan's devastating civil war has already spilt across borders, while Eritrea-Ethiopia tensions remain deeply concerning. Ethiopia's pursuit of access to the Red Sea has added another layer of geopolitical tension.
Reports in 2026 have also alleged that Ethiopia has hosted facilities linked to Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including claims involving UAE support. The UAE has denied providing military assistance to the RSF through Ethiopia. More recently, satellite imagery and reporting have renewed scrutiny of alleged military activity connected to the RSF in western Ethiopia.
These allegations require independent investigation, not political speculation. But the broader point is clear: Ethiopia's internal conflicts can no longer be separated from the security dynamics of the wider Horn.
A new war in northern Ethiopia would therefore risk becoming part of a much larger regional crisis involving Sudan, Eritrea, the Red Sea and competing external powers. That is a danger Ethiopia's neighbours and the international community cannot afford to ignore.
The African Union also faces a difficult test. The AU's role in facilitating the Pretoria agreement demonstrated that African-led diplomacy can succeed when political will exists. But the organisation has struggled to maintain sufficient leverage during implementation.
Read Political News The answer cannot be to abandon the process. The AU should work with IGAD, the United Nations, the European Union and other partners to establish a stronger monitoring and political mechanism capable of engaging all relevant Ethiopian stakeholders.
Ethiopia's status as the host of the African Union makes this responsibility even more significant. A country hosting the continent's principal institution for peace and security should not become a place where continental peace mechanisms are weakened by political convenience.
The AU's credibility depends not only on its ability to negotiate peace agreements but also on its ability to help ensure that those agreements survive.
Beyond Ceasefire: From battlefield to dialogue
The fundamental mistake would be to believe that another ceasefire alone can solve the current crisis. A ceasefire is necessary. But it is not sufficient.
A ceasefire is necessary. But it is not sufficient."
Ethiopia needs a broader political process capable of addressing the root causes of conflict: constitutional disputes, contested territories, displacement, political exclusion, security arrangements, accountability, and the future relationship between the federal government and the regions. That may ultimately require a transitional political arrangement in which all relevant actors can participate.
Join Diaspora Networks Such a process should not be designed around the political survival of any individual leader or party. No Ethiopian political figure is indispensable. No party has a permanent entitlement to power. The standard should be constitutionalism, civilian protection, political pluralism, and respect for human rights.
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The choice should therefore not be framed as a struggle between the survival of the Prosperity Party and the survival of the TPLF. The choice is between political settlement and another cycle of war.
Ethiopia has already paid an unbearable price for political disputes settled through military force. The war in Tigray demonstrated what happens when political disagreements are militarised. The subsequent conflicts in Amhara and Oromia have demonstrated that the problem is not limited to one region. On the other hand, Sudan's war demonstrates how quickly domestic conflict can become a regional catastrophe.
There is still time to prevent history from repeating itself. But that requires political courage in Addis Abeba, restraint from all armed and political actors, and sustained international engagement.
The mediators of Pretoria should return to the table not to renegotiate yesterday's battlefield calculations but to address the political failures that followed the cessation of hostilities. The Ethiopian government and Tigray's political authorities must understand that neither side can achieve a durable solution through force. Furthermore, international partners must stop treating Ethiopia's stability as synonymous with the stability of its government.
A stable Ethiopia is not one in which violence is merely suppressed. It is one in which citizens can challenge their government without being treated as enemies, displaced people can return home safely, political disagreements can be resolved without armies, and constitutional questions can be settled through legitimate institutions.
The choice before Ethiopia is therefore stark. It can either allow the unfinished business of Pretoria to become the prelude to another war or use the remaining space for dialogue to build a political settlement that finally addresses the causes of conflict.
Addis Ababa tourism The first path leads back to the battlefield. The second offers Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa a chance to step away from it. AS
Editor's Note: Gebremichael Negash is a refugee who was displaced from Western Tigray and is now an active member of Tsilal (ፅላል), a civil society organization dedicated to the people of Western Tigray. He can be reached at wele63776@gmail.com
