Nigeria's 2027 general election campaign has entered a new and increasingly complicated information environment. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing not only how political messages are produced and distributed, but also how easily false information can be made to look authentic. As the campaigns gather momentum, the country is approaching an election in which voters may encounter fabricated videos, cloned voices, manipulated photographs, fake newspaper pages and even invented election results alongside genuine information.
Recently, expressing this concern, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) acknowledged that the misuse of AI in creating and spreading manipulated content is no longer a distant or theoretical danger. The National Commissioner and Chairman of the Information and Voter Education Committee, Mallam Mohammed Haruna, said AI and deepfakes threats extend beyond fabricated content, but they could also be deployed to produce highly targeted messages designed to feed conflicting narratives to different groups of voters. Haruna said "Generative AI has made it cheaper and considerably harder to detect manipulated audio, video and images,"
The warning could hardly have come at a more important moment. INEC's concerns were echoed at the eighth Bagauda Kaltho Media Lecture, where media stakeholders identified AI-generated fake election results, deepfake videos and manipulated audio as emerging threats to the 2027 elections. The stakeholders also noted that social media can spread false information faster than journalists and fact-checkers can verify it. The significance of this development lies not simply in the sophistication of the technology, but in the speed with which fabricated information can enter an already highly competitive political environment.
AI has lowered the cost and technical barrier for producing convincing deceptive content. A person does not necessarily need advanced editing skills to manufacture an image that appears to show a politician making a statement, create an imitation of a newspaper front page or manipulate a voice recording. This changes the character of political misinformation. The old problem was often that false information looked obviously false. The emerging problem is that false information can increasingly be designed to look like evidence.
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Nigeria has already seen examples of this emerging pattern. Recently, a newspaper cover page went viral on WhatsApp group about a purported interview granted to "PM News", a popular online newspaper on Monday 17th May, 1999. The paper carried a banner with a bold headline "Lagos state Governor, Bola Tinubu, Opens Up: How I Became a Drug Abuser & Traficker". From the date on the paper and the headline, it is easy for someone with an elementary media literacy to understand that this is a fake news. The story went further to state that "The Governor, who is also the national leader of the All Progress-ives Congress (APC)". This and other stories like this are circulating on social media targeting gullible Nigerians with stories generated by the use of AI.
Fact-checkers have documented fabricated newspaper front pages like the widely circulated newspaper front page "Daily Tribune" carrying statements attributed to leading presidential candidates like Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi. The false materials were circulated through social media in a manner designed to give them the appearance of legitimate newspaper reports. Other fact-checking work has identified fabricated campaign promises attributed to presidential candidates, including promises that the politicians did not make. These examples are important because they demonstrate that the manipulation of political information does not necessarily require sophisticated deepfake videos. A convincing-looking graphic circulating through thousands of WhatsApp groups can be politically consequential even when it contains no technically complex manipulation.
The greater danger is therefore not only that voters will believe a particular false story. It is that repeated exposure to fabricated political content could create a wider credibility crisis. Citizens may eventually become uncertain about what is genuine, what has been manipulated and which source can be trusted. In such an environment, the damage goes beyond misinformation. It begins to affect the public's relationship with journalism, political institutions and the electoral process itself.
This credibility problem is particularly significant in Nigeria because political information increasingly travels through a combination of mainstream media and informal digital networks. A television report may be shared on Facebook, discussed on X, reduced to a screenshot and circulated through WhatsApp groups before reaching thousands of people who never saw the original report. A fabricated message can follow the same route. By the time a journalist establishes that it is false, the material may already have acquired a life of its own.
Election periods make this problem more acute because citizens have a strong appetite for immediate information. During voting and result collation, uncertainty creates a powerful demand for updates. Political parties, candidates, journalists, election observers and citizens will all be watching events at the same time. A fabricated result sheet or manipulated video purporting to show what happened at a polling unit could therefore spread rapidly before official information becomes available.
The problem becomes more serious when fake information is presented as an official communication. A fabricated statement attributed to INEC, a fake result announcement or a false video showing an electoral official can exploit existing public expectations about how election information is normally communicated. INEC itself has previously had to warn Nigerians about fabricated social-media accounts and false material attributed to its chairman. This shows that campaign communication now has to contend not only with inaccurate reporting but also with deliberate digital impersonation.
This places an additional responsibility on journalists. The traditional imperative of being first to publish remains important, but the synthetic-media environment gives greater value to being right and being able to demonstrate why a report is authentic. The most valuable newsroom during an election may increasingly be the one capable of verifying information quickly rather than simply reproducing whatever is trending.
Nigerian news organisations need journalists trained in digital verification, image authentication, video analysis, geolocation, source verification and the identification of manipulated audio and visual material. Newsrooms also need direct channels for confirming sensitive information with INEC and other authoritative institutions. Verification cannot remain an occasional fact-checking exercise carried out after a false story has already gone viral. It needs to become part of routine election reporting.
INEC faces a similar challenge. The Commission has recognised the need for stronger communication and has begun capacity-building for its Public Affairs Officers. It has also identified disinformation countermeasures and AI-driven deepfake detection among areas requiring attention in its engagement with the African Union's pre-election assessment mission. This is significant because electoral credibility depends partly on the speed and clarity with which the electoral commission can communicate authoritative information.
Political parties also have a responsibility. Campaign organisations will have powerful incentives to promote favourable narratives and challenge damaging ones, but the temptation to exploit manipulated content against opponents could further contaminate the information environment. Parties that knowingly manufacture or amplify fabricated material may gain short-term attention while contributing to a political culture in which citizens become increasingly suspicious of every source.
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The same AI revolution that makes fabrication easier can also assist verification, monitoring and analysis. INEC has indicated that technology can be deployed to identify discrepancies in election-related information, while broader election preparations increasingly involve digital systems and data analysis. The real issue is therefore not whether Nigeria can stop AI from entering the electoral process, but for institutions to develop the capacity to use the technology responsibly while limiting its potential for abuse.
The media has an especially important role because professional journalism remains one of the strongest mechanisms for establishing a shared factual record during campaigns. When competing political actors produce competing versions of reality, credible journalism can provide independent verification. This can be done through careful sourcing, transparent corrections, responsible headlines and resistance to the pressure to publish unverified material simply because it is generating engagement.
The 2027 election campaign will therefore test more than Nigeria's electoral technology and political institutions. It will test the country's information infrastructure. INEC will have to communicate clearly. Political parties will have to resist the temptation to turn every technological capability into a campaign weapon. Social-media platforms will face pressure to respond to manipulated electoral content. Citizens will need greater media and digital literacy. Most importantly, newsrooms will have to recognise that verification is becoming as important as speed.
The campaign period provides an opportunity for INEC, political parties, media organisations, technology companies, civil society and citizens to develop stronger mechanisms for detecting and responding to synthetic political content.
Dr Danladi is Editor-at-Large, Media Trust
