After More Than Two Decades of Postwar Governance, Why Political Competition in 2029 Should Move Beyond the UP-CDC Binary
Liberia stands at an important political crossroads.
By the 2029 presidential and legislative elections, nearly a quarter-century will have passed since Liberia held its first postwar democratic elections in 2005. During most of that period, national political power has revolved around two dominant political camps: the Unity Party (UP), which governed from 2006 to 2018 and returned to power in 2024, and the Congress for Democratic Change/Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC), which governed from 2018 to 2024.
Liberians therefore have enough political history to ask a difficult but necessary question: Must the country continue choosing between the UP and CDC?
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My answer is no.
Liberia needs a credible third political force capable of competing seriously for national power in 2029--not simply another coalition assembled months before an election, but a disciplined national movement built around institutional reform, meritocracy, economic transformation, accountability, reconciliation and a national identity stronger than partisan loyalty.
This is not merely an argument for changing political parties. It is an argument for changing the political system that has developed around the UP-CDC rivalry.
More Than Twenty Years Is Enough to Judge the Record
When Liberia emerged from civil war, the expectations of our people were enormous. Liberians wanted more than elections. We wanted transformation.
We wanted functioning institutions, decent roads, reliable electricity, modern schools, quality healthcare, employment, agricultural transformation, industrialization, effective local government, professional public administration and a political culture in which competence mattered more than political connections.
Instead, the postwar period has repeatedly reproduced a system in which access to government often means access to jobs, contracts, appointments, influence and economic opportunity.
Liberia's problem is therefore not simply who occupies the Executive Mansion. The critical question is what governing philosophy accompanies that occupation.
A scholarly examination of neopatrimonialism in Liberia concluded that the extensive presidential appointment system has helped foster patronage, weaken state capacity and contribute to instability.
That description helps explain a central weakness of postwar Liberian politics: government is too frequently treated as a political reward system.
Under such a system, the political question becomes: Who supported us? Who campaigned for us? Who belongs to our party? Who deserves to be rewarded?
The questions should instead be: Who is qualified? Who is competent? Who has integrity? Who can deliver measurable results for Liberia?
When political loyalty becomes more valuable than professional competence, meritocracy suffers. When appointments become political rewards, institutions become personalized. When access to opportunity depends on proximity to politicians, citizens begin looking for patrons instead of depending upon institutions.
That is neopatrimonial politics.
And Liberia cannot build a modern state upon it.
When Party Loyalty Replaces Nationalism
One of the most damaging consequences of the UP-CDC political rivalry is the gradual elevation of party identity above national identity.
Too many Liberians have been conditioned to see national issues through partisan lenses.
If the UP is in government, some UP supporters defend conduct they would condemn under a CDC government. When the CDC controls government, some CDC supporters behave the same way.
Corruption becomes unacceptable when the other side is accused but explainable when one's own side is implicated. Executive overreach becomes dangerous when committed by an opponent but defensible when committed by an ally. Government appointments are condemned as patronage when the other party benefits but celebrated as political entitlement when one's own supporters receive them.
That is not nationalism.
Nationalism means that the same standards apply whether the President wears UP red or CDC blue.
Liberia must become greater than our political parties.
The Legislature Shows How Fluid the Supposed Divide Can Become
Liberians should also examine the history of legislative power struggles.
In 2007, Speaker Edwin Snowe faced an extended campaign by lawmakers seeking his removal. The Supreme Court initially ruled that actions taken to remove him were unconstitutional, but Snowe eventually resigned amid the continuing political standoff. Alex Tyler was subsequently elected Speaker in April 2007. Tyler was then a member of the Liberia Action Party, which later merged into the Unity Party.
Nearly two decades later, Liberia witnessed another extraordinary battle over the speakership.
J. Fonati Koffa, elected Speaker in January 2024 and elected to the House on the CDC ticket, faced a prolonged effort by a majority bloc to remove him. Significantly, the anti-Koffa bloc included numerous lawmakers elected on the CDC ticket. The CDC itself temporarily suspended eleven of its lawmakers--including Deputy Speaker Thomas Fallah--for participating in the anti-Koffa bloc.
The episode eventually reached the Supreme Court, which ruled in April 2025 that legislative actions taken by the majority bloc without Koffa presiding, when he was neither absent nor incapacitated, were unconstitutional.
Whatever one's position on either speakership dispute, these episodes demonstrate something important about Liberian politics: the supposedly rigid partisan dividing lines can become remarkably flexible when political power is at stake.
Politicians who publicly present themselves as mortal partisan enemies can cooperate across party lines when their interests converge.
Ordinary citizens should remember that lesson.
The people should not become enemies because politicians wear different party colors. Political elites themselves frequently demonstrate that their alliances can change when power, legislative leadership or political survival is involved.
Patronage Is Becoming Too Comfortable
Consider also the public debate created in February 2026 when Unity Party Chairman Luther Tarpeh defended remarks about political allies receiving what he described as political dividends. His comments prompted criticism that such reasoning encouraged patronage politics. Tarpeh defended his position as a normal feature of political collaboration.
That controversy illustrates the deeper debate Liberia must have.
Should government employment be viewed as a dividend of partisan political participation?
Or should public employment primarily be a function of competence, qualification and transparent recruitment?
A republic cannot sustainably develop when citizens believe they must belong to the governing party to improve their economic prospects.
The civil service should belong to Liberia--not UP, CDC or any other political organization.
The Politics of Political Patriarchs
Liberian politics also remains excessively centered on personalities.
Political parties are too often organized around dominant individuals rather than durable ideologies, internal democratic institutions and clearly defined policy programs.
This problem has been observed beyond partisan commentary. The BTI 2024 assessment described Liberia's party system as weakly institutionalized and strongly personalized, noting that many parties function largely around individual political leaders rather than identifiable societal interests.
That political culture encourages patriarchal politics: the powerful political figure becomes the center of the organization; loyalty flows upward; access flows downward; dissent becomes betrayal; and institutions become secondary to personalities.
Liberia needs political parties capable of surviving their founders.
We need institutions, not political patriarchs.
We need citizens, not political dependents.
We need public servants, not partisan clients.
And we need leaders whose authority comes from performance and democratic accountability rather than unquestioning personal loyalty.
The UP-CDC Rivalry Is Becoming Dangerous
There is another reason Liberia should take the emergence of a credible third force seriously: the increasing intensity of the UP-CDC confrontation carries risks for national cohesion if political competition becomes a zero-sum struggle.
Liberia's history should make us particularly careful about political rhetoric that divides citizens into hostile camps.
In March 2026, a CDC-associated political figure publicly warned about alleged attempts to manipulate the 2029 elections and argued that problems with electoral credibility could threaten Liberia's peace and democratic stability. Those were political allegations, not established findings that the 2029 election will be manipulated, but the rhetoric demonstrates the level of distrust already developing years before the election.
During the Koffa crisis, the CDC leadership also accused the UP-led government of involvement in efforts to remove the Speaker. The government categorically denied those accusations and characterized the dispute as an internal CDC power struggle.
These competing accusations matter because democracies require more than elections. They require political actors who believe disputes can be resolved constitutionally.
Liberia cannot afford an election in which millions of citizens are psychologically conditioned to believe that only two outcomes are possible: our side controls the country or our enemy controls the country.
That is precisely why a broader competitive political environment matters.
I would not claim that Liberia is inevitably heading toward another civil conflict; such a conclusion cannot responsibly be established from today's evidence. But the country's history gives Liberians every reason to take polarization, institutional distrust, inflammatory rhetoric and zero-sum politics seriously.
Peace is not something Liberia should gamble with.
A Third Force Could Break the Political Binary
A credible third force could fundamentally alter the political psychology of 2029.
It could tell Liberians that they are not imprisoned between UP and CDC.
It could demonstrate that criticizing the UP does not automatically make someone CDC and criticizing the CDC does not automatically make someone UP.
It could create political space for Liberians who believe both governing records deserve rigorous scrutiny.
Most importantly, a serious third force could shift the national debate away from personalities and toward measurable questions:
What is the plan for electricity?
What is the plan for roads?
What is the plan for agriculture?
What is the industrial policy?
How will Liberia create private-sector employment?
How will corruption be reduced?
How will the civil service become merit-based?
How will counties receive greater political and economic authority?
How will healthcare and education outcomes improve?
How will Liberia transform its minerals, timber and agricultural resources into domestic industries rather than remain primarily an exporter of raw materials?
How will government performance be measured?
These should be the questions determining political power in 2029.
But a Third Force Cannot Simply Be UP and CDC Politicians Wearing New Shirts
Liberians must also be careful.
A "third force" will mean nothing if it merely gathers disgruntled politicians from existing establishments, gives the coalition a new name, designs a new logo and continues exactly the same political culture.
Changing acronyms is not political transformation.
A credible alternative must demonstrate through its own organization the reforms it promises to bring to government.
Its candidates should be selected transparently. Its leadership should be accountable. Competence should matter. Women and young Liberians should participate meaningfully. Its economic program should contain measurable targets. Its sources of political financing should be subject to appropriate disclosure requirements. Its leaders should accept internal criticism rather than treating disagreement as disloyalty.
Most importantly, the movement must place Liberia above personalities.
Otherwise, the so-called third force will simply become another vehicle for neopatrimonial politics.
Liberia Needs Meritocracy, Not Political Entitlement
The central battle of 2029 should therefore be bigger than personalities.
It should be a battle between two political philosophies.
One philosophy says political victory entitles the winner to control government opportunities and distribute them among supporters.
The other says winning an election merely gives a political organization temporary authority to manage institutions that permanently belong to the Liberian people.
The second philosophy is what Liberia desperately needs.
A teacher should not need a party connection to teach.
A qualified engineer should not need to know a minister to work for government.
A nurse should not need a political godfather.
A Liberian entrepreneur should not need proximity to politicians to compete fairly for public contracts.
A civil servant should not fear losing employment because political power changes hands.
Government should work according to rules.
That is how functioning states are built.
2029 Should Be a Referendum on the Political Status Quo
By 2029, Liberians will have had approximately twenty-three years since the inauguration of the first elected postwar government.
That is sufficient time to examine the record.
The UP has had the opportunity to govern.
The CDC has had the opportunity to govern.
The UP has returned to government.
The question in 2029 should therefore not simply be whether Liberians prefer UP to CDC or CDC to UP.
Liberians should ask whether continuing the same binary political competition will produce fundamentally different governance.
That decision belongs entirely to the Liberian electorate.
But voters deserve more than a contest between two political establishments portraying each other as the country's only alternatives.
They deserve genuine competition.
They deserve a credible third option capable of presenting a serious governing program and allowing its record, candidates and policies to be examined alongside those of the UP and CDC.
Liberia belongs to the Liberian people.
The 2029 election offers an opportunity for voters to scrutinize the records of the UP and CDC and to determine whether an alternative political force has earned their confidence.
A credible third force would have to earn that confidence through organization, ideas, integrity, competence and a demonstrable commitment to peaceful democratic competition.
After more than two decades of postwar politics, Liberia's democracy is mature enough to demand more choices, stronger institutions and a political competition based on what parties can actually deliver.
The choice in 2029 need not be UP versus CDC. It can should be a contest over whether Liberia is prepared to build a different political culture altogether. I rest my pen.
About the Author: Seltue Robert Karweaye Sr. is a Liberian policy analyst, security expert, researcher, and commentary writer with interests in governance, public finance, economic development, public policy, and national security and can be contacted at Seltuek@gmail.com