The Organisation for African Unity is now 50 years old. What challenges does its successor, the African Union, face in the next 50 years?
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed in the searing heat that followed the withdrawal of colonialism. A connubial compromise from the outset, it blended the fever of Pan-Africanism with the gradual economic and political reform solemnly called for by the more pro-Western states of Liberia, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria.
The so-called 'Casablanca Group' of states, using the fiery rhetoric of Kwame Nkrumah, agreed to convene with the more conservative 'Monrovia Group' in Ethiopia in 1963. United under the vision of an Africa for and by Africans, the first OAU charter was signed on 25 May in Addis Ababa, the city which has played host to the organisation ever since. Today, a golden statue of Nkrumah, his hand aloft in solidarity, adorns the paved plaza outside the organisation's headquarters.
The OAU, under the Chairmanship of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, established broad goals that reflected the euphoria of self-governance: to rid the continent of the vestiges of colonialism, promote unity and solidarity amongst African states, coordinate and intensify development, safeguard sovereignty, and to promote international cooperation within the framework laid out by the United Nations.
The OAU: from colonisation to independence
From the 1960s to the late 1990s, the OAU battled against colonial oppression, a feature that is arguably the hallmark achievement of that period. It actively supported the anti-apartheid movement and assisted the African National Congress (ANC) in bringing down South Africa's segregationist government; and it played a role in the liberation efforts in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and enjoyed some success with regards to conflict resolution.
But in many ways, the OAU was hamstrung by the scope of its mandate. Its emphasis on state sovereignty meant that it avoided several domestic issues, and its failure to intervene in the face of numerous human rights abuses carried out by deplorable governments mars the OAU's legacy.
Indeed, the principles of democracy were difficult to endorse when only a limited number of leaders within its body were themselves democratically-elected. As an organisation, it reflected the make-up of mostly authoritarian rulers who clung to power through force and fraud - a rickety platform from which to champion the aspirations of democracy. Furthermore, often the countries with the most resources - and therefore influence - were the ones in the greatest need of intervention.
The OAU becomes the AU
The large-scale economic liberalisation that followed the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about an adjustment of the OAU's operational focus. Several factors, such as the growth of regional economic communities and more sensitivity to dispute resolution, required states to redefine the terms of interaction within the OAU.
The constructs of the organisation seemed too narrow to capture the broader ambitions of an economically-evolving Africa. On the 9 September, 1999 (a date acknowledged by the height of the African Union's headquarters: 99.9 metres), the OAU agreed to the Sirte Declaration, a move pushed in particular by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, which heralded the formation of the African Union (AU).
This new incarnation sought to implement the principles of the Abuja Treaty, signed earlier in the decade, in establishing an African Economic Community, an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Union, an African court of Justice, and a Pan-African Parliament. Whereas the OAU was a political administration that discussed matters of economic and social concern, the AU would be an organisation aimed at economic integration and social development which would foster political unity.
Summits followed in Lomé in 2000, which adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and Lusaka in 2001, where the AU implementation plan was mapped out. In the same year, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was created, and on the 9 July 2002, the OAU was disbanded.
Despite the initial inclusionary economic ambitions of the AU, the past ten years have seen priorities accorded to the principles of amity. The Department of Peace and Security is the largest within the AU and donor subsidies are predominantly focused upon related initiatives. The vision has been to reinforce the idea of positive peace; to create an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa which is driven by its citizens.
The AU has co-led peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Somalia. Recently the AU, through a negotiating panel chaired by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, brokered South Sudan's split from Sudan. It has assisted in trying to unravel political stalemates in Guinea, Kenya and the Ivory Coast. It has articulated a framework for post-conflict reconstruction of societies as well as worked with the UN and regional economic communities to develop the African Peace and Security Framework (which includes an African Standby Force). And the AU has also initiated the African Peer Review Mechanism, which is designed to identify procedures of good governance across the continent.
Challenges ahead
But on a continent still trying to establish its own modes of structure and institution, the AU faces a number of challenges, not least of which is funding.
To begin with, the scale of the AU's financial capacity has been called into question. In 2011, the AU's total budget came to $257 million while its European counterpart, the EU, had a budget of over $140 billion.
The independence of the AU due to the source of its funds is also a point of concern. The sparkling AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, for example, was a diplomatic offering sponsored by the Chinese government. But more importantly, over half the AU's budget comes from international development partners, whose donations also account for over 96% of the funding for next year's programmes.
Another issue facing the AU is ensuring cooperation from nations within the continent for where funds ought to be focussed. States belonging to two or three regional economic communities tend to spread their resources thinly, denying institutions the skills and money they require in order to develop. And nations can be reluctant in approving their funds to be spread too wide, expressing the need to prioritise their own electorate.
Peacekeeping, the AU has come to realise, is also a highly political directive. Member-states often shun outside intervention and cooperation can be an extremely laborious exercise.
50 years on from the establishment of a Pan-African political organisation, considerable challenges remain. Internal and external politicking, the corruption and lack of equality within member-states, cooperation between neighbours, and funding all remain major concerns. How the AU handles all of these as well as Africa's rising economic growth will likely determine assessments of its successes and failures another 50 years on.
A London based Master's student from the shadows of the Cape winelands in South Africa, Andre is interested in African affairs that detail conflict resources, energy extrapolation and the perpetual search for sustainable power generation. Previously he worked within the resource sector in South Africa, having banged his head against the turgid structures of state bureaucracy and experienced first-hand the need for energy solutions that address the needs of citizens and not mismanaged governance.