The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is currently pained by the establishment of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES: Alliance of Sahel States, ASS).
The pain is unfortunate because it prompted the withdrawal of the AES Member States from the ECOWAS. For Nigeria, the withdrawal is more painful for many reasons. For instance, it was Nigeria that initiated, and in collaboration with the Republic of Togo, paved the way for the establishment of the ECOWAS on 28 May, 1975 in Lagos. It was then an ECOWAS of 15 original Members, and then 16 with the accession of Cape Verde in 1977. The objective is to promote economic integration. Consequently, it cannot be in Nigeria's interest to build a house and see it destroyed. Mauritania's withdrawal, in December 2000, from the ECOWAS was not in Nigeria's interest despite the disagreement between the ECOWAS and Mauritania over the mistreatment of African Malians to the advantage of Arab Malians in Mauritania.
Mauritania is essentially more affiliated to the Arab world than to black Africa politically and culturally. She is a member of the Arab League and has Arabic as its official language. Mauritania considered ECOWAS' condemnation of its political governance as an unnecessary interference in its domestic affairs. Besides, Mauritania also considered that the Arab Maghreb Union in North Africa was better than the ECOWAS, and, therefore, opted to join the Maghrebin Union after withdrawing from the ECOWAS. This new partnership did not work well as expected and Mauritania returned to the ECOWAS by joining as an Associate Member in August 2017. Nigeria's interest as a founding initiator is to ensure the survival of the ECOWAS by enabling the return of the AES countries under different status.
Secondly, it cannot but be difficult to explain why it is under Nigeria as a founding initiator and again as Chairman of the ECOWAS that three Member States withdrew from the organization. Indeed, it is more painful. It is against this background that we conjecturally discuss the likely patterns of relationships between the ECOWAS and the AES and also explicate the implications for Nigeria's strategic autonomy as propounded by Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar.
Likely Scenarios of the Relationship
The first likely scenario is the failure of ECOWAS diplomacy in bringing back the AES countries by the end of July 2025. As such, international power rivalry should be expected. For instance, in the event of Western conspiracy to remove the various military junta in the AES countries, will the people, Malians, Burkinabé, and Nigériens, go along with the conspiracy? The military juntas derive their strength from the unflinching support from their people. In terms of strategic calculations, the challenge for Nigeria is how to relate more with the people directly. This is where the deployment of citizen diplomacy is necessary.
A second likely scenario is the coming back of the French by whatever means. If they come back, will the returning be France as an African Power or Power in Africa? France is generally considered as an African power because of her military influence, because of her capacity to influence political, economic and cultural developments in the various Francophone countries in Africa. Now that this influence is being neutralized, with the introduction of local languages to replace French as lingua franca and with historical ties being made a nonsense of, the likelihood of France coming back to be an African power is remote. As a great power in Africa is more likely, and in this case, rivalry with other great powers cannot be ruled out. As a power in Africa, France is likely to engage in an indirect use of diplomacy of soft power in which case Nigeria must be more cautious in not being seen as a tool as we have once advised. Nigeria is rightly or wrongly perceived as a collaborating with France to undermine the sovereignty of the AES countries.
Thirdly, in this regard, there is the likelihood of the AES countries still developing hostility via-a-vis Nigeria because of their perception of the ECOWAS and Nigeria under PBAT as aiding France and other foreign powers in the prolongation of their domestic problems: foreign exploitation of their natural resources, terrorism-driven insecurity, foreign destabilization of their countries, democracy-driven poor governance, etc. Put differently, how does Nigeria reshape this perception of Nigeria being considered a stooge and unfriendly? Again, the resort to the adoption of citizen diplomacy has become a desideratum.
A fourth likely scenario is intensification of terrorist threats at both the levels of the AES and European Union countries. It is useful to recall here that European support for the Sahel countries in their war against terror is not à priori because of altruism. The support is indeed in protection of European national interests. The European Union wants to contain terrorism in faraway Africa, and by so doing, preventing it from being brought closer to Europe. Destroying terrorism in Africa necessarily weakens and incapacitates the exportation of terror to Europe. Consequently, now that the European Union cannot fight the use of terror in the AES countries, the challenge of how not to allow terrorism being brought to the doorsteps of EU countries is what should be addressed. This challenge also remains the same for Nigeria as the Boko Haram is affiliated to the Al Qaeda.
Fifthly, with or without any quarrel, Niger Republic cannot but permanently remain a geo-political neighbor of Nigeria. This simply means that whatever differences that may arise in their bilateral relationships must still be resolved. Any intensification of terrorism in Niger cannot but have implications for Nigeria. Nigeria cannot therefore afford the luxury of being lonely or alone in the anti-terror war. This scenario cannot be set aside. There is the need for collaboration at the Nigerian sub-regional level (Nigerian and all the immediate neighbours). The issue in this case is that the AES countries are more interested in the protection of their national sovereignty and Nigeria's protection of her own sovereignty cannot be detrimental to the protection of the AES sovereignty. The Francophone countries are fed up with French interferences in their electoral politics. Nigeria cannot be against AES complaints about electoral interferences and be expecting friendliness from them. Nigeria therefore has to pursue a diplomacy of compromise as a strategy.
A sixth likely scenario is if the French do return, how will the current Russianisation be contained? If it is not contained, how does Nigeria intend to deal with the use of West Africa as a new battle ground for a likely French- or Russo-American proxy war? In this regard, many are the foreseeable challenges. For instance, the likelihood of total French divorce is not foreseeable for the time being. It will take time before French can be easily replaced as a lingua franca. France is still the depository for the foreign exchange earnings of Francophone Africa in general. 50% of the 300 million speakers of French language are in Africa. In fact, Cameroun is bilingual and a new French-English pidgin language is unconsciously is in the making in the country. In fact, it will take time before French impact can be done away with. French language is still the medium for educational training. Even if French language is no longer the lingua franca at the national level, the AES countries cannot do away with French language at the international level because it is one of the two official languages of the United Nations. It is the first international diplomatic language. Consequently, for Nigeria, the challenge is how to reconcile 'what is' with 'what ought to be.' In other words, the redefinition of the 4-Ds to respond to these challenges has become another top priority.
Seventhly, there is the challenge of continuity of regional insecurity. One of the major complaints of the AES against the ECOWAS was its inability to do something meaningful to assist in the war on terror. And true, no single country can successfully contain terrorism. Even the United States, as powerful as it is, has to seek the understanding of many stakeholders to help. Airlines do control passengers going to the US from their point of embarkation. Efforts are made to ensure that visas are legally issued. Consequently, Nigeria must admit that its national security is intertwined with that of the whole of the West Africa region.
This means that regional security must be a top priority of Nigeria's 4-Ds and strategic autonomy. The challenge is to look at the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, done on May 29, 1981 in Freetown. The Protocol is a regional mechanism that required Member Signatories to provide troops in the event of an external aggression: it is considered that any armed threat or aggression against any Member is also a threat and aggression against the entire community. Will ECOWAS without the AES countries still be the same community?
In the same vein, the 1978 Protocol on Aggression requires all Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression... against the territorial integrity and political independence of other sovereign states. External aggression is not defined in the context of an aggression coming from within Africa. Will any extra-African threats from the AES sub-region be considered a threat on the entire ECOWAS region? If yes, how will regional and continental integration be affected? Will the international community not be compelled to raise the issue of IR2P if the region becomes disorderly? Will the ECOWAS region, not to say the West Africa region, not become another Somalia or the Congo? These questions require further explications at the level of Nigeria's strategic autonomy.
Nigeria's Strategic Autonomy as Major Dynamic
The conduct and management of Nigeria's foreign policy before the advent of Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) has been largely done at five different, but still complementary levels: bilateral diplomatic missions; establishment of Joint Commissions; Strategic Cooperation; Strategic Partnerships; and through Bi-national Commissions. These levels are generally done at the bilateral level, rather than at the plurilateral and multilateral levels. It is the emphasis on the mania of the relationship that largely explains the nuances. While cooperation has a general scope in terms of areas to be covered, partnership underscores the extent of commitment defined by parity. Joint Commissions are about institutionalization of the relationship, while the factor of 'bi-national' explains the highest level of involvement and the high level of importance of the relationship.
For example, Nigeria and Niger established the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation (NNJCC) after the first two summit meetings held by President Hamani Diori of Niger and General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria in Nigeria in November 1970 and in Niamey on March 3, 1971. Both leaders considered that the same communities lived on both sides of their common border: Dosso, Tahoua, Maradi, Zinder and Diffa regions in Niger and Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe and Borno, on the Nigerian side. It was in light of this reality that both leaders again signed an additional Protocol on 22 December 1973 which amended the 1971 Agreement and set up three main organs to oversee the NNJCC.
The first organ, High Authority, comprises the two leaders who are required to meet, at least, once every year. The second organ is the Council of Ministers, which is responsible to the High Authority, and consists of an equal number of representatives and also meet, at least, once in a year. The third organ is comprised of the Permanent Secretaries from both sides. The declared objective was to address common problems, resolve whatever conflicts that might arise, and promote cooperation across their borders. The NNJCC should not be confused with the diplomatic missions of the two countries.
In this regard, the establishment of a Joint Commission cannot but incorporate strategic cooperation and partnership, as well as bi-national commission without having to be specially mentioned. This is because of the additional protocol done in 1973 and which created three organs to manage the NNJCC. Meetings of Bi-national Commissions are normally held at the summitry level, and if delegated, at the level of Vice Presidents. More interestingly, strategic cooperation and partnership is generally managed at the level of Ministers, with emphasis on the resolution or facilitation of shared problems in the trade and development sectors.
As there are not many cases of Joint Commissions, what Nigeria does is to gradually promote or elevate her bilateral relations from the ordinary level of bilateral cooperation to strategic cooperation by identifying specific areas for cooperation, and further through strategic partnership by defining the implementation strategies to be adopted, and finally to the level of bi-national commissions which are like supreme courts in the adjudication of litigations in any given misunderstanding. Bi-national commissions are at the crescendo of the continuum of bilateral relations.
In this regard, from 1960 to date, Nigeria's foreign policy has been guided by the foundational and circumstantial principles established under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, or by the inherited foreign policy principles, circumstantial principles, doctrine, and constitutional principles provided for in Nigeria's 1999 Constitution as amended. General Ike Omar Nwachukwu came up with 'economic diplomacy' at a point in time. This was what was first called 'development diplomacy' in the 17th Century. General Olusegun Obasanjo even touted the idea of 'globalism' as a redefined centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Opinion of foreign policy stakeholders did not favour the shift from Africa as centerpiece. Consequently, globalism quickly entered into désuétude to allow charity to begin from home.
Today, what is trending is the diplomacy of 4-Ds and Strategic Autonomy as propounded by Foreign Minister Tuggar. As explained by the Minister, strategic autonomy is the fulcrum of the administration of PBAT. It is the guide to political governance. This clearly implies that as a guide, it cannot but also apply to Nigeria's relationship with the AES countries at the level of foreign policy. Put differently, how does strategic autonomy impact on the relationship? How does the AES also impact on Nigeria's strategic autonomy? More pointedly, what are the likely scenarios and challenges for strategic autonomy as a new foreign policy grand strategy? From the perspective of qualitative methodology, it can be rightly posited that the ultimate objective of the Foreign Minister is to have a new Nigeria that will be completely free from politico-economic dependency on other sovereign states for survival in various ramifications. He does not want the security of Nigeria to be defined by the whims and caprices of foreign powers.
Like Professor Akinwande Bolaji Akinyemi argued the need for Black Bomb, the need for Nigeria to make use of what she has to impact international politics by calling for the Concert of Medium Powers, Ambassador Maitama Tuggar is simply saying that Nigeria can be great and respectfully reckoned with in international relations if the level of Nigeria's self-reliance is substantially increased in such a way that Nigeria's bargaining power in the conduct and management of regional, multilateral or interdependent relations will be quite stronger. Explained differently, Nigeria should be able to be at par with any negotiators and interlocutors during international negotiations. This is one possible and logical interpretation of the Foreign Minister's 'strategic autonomy.' We see it as nothing more than an ultimate foreign policy objective which has not been constitutionalized but which has become a desideratum in light of the politics of the AES.
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If Nigeria is autonomous, she can always deploy tactical means to enable the playing of active parts in international politics as national interest may require. In this regard, the use of Nigeria's Diaspora, Nigeria's big population, the joy of also being a big democracy, Nigeria's potential wealth as a result of the unexploited mineral resources, etc., all combined, can come into play as instruments of nation-building, self-reliance and industrial development of the country. As such, Nigeria can be expected to engage in international relations on the basis of her own whims and caprices in the spirit of the country's non-alignment policy. As the AES countries have reconstituted themselves into a sub-region within the West Africa region, what will Nigeria's strategic autonomy mean?
How will Nigeria respond to regional challenges? How should the status of strategic autonomy be considered and further developed? We ask these questions because ECOWAS-AES relations have the great potential to be defined by Nigeria's position in the long run. This is because Nigeria is a founding initiator of the ECOWAS in collaboration with Togo. It is under Nigeria's chairmanship of the ECOWAS that the regional organization is now facing the challenge of disintegration. And now that Nigeria is underscoring strategic autonomy, the autonomy must not allow the building of borders that divide but borders that actually unite to borrow the idea of Professor A. Asiwaju.
The AES as a body can become an Associate Corporate Member of the ECOWAS. This means that the ECOWAS must begin to look at three categories of membership: original membership, associate individual membership as it is the case with Mauritania, and associate corporate membership to accommodate the AES. The border of political differences must still accommodate the border of cooperation. This is a major challenge for Nigeria. First, efforts should be made to investigate how the 4-Ds can assist strategic autonomy as a foreign policy objective. For instance, democracy can be an asset and also a liability. How can democracy in Nigeria foster further democratization in the region or help consolidate democracy where it already exists? How can Nigeria provide electoral assistance?
Can Nigeria promote electoral democracy when it does not exist in Nigeria? Even though President Donald Trump is not only a problem to America, but also to the whole world with his Trumpism, his suggestion that Nigerian professionals should stay at home to help nation-building is a welcome development. But the environment must not be inclement. The NIDCOM under Honourable Abike Dabiri-Erewa should be specially strengthened to assist in ensuring that the Nigerian Diaspora plays greater part in the political governance of the country. Development and Demography are two sides of the same coin but have no meaning without the people. Life is meaningless for the people without development. Development is an objective of every living human being. Thus the diplomacy of 4-Ds is very critical in achieving strategic autonomy.
Secondly, all the stipulated foreign policy objectives under Section 19 of the 1999 Constitution as Foreign Policy objectives are stricto sensu not objectives. They are, at best, means to achieving unstipulated ultimate objectives. For us, Strategic Autonomy can naturally be considered as a new foreign policy objective. By so doing, Nigeria must be in a new position to respond to whatever challenges as a strategically-autonomous hegemon on her own right. While foreign influence and the position of the people of the Sahel, coupled with regional insecurity, are currently the major dynamics of AES relationship with the world that must always be factored into Nigeria's foreign policy calculations, there is no disputing the fact that Nigeria's strategic autonomy has become the most important definiendum that the AES must also begin to reckon with in Nigeria's foreign policy calculations.
