Kampala — I have taken keen interest and participated in the political activities on the Ugandan scene since the late 1970s. This was during a period of intense jostling to topple and later succeed the Idi Amin regime.
I am therefore, fully aware of the euphoria, excitement and hope with which Ugandans received the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A).
Ugandans supported the UNLF's stated approach of "politics of consensus" through the common front.
It was hoped that the new approach to politics would be maintained and Uganda rebuilt from the ruins left by the Amin regime. Unfortunately, instead of nurturing the structures, and regulations which bound the front together, we witnessed a primitive power struggle that resulted into ripping the front apart to the chagrin of the population.
Some of us young people were immediately thrown into serious confusion. We had not belonged to any political party before, and we did not approve of the record and character of the existing parties - UPC and DP.
The re-awakened party enthusiasts immediately re-grouped and started off their mordant and pugnacious exchanges from where they had left off in the 1960s. Spontaneously, many people started talking of belonging to a THIRD FORCE. This force represented those persons who wished to make a fresh start at political organisation, with unity and consensus politics as the centre-pin.
With a few months left to the 1980 elections, the Third Force crystalised into a new political organisation - the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM).
The population, to a large extent, expressed their appreciation of the ideas and opportunity presented by the young organisation, but was pessimistic regarding its electoral success. Pessimism was justified, because the new organisation simply had no time and resources to organise effectively nationally; and UPC was already positioning itself very loudly and arrogantly to rig the elections - and seemed to have what was essential for them to do so successfully.
It may be remembered that there was a very palpable desire in the population that UPM and DP should unite and exploit their mutual advantages; especially, on the part of DP an elaborate mass organisations, on UPM's part, fresh ideas and blood, and a reasonable anchor in the very important Security and Defence Arena.
Again there was a sad failure to meet this expectation occasioned by the leaders. The tragedy that followed is well known to most Ugandans.
After the sham 1980 elections, when Paulo Muwanga (RIP), a leader of UPC (and Chairman of the Military Commission) took over all powers of the Electoral Commission, and declared his own election results, there was widespread despondency and tension.
While the "minority" DP Members of Parliament took up the opposition benches in parliament, the rank and file of the party rapidly united behind the new forces of resistance to struggle against the dictatorial rule.
The Popular Resistance Army (PRA and later, NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni which started with about 30 fighters, was overwhelmed by people seeking to join their ranks.
Within the Buganda region, there were other fighting groups like the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) led by Andrew Kayiira (RIP), the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO) led by Dr. Lwanga and Nkwanga (RIP), even others largely unheard of like Vumbra Armed Forces of Maj. Kakooza Mutale.
Some of these groups were actively engaged in undermining other fighting groups especially NRA which they sought to project as an army of Banyankole/Banyarwanda which should go back to Ankole. The response of the civilian population was again instructive: they called on the groups to unite and work together, and when this failed, they identified the group which was serious and advocating for unity (i.e. NRA) and vigorously supported it in total neglect of the venomous campaign rife in the air.
The NRM was born as a political organisation in June 1981. It was created by a protocol that effected the merger of Uganda Freedom Fighters- UFF. (led by late Prof. Y.K. Lule) and Museveni's PRA.
The armed wing of the organisation became the National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRM political programme was initially based on seven points which were later increased to become the well-known Ten-Point Programme. The basic consideration in drawing up the programme was that it should form the basis for a broad national coalition of democratic, political and social forces. A national coalition was considered to be of critical importance in establishing total peace and security, and optimally moving the country forward.
The political programme was, therefore, referred to as a minimum programme around which different political forces in Uganda could unite for rehabilitation and recovery of the country. It was recognised that there existed many other issues on which the various forces were not in agreement, and that these issues would remain outside the minimum programme.
To achieve unity, it was envisaged that the minimum programme would be implemented by a broad-based government. It was considered important that all Ugandans are able to see themselves in the NRM (as in a mirror).
After the bush war, discussions were undertaken with the various political forces to establish a broad-based government that would reflect a national consensus. The NRM set up a committee led by Eriya Kategeya (then Chairman of the NRM Political and Diplomatic Committee) for the purpose of engaging the various groups in these discussions.
This exercise was however, never taken to its logical conclusion. Some party leaders blamed the collapse of these negotiations on the NRM, but I believe their own internal weaknesses may have been more to blame.
It would appear that once the leaders of the political parties were given "good" posts in the NRM government, their enthusiasm for the discussions waned, and the process eventually fizzled out.
Inspite of the lack of a proper modus operandi, the initial NRM government (executive branch) was impressively broad-based.
The proclamation which set up the legal basis for the NRM government (Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986) provided for the expansion of the supreme body the National Resistance Council (NRC) to include: representatives of political forces or groups. The NRC was subsequently expanded in 1989, and I think all shades of political opinion were reflected in its composition.
From the early days, elections for political offices under the NRM (i.e. local governments) were organised on the basis of individual candidates' merit rather than on political affiliation basis. This approach was overwhelmingly popular because the population saw it as a way of getting good leaders (who would serve their interests and were directly accountable to them), but equally importantly, as a way to avoid re-opening of the wounds that had been occasioned by past political party activities. Indeed through these elections, reconciliation and healing of the society was evident. The executive offices were always filled with due consideration of the whole social structure of each area.
Consensus Politics conducted through elections based on individual merit and formation of broad-based government became the hallmark of the NRM.
However, the popular concept of the broad-based government, which had also received support of most political groups, was progressively undermined. It ought to be remembered that due to the support and co-operation of other political groups, no legal restrictions were imposed on political parties until August 11, 1992 when the NRC made a resolution on Political Party activities in the interim period.
In my opinion, there were three factors responsible for undermining and later destroying the NRM cardinal principle of broad-basedness especially in appointments to the Executive:
(1) The NRM had set itself to serve for a period of four years as an interim government, and then return power to the people. However, it was not very clear how this would happen at the end of the four years.
Some politicians in NRM Government who came from other political parties set out to use their advantaged positions to, on the one hand, undermine the NRM, and on the other, strengthen themselves in preparation for the post-NRM political period.
Consequently, they fell out with the NRM leadership, and a number of them were arrested and charged with treason.
(2) Historical NRM politicians who thought that they were not "appropriately" placed in government, blamed this on the large number of the "non-NRM" people in high up places, and set out to campaign against that situation. They created a distinction between government leaders as "NRM", and "broad-based".
If you were referred to as "broad-based", it was another way of saying that you were undeserving of your post, or that you were possibly an enemy agent ("5th Columnist").
(3) After some years of NRM rule, some in the leadership began to feel that there was sufficient grassroots support for the NRM, such that one could "off- load" the "broad-based" elements in government at no political cost.
These factors were at the centre of an unprincipled power-struggle which was mostly covert and hence could not be resolved democratically. It continued to play itself out outside the formal Movement organs, with the result of weakening and eventually losing the concept of consensus politics and broad-basedness.
By the time of the Constituent Assembly elections in 1994, the NRM's all encompassing, and broad-based concept remained only in name. For instance, while the CA. electoral law clearly stated that candidates would stand on "individual merit", the NRM secretariat set up special committees at district level whose task was to recommend "NRM candidates" for support. Not only did the logistical and administrative machinery of NRM move against the candidates supporting or suspected to be favouring early return to multi-party politics, it even moved against liberal candidates advocating for the initial NRM broad-based concept, and others for no apparent reason.
It ought to be emphasised again here that the CA. law was premised on the "broad-based" and "individual merit" concepts of the NRM because these were popular. So to provide a "Movement platform" to certain candidates through the district committees, the NRM secretariat had to operate secretly.
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That is why very many people were surprised and confused when some senior NRM leaders declared that "we have won!", after the CA. results were announced. Who had won?
It was clear that there were two systems; one described in the law, and another being practiced.
Moreover, the conduct of the CA. again exhibited the contradictions between the principles of NRM (and the law), and the practice. Whereas the law provided that coming into and participation in the CA. would be on "individual" basis the practice was different.
I was quite alarmed when I read a document entitled "Minutes Of A Meeting Between H.E. The President With CA. Group Held On 25.8.94 At Kisozi." The copy had been availed to me by my colleague Lt. Col. Serwanga-Lwanga (R.I.P.) who attended the meeting. Present at the meeting were recorded as: H.E. The President (Chair), Hon Kategaya, Hon. Bidandi Ssali, Hon. Steven Chebrot, Hon. Agard Didi, Hon. Basoga Nsandhu, Hon. George Kanyeihamba, Hon. Miria Matembe, Mr. Matthias Ngobi, Mr. Sebalu, Lt. Noble Mayombo, Hon. Jotham Tumwesigye, Mr. Aziz Kasujja, Mrs Beatrice Lagada, Mrs Faith Mwonda and Mrs Margaret Zziwa.
The introduction of the meeting reads in part as follows: The National Political Commissar introduced this committee as a Constituent Assembly Movement Group which wants to agree on a common position.
The arbitrarily hand-picked group went ahead to take positions on major areas of the draft constitution, which we members of CA. (considered as "NRM supporters") were supposed to support in the CA.
It is interesting to note that among the 16 hand-picked members of the group, only six were directly elected to represent constituencies in CA. The others were presidential nominees and representatives of special interest groups. One member was not even a CA delegate at all.
We strongly resisted this approach, and after intense pushing and shoving, this group was replaced by the "Movement caucus" under the chairmanship of the National Political Commissar Kategaya!
The Movement caucus acted very much like an organ of a ruling party. All ministers (except Hon. Paul Ssemogerere who later resigned from government), were members. Members were not expected to oppose a position approved by the caucus in the CA. The hand-picked group, and the Movement caucus after it, both undermined the principles of the Movement and the law.
* Col. Kiiza Besigye is a former National Political Commissar. He was was also a Historical member of the NRC, and represented the army in the CA, and was associated with the "progressive" tendency in the constitutional making process. He has held various top positions in the army.
- Continues in The Monitor tomorrow.
