allAfrica.com: Sudan: Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia (Page 1 of 2)

This is the first in a series of articles concerning the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were negotiated by the Government and Movement delegations, what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. This first article asks, how are the Janjaweed and other armed militia to be disarmed?

One of the toughest questions in the negotiations in Abuja that led to the DPA was how to control and disarm the Janjaweed and other armed militia in Darfur. The Movements' negotiators raised this issue time and time again, and went line by line over every relevant paragraph over many long weeks. Each of the Movements' negotiators--Ali Tirayo (SLM-Minawi), Mohamed Adam (SLM-Abdel Wahid) and Tajudeen Niam (JEM)--was closely involved in this issue, and the GoS security team led by General Ismat al Zain was extremely professional and examined every detail. Everyone in the peace talks knew from the beginning that long-term peace and security in Darfur requires the control of all the militia and paramilitary forces, some of which have terrorized Darfurians since the 1980s, and some of which were only recently established.

Security experts agree that the DPA articles concerning the Janjaweed are some of the toughest parts of the whole Agreement. For the first time there is a practical plan for controlling and disarming the Janjaweed. This is a credit to the GoS and Movements negotiating teams in Abuja and the hard work they put in.

When the Government of Sudan (GoS) signed the "Humanitarian Ceasefire" in N'djamena in April 2004, it made a commitment to disarm the Janjaweed. Two months later the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1556 that insisted that Khartoum should disarm the Janjaweed, within one month. Shortly afterwards, the Government presented a plan for disarmament to the Darfur Ceasefire Commission, but the plan was rejected by the African Union and the representatives of the Movements.

The responsibility for disarming the Janjaweed and other armed militia falls on the GoS. This principle was laid down by the UN Security Council. And throughout the Abuja talks, the Movements insisted that because the GoS had armed these militia, it was responsible for disarming them too. However, the entire process of controlling and disarming them is to be supervised and monitored by the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC). Both of these bodies are chaired by the African Union and include representatives of the SLM and JEM as well as the international community. At every stage of the disarmament process, all those represented on the CFC and JC must be satisfied that the GoS has properly completed its task.

Article 314 of the DPA demands that the GoS produces a plan for disarming the Janjaweed 37 days after "D-Day", which was 16 May (eleven days after the signing of the Agreement in Abuja). But the DPA also spells out in detail how many aspects of this disarmament are to be done. The Movement negotiators insisted on this, and the GoS delegation insisted that the provisions should be practical. The DPA has a detailed timeline and different provisions covering different armed groups.

The timetable for disarming the Janjaweed is part of the overall sequence of steps for the Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Status Security Arrangements in Chapter 3 of the DPA. There is a simple principle governing the steps. For every action that the armed forces of the Movements (SLA and--if it should sign up--the JEM) are asked to take, the GoS has to take a step beforehand. The ceasefire works on the principle of protecting the weaker parties--in this case the Movements and the civilian population--from the stronger party, which is the GoS and the armed militia. This means that the Movements are not required to redeploy their fighters until the Government has withdrawn its troops and controlled or disarmed the Janjaweed--and this has to be verified by the CFC and JC, which means the Movements' representatives have to confirm this themselves.

The DPA spells out a number of the steps that the GoS has to take in its steps for controlling the Janjaweed and armed militia.

--Paragraph 315 spells out some of the measures the GoS should take, including restricting Janjaweed to garrisons and cantonment sites, disarming them of heavy weapons, and ensuring that they cannot pose a threat to the Movements' assembly sites.

--Paragraph 316 demands that any armed militia that violates the ceasefire should be immediately disarmed.

--Paragraph 366 specifies that the Janjaweed must be prevented from moving into any areas in which they can pose a threat to civilians including especially IDPs.

--Paragraph 367 spells out some of the measures to be taken during Phase 2 of the Ceasefire (which begins 82 days after "D-Day") including confiscation of motor vehicles and heavy weapons, actions to enforce control, and prosecutions.

--Paragraph 417 specifies that the Movements only move their fighters to assembly sites when the disarmament of the Janjaweed is verified, after phase 3 of the ceasefire (127 days after "D-Day").

--Paragraph 457 lays out the timetable for all these activities.

web allafrica.com	Enter your search terms	Submit search form
OR subscribers use AllAfrica's premium search engine


Use our pull-down menus to find more stories