allAfrica.com: Sudan: The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (Page 1 of 2)

This is the fourth in a series of articles concerning the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were negotiated, what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. This article asks, what is the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and why was it proposed by the African Union Mediation?

One of the most controversial issues in the Abuja negotiations was the question of whether Darfur should be constituted as a single Region or should remain as three states. The Movements' negotiators insisted that Darfur was historically constituted as a single political and administrative entity and had only been divided by administrative fiat in 1994, and should be returned to that status immediately, with its pre-existing borders. Their chief negotiators--Abdel Jabbar Dosa for the SLM-Minni Minawi and Abdel Rahman Musa and Ibrahim Madibo for the SLM-Abdel Wahid, plus Ahmed Tugod Lissan for JEM--insisted on this to the last. The GoS delegation, led by Dr. Majzoub al Khalifa argued that the status quo of three states was supported by most of the population and was also consistent with the Interim National Constitution. The most that Khartoum was ready to concede was a "coordinating council" for the three States.

Three times during the Seventh Round of peace talks in Abuja, which lasted from November 2005 until May 2006, the GoS and the Movements had direct, bilateral talks on power-sharing issues. In January and February, the GoS and the SLM-Abdel Wahid actually reached their own bilateral agreement--but then Abdel Wahid pulled out. In March, Vice President Ali Osman Taha met with Khalil Ibrahim in Tripoli. Khalil reported that Taha had agreed to the Region, but no sign of any such agreement could be seen at the negotiating table in Abuja. In April, Vice President Ali Osman Taha spent three weeks in Abuja and had numerous discussions with the leaders of the Movements, but they couldn't agree on the Region or on how to divide power in Darfur.

By mid-April the Abuja talks were making progress on many issues--most of wealth-sharing and much of security arrangements--but were getting stuck on some basic issues of power-sharing. The African Union Mediation decided to present some compromise proposals. International partners also worked to make some enhancements in the final days, using the same framework.

The challenge facing Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim and his team was not just how to identify a middle position between the Parties, but also to take account of several other important concerns.

One obvious consideration was that the SLA and JEM had not won the war, and therefore could not dictate their terms. They would have to compromise. And they would have to accept that the Darfurians who hold posts in the legislature and executive today are indeed Darfurians with equal rights--the Movements could not claim to represent 100% of Darfur and exclude others. The GoS was in a more powerful military and political position, but it had not won either. It would have to concede a significant amount of power to the Movements. After much debate, the Mediators accepted the principle that the National Congress Party should keep a bare majority in whatever government system was agreed for Darfur--as it had done in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in the CPA. It simply wasn't possible for the Movements to negotiate the GoS out of power.

A second consideration was the importance of respecting the spirit of the Naivasha Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This was not just a matter of maintaining the delicate balance the CPA had established between North and South, but also keeping the intact the CPA's principles of democracy and pluralism. The Declaration of Principles for the resolution of the Darfur conflict, signed in June 2005, had already specified that any agreement reached in Abuja would be incorporated into the Interim National Constitution. But that was not an invitation to ride roughshod over the provisions of the INC. The reasons for this included the fact that the CPA and INC have far-reaching provisions for the democratic transformation of Sudan, including free elections to be held in 2009. The Mediators reasoned that the DPA should enable Darfurians to become a full part of Sudan's national process of democratic transformation. The DPA should not set Darfurians apart from that democratic process. And a central part of that democratic transformation should be the chance for Darfurians to choose their type of state or regional government.

The CPA also gives official status to the many different languages of Sudan, meaning that this did not need to be negotiated in Abuja. It initiates a process of changing Sudan's security institutions into smaller, non-partisan, professional institutions. It provides mechanisms for the devolution of power. For these reasons and others, the CPA is an asset to the people of Darfur and not an obstacle to them, and the achievement of peace in Darfur--which also means the fuller participation of Darfurians in national political life--should become a means of ensuring the more faithful and rapid implementation of the CPA.

A third consideration was practicality. Darfur is ravaged, half of its people driven from their homes, facing a huge task of reconstruction and reconciliation before normal life can begin again. In these circumstances, it is better to build on what exists--the existing states administration--rather than destroying it, and better not to create any conflicts that do not already exist. For this reason, the Mediation preferred to propose to keep intact what is already there for state and local government, and establish new institutions for the specific tasks of implementing the DPA.

web allafrica.com	Enter your search terms	Submit search form
OR subscribers use AllAfrica's premium search engine


Use our pull-down menus to find more stories