allAfrica.com: Sudan: The Future of the Movements' Combatants (Page 1 of 2)

This is the ninth in a series of articles concerning the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were negotiated, what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. This article focuses on the controversial question of the future of the armed forces of the Movements: how many should be integrated into the national army and other security services, and in what way, and what should happen to the remainder.

The question of the integration of combatants was one of the very last issues to be resolved in the Abuja talks. The version of the DPA presented to the parties on 25 April did not contain figures for the numbers to be integrated: it just had "x" where each number would be. And it did not contain details on how those numbers would be integrated: would rebel units be absorbed into the army, would individuals be integrated on an individual basis, or would special integrated units be formed? The Movements' negotiators pressed for the largest number of their fighters to be integrated, forming special units. The Movements' negotiators also demanded that they should keep their forces intact under separate command for at least five years. Their aim was something as close as possible to what the SPLA had achieved for Southern Sudan.

The GoS delegation at first insisted that all the Movements' combatants should be disarmed and should return to civilian life. The GoS argument was that the guerrillas were not professional soldiers who could easily become part of a regular army, and that the CPA demanded that the national army should be reduced in size rather than expanded. They also said that there was already sufficient representation of Darfurians in the army. The Movements' negotiators won their case: after making strenuous objections, the GoS delegation backed down.

When the GoS accepted the principle of integration, the SLM/A negotiators also abandoned their demand for keeping a separate command throughout the interim period. Only Khalil Ibrahim of JEM stuck to that demand until the end--while also demanding that the GoS pay the salaries of his army.

Throughout the three stages of the Comprehensive Ceasefire, which last five months, the Movements' forces remain intact under their existing command and control structures. They disengage from the Sudan army, redeploy, and have their heavy weapons limited to secure areas under AMIS supervision. But the processes of assembly, integration and disarmament begin only on the completion of these phases, 160 days after "D-Day." This depends on the completion of the previous phases--including verification of specific steps in controlling and disarming the Janjaweed. The Movements only lay down their arms when the Janjaweed are already disarmed and the Sudan army has withdrawn to its main garrisons. This sequence of steps represents an important concession by the GoS and a success for the Movements' negotiators in Abuja, notably Ali Tirayo, Mohamed Adam and Tajudeen Nyam. Minni Minawi also took a close personal interest in negotiating these elements of the DPA.

During the first months of the ceasefire, AMIS must identify good locations where the Movements can assemble their forces. These places must be chosen carefully so that they have all the essentials to support a camp. They must also be secure. For guerillas used to moving and hiding, assembling in camps is a sensitive issue--the fighters fear that they may be attacked and wiped out. Assembly of the Movements will only begin when security is assured: when the Janjaweed and other militia have been disarmed and removed from the vicinity of any assembly sites, and the Government army has also redeployed back to barracks, with its heavy weapons under inspection and its airfields also closely monitored.

The purpose of assembly is to allow the Movements' soldiers to be fed and housed, and kept under control. It will be possible to select those who are going to go forward for integration into the army and other security services, on the basis of their fitness, skills, qualifications and their own personal choice. They can also be given some training. The remainder who are going to be demobilized and return to civilian life can meanwhile be given assistance, reorientation and training.

One of he most controversial issues in the Abuja talks was the number of combatants from the Movements who should be integrated. While the GoS tried to minimize the number, the Movement leaders tried to maximize it. If the SLA and JEM really had the 60,000 troops that their leaders jointly claimed at some points, it is astonishing that they didn't win the war--while if they just had the 5,000 fighters claimed by the GoS, it is amazing that the Sudan army didn't defeat them years ago. The question of numbers was resolved only in the very final days of the Abuja negotiations, when the U.S. delegation arrived, and took this question on as a priority.

In the end, the formula agreed was: 4,000 fighters from the Movements should be integrated into the national army and 1,000 into the police and other security services. A further 3,000 will be given special training for other positions in civilian life--a better deal than normal disarmament and demobilization. When AMIS carries out the process of verification of the positions of forces it will also verify the numbers of fighters that the Movements have, so that the correct proportions of combatants can be chosen from the different Movements.

One of the fears of the Movements was that their fighters might be integrated, but then dispersed in small numbers throughout army units across the country. The SLM/A negotiators were insistent that when their fighters were integrated, they should be integrated in sufficiently large numbers in every integrated unit that they could, if need be, protect themselves. However, the GoS was equally insistent that the army should only have one command structure and that units should have only one loyalty. There were to be no "Joint Integrated Units" such as those that had been set up with the SPLA.

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