Today, Sudan stands on a precipice - of partition, and perhaps a return to all-out war. The next 18 months will determine not only the future of Sudan, but also what the coming decade will look like across the Horn of Africa.
I recently returned from a visit to Darfur, the war-torn western region of Sudan that has been a focal point of international engagement in recent years, with US Special Envoy to Sudan, General Scott Gration. Asked if Sudan is a genuine national interest for the United States, Gration answers decisively in the affirmative. "If Sudan implodes, the spillover of refugees, the international attention, and the inability to do anything because there's no infrastructure . . ." The unspoken end of Gration's sentence is a picture of chaos throughout the region. The U.S. has a critical supporting role to play in ensuring such an apocalyptic scenario does not come to pass.
In 2005, the Sudanese government signed onto a document known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It brought an end to over two decades of civil war between the north and south of the country, and gave southerners the option of voting to become an independent state in a referendum scheduled for 2011. The time between the signing of the CPA and the 2011 referendum was supposed to be used to institute a democratic transformation of the country, and to sell southerners on the benefits of a unified "New Sudan" inclusive of the areas traditionally marginalized by Khartoum's ruling riverine elite. But that ideal was never transformed into reality.
Khartoum's leaders consistently violated provisions of the CPA. Through delay and obfuscation, they ensured that the fledgling Government of South Sudan did not receive all it was entitled to under the wealth-sharing provisions of the agreement, and that procedural safety nets, like a national census, were neither fully inclusive, nor timely. As a result, southerners have not seen the kind of peace dividends needed to make unity attractive. As a Nuer man from the Upper Nile in south Sudan summarizes the situation, "Peace was only written on white papers."
Southern leadership must also take responsibility for this bleak state of affairs. Southern leader, Salva Kiir, has never been forceful enough in pushing Khartoum to deliver on the CPA. Charges of corruption and poor governance are in abundance. Moreover, the factionalism that plagued southerners throughout the 1990s has reared its ugly head once more. Nearly five years after the signing of the CPA it is now a near-certainty that southerners will opt for independence in the upcoming referendum. There is similarly little doubt that Khartoum will not readily accept losing control of the majority of Sudan's oil reserves held in the south.
While the ultimate decision of whether to return to all-out war lies in the hands of the Sudanese themselves, the international community has not played the role that it could (and should) have. Under the Bush Administration, a U.S.-led multinational coalition put unprecedented resources into getting the CPA signed, but got distracted when it came to implementation. Darfur advocates, myself included, share some of the blame for the global failure to ensure the CPA fulfilled its potential.
We secured significant levels of attention to atrocities being committed in the west of the country, but failed to make sure this came in addition to - rather than at the expense of - attention to the south. This year has brought belated recognition of this error, and the outcome of the Obama Administration's Sudan policy review, announced on Monday, brings a welcome commitment to addressing Darfur and the CPA in parallel. But it may be too little, too late. Both sides are preparing for a return to war. A recent report by Jane's Defense Weekly shows satellite imagery of 33 new T-72 tanks en route to the south. Khartoum, with equipment from China and the former Soviet Union, and financing from Iran has continued to bolster its military capacity.
But war is not inevitable.
With intensive engagement an unsatisfying, but ultimately peaceful second-best can be achieved. While the bulk of the oil reserves are in the south, the pipeline runs through the north. If either side tries to cut the other off, they harm themselves as well. This mutual dependency means the north could continue wealth-sharing arrangements with a provisionally independent south, to the benefit of both. This would reduce Khartoum's unwillingness to accept southern secession, while giving southerners most of what they want.
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Many of those in U.S. civil society and Congress who spent years securing the CPA will be disappointed to see anything less than the full vision behind the agreement realized. But this is a case where the policy-making truism, not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good, deserves consideration. I was working in south Sudan just as the CPA was being concluded, and have vivid memories of people telling me about their dreams for "when peace comes." Unless immediate action is taken to support a second-best scenario, these dreams will slip away again – with the consequences reverberating across the nine countries bordering Sudan and beyond.
Rebecca Hamilton is the author of the forthcoming book The Promise of Engagement , an investigation into the impact of citizen advocacy on Darfur policy and the situation on the ground in Sudan. She is an Open Society Fellow and a Visiting Fellow at the National Security Archives. Her blog is found at here.
