Juba — Just before Christmas, in the dusty, impoverished capital of Southern Sudan, AllAfrica's Reed Kramer and Tami Hultman sat down with Deng Alor Kuol, minister of regional cooperation of the government of Southern Sudan, administered by the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement or SPLM, led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit. Prior to assuming that post, he served as minister of foreign affairs for the Republic of Sudan, in the unity government established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, which formally ended a 22-year civil war that killed an estimated two million people and displaced twice that many.
In the five years since the October 2005 CPA signing, international policymakers focused on other world crises - although the continuing violence in Darfur, in Sudan's west, has attracted a measure of attention. In recent months, international NGOs, churches and activists, including celebrities - most prominently actor George Clooney - have tried to focus policy makers and news organizations on unresolved tensions that could reignite the war. The government in the capital, Khartoum, is controlled by the National Congress Party, led by Omar al Bashir, who came to power in 1989 and has been accused by the International Criminal Court of war crimes in Darfur.
During a five-day referendum beginning 9 January 2011, southerners will choose to remain part of Sudan or become an independent nation. Conducting a successful referendum, and preserving the peace during and after it, is a formidable task, logistically and politically.
The disputed border territory of Abyei, which sits on an unknown amount of unexploited petroleum, is widely regarded as the most likely ignition for a resumption of large-scale hostilities. Sudan is Africa's third-largest oil producer, and as much as two-thirds of proven reserves are in the south, while pipelines transport the crude oil to the north, to be refined and exported. The CPA specified a referendum in Abyei, as well as across the south, but the parties failed to agree on modalities.
Southerners cite compromises they made over Abyei to achieve the CPA, followed by their agreeing to give up more territory after mediation at the International Court at The Hague. The north insists that it should get more of Abyei, and that northern nomads, teh Messiriya (also spelled Misseriya or Messiria ) people, who graze their animals in Abyei in the spring, are entitled to part of the land and a share of political control, alongside the Ngok Dinka who have traditionally resided in the area.
Sudanese churches and international ecumenical organizations, who have played key roles in brokering peace agreements in Sudan, have been working to convene Dinka and Messiriya leaders to discuss Abyei. The issue of citizenship is equally disputed, as are the numbers of people involved. Fearful southerners have been fleeing southward in the tens of thousands in recent weeks, ahead of the referendum.
In this conversation, Deng Alor discusses the future of the Abyei; the question of citizenship, after the referendum, which almost certainly will see a vote for separation; and the issue of future reunification. Excerpts:
What are you saying to your people about the current process and the upcoming vote?
According to the Southern Sudan Referendum Law, we have a turn-out requirement of 60%. I would like all those who have registered to turn out to vote, because that will definitely go a long way in achieving what the people of Southern Sudan want. If we get below 60%, it would negatively impact on the results. So we'd like them to turn out to vote in big numbers.
We'd also like them to keep peace and be calm during the voting, because it's important. Any violence also will negatively affect the voting. We are confident that the people in the south will achieve what they have been fighting for - for the last 50 years - because registration has taken place, and we are satisfied with the numbers that have registered. We think that will help the region in achieving peace and stability.
Are you confident that a free and fair referendum can happen?
Yeah, it can happen. We would like to appeal to the region, to the international community, to support and recognize the outcome of the referendum.
Do you have ballots, all the measures in place that are needed?
We do. The only problem we have now is the referendum for the Abyei area. We are still talking, we are still discussing, and I think we will be able to come up with a solution. That's the only thing that would create serious problems between us and the north.
With proposals circulating for resolving the disagreement over the future of Abyei, including giving the northern part to the north and the southern half to the south, we have been hearing some people say that they fear the government may compromise too much.
The government of Southern Sudan?
Yeah.
No, no, no.
No chance of that? ...
There's no chance of more compromising on Abyei. You know, when the issue of Abyei was discussed and resolved in Kenya [in the CPA negotiations], we thought that was the end of it. And we formed later a committee, the Abyei Boundaries Committee, to define the boundaries of the area. The protocol says the decision of the experts shall be final and binding.
When the experts came up with their decision and presented it in July 2005, President Bashir rejected the decision by the experts. That was the first violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Later, in 2008, they attacked the area, destroyed the area, burned the town of Abyei. As a result, SPLM and the National Congress went into a very long discussion. At the end, the National Congress suggested that the Dinka were given a bigger land, more than they really deserved, and they said we had to go for international arbitration.
The SPLM accepted to go for international arbitration. We went to The Hague; we spent almost one year. And in the end, the ruling the tribunal came up with, both of us accepted. The ruling was supposed to be, again, final and binding on the parties. Both of us celebrated, and we were going back home. Three or four months later the National Congress started to renege on The Hague ruling. This is where we are now.
Now they are coming again and saying, "You have to give us the northern part of Abiyei." There is no northern part of Abiyei that's going to be given. It's finished, the ruling was made.
Most of the oil areas were ruled in their favour. We lost almost sixteen thousand square kilometers as the result of The Hague ruling. Now they want us to give them, again, something like 4,000 square kilometers. It is not possible, there's no way you can do that. This is the area of Abyei where we still have some little oil. The majority of oil wealth [in Abyei] went to the north. I think maybe it's not well explained to the international community, that The Hague ruling, in fact, took almost 80% of the existing, producing oil wells.
Do you think there may be other oil that can be found and exploited for Southern Sudan for development for the future?
In the Abyei area? Yes, this a very rich area. They suspect there's a lot of oil still underneath, more than two billion barrels, in reserve.
We have been speculating why President Bashir has been insisting that this northern part be given to them, to the north. There are two or three explanations to that.
One, that President Bashir has a personal relationship with the Messeriya people. When he was fighting, these were the people that were recruited and used as militia against SPLA. Number two, that he has a friendship with the tribal leaders of the Messeriya . We are told that during the fighting he said he would give this area to them - if he had power.
The third reason - maybe this is the real reason. There is a lot of oil in this area, and maybe they know the quantity of the oil that is in this area, and that is why they insist that this area must be annexed to the north.
We have been arguing We have been telling the mediators, the facilitators, the special envoy of President Obama [Scott Gration], the former president of South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki and his panel [from the African Union] - we have been trying to convince them that there is no way we can come up with a new model, after the one which was defined by The Hague.
This is going to be a very bad precedent for the international community, that international courts could come up with decisions and rulings, and they are not implemented. That is going to be bad, a bad precedent. There will be no need for anyone to call for international arbitration, if you go [for arbitration] and decisions are not respected.
We also have been telling them that it is not practical [to divide Abyei and give the northern half to the Messiriya people] . You know, during the war, we fought for over 21 years. The Dinka from this area were displaced even before that, by the same people who are trying to claim the area now.
The Messiriya are nomads. They could have settled during the war [when the Dinka were chased out or captured]. They never settled. Even now. So when they say you give this area to the Messiriya , you give it, really, to nobody, because nobody is there. These are people whose livelihood is completely dependent on movement. They are migrating southwards, up to April/May, depending on the pattern of the rains. And when rains begin to fall, they move back north to their permanent area.
They don't stay [in Abyei], because the type of animals that they have, the cattle that they have, cannot survive in the Dinka area during the rains. They can't, because they don't have that resistance. And the Dinka cattle cannot survive in the Messiriya a rea. Nature itself has divided the land and people. So we think maybe there is something other than a commitment of President Bashir to the Messiriya people. Maybe it is something connected with the land - more oil in the area. We don't know any exact figures about the amount of oil that is there.
What about the issue of oil revenues, post referendum? You've been negotiating that too.
There is oil for the whole of Southern Sudan; many areas that are producing oil, other than Abyei. There is [the issue of] distribution. The oil between the north and the south is distributed in a way that the north gets 50% of that oil, the south gets about 42% of that oil, because 2% goes to the oil producer. Then the south [the SPLA government] gives 30% to the local areas that are producing oil. So that has been the division of the oil between the north and the south.
This is oil from the south?
This is the south. All this oil is from the south. The oil produced from the north is not distributed. The north takes it all, and this is unfair.
The oil produced in the Abyei area, 50% goes to the national government [in Khartoum], 42% goes to the government of southern Sudan, 2% goes to Abyei area, 2% goes to Messiriya area, 2% goes to Southern Kordofan, and 2% goes to Bar El Gazzar. That was a compromise during the interim period, suggested by the former special envoy of President [George W.] Bush, Senator [John] Danforth.
Did you see U.S. Sudan envoy Scott Gration on his just-concluded visit to Sudan?
Not on this visit, but on his last visit. Gration came last month, I think in his attempt to arrive at any solution - not necessarily a just solution [to Abyei]. We were in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. That was the first time the issue of the division of the area into two came up.
Gration was saying there would be not enough time now for us to set up a commission for Abyei. And maybe the best for us to do would be just to transfer the area back to the south, the way it was transferred to the north by the British, (who) used an administrative decree. [Gration] said President Bashir could use a presidential decree to do that.
The National Congress said fine, you can do that, provided this area is divided into two - you give us the northern part. And I think he fell for that. When we came to the plenary and this issue was brought up [by the northern government], Gration immediately supported it. And this made the National Congress more difficult. They have become intransigent, because now they feel they have support from the United States.
We took it up with Gration and he insisted [on this approach]. He even tried to mobilize people for this, from the State Department and from the (Obama) administration. Senator [John] Kerry came, and he tried to convince us to accept the division of the area.
And we told him - "Senator, we respect your views, we respect your opinion, we are friends with the United States. But, you know, land is the most important thing for human beings. And, after all, you cannot reward these people. This land that you think is free, is empty. The northern part of Abyei - the people were forcefully displaced by the same people you are trying to reward by giving them the same land, while they have displaced the owners of the land. So there is no justice at all."
So later, I think, the State Department decided that that was not the position of the United States, that the United States has no position. [The United States is now saying:] "It is what the parties agree. We are trying to bring the parties together; we are trying to mediate. We are trying to facilitate the talks, not to impose solutions on the parties."
But General Gration still insists now, at the personal level, that SPLM should compromise by accepting a division of the land. This is his position up to date.
The Addis meetings included [AU envoy] President Mbeki?
No, Mbeki was not there. Mbeki came later. And when Mbeki came, he also brought the idea of the division. The same thing. Among the six ideas for resolving the problem, the last option is this option: dividing the area. And this was the favoured position by the AU, the African Union High Implementation Panel. This is because Gration tried to push it, to sell it to them.
Gration was not here then, but we asked his deputy, Ambassador [Princeton] Lyman. And Ambassador Lyman said no, that was not the U.S. position. Their position, he said, may be option five, which says we include the Messiriya in the administration. The northern part should be made a county[of the state of Abyei], and two thirds of the administration of that county should be given to the Messiriya . The Messiriya should be given one third of the whole administration of Abyei, and then they take two thirds of the northern county.
My response was, "Ambassador, you are giving two thirds of the northern county to the Messiriya - where do you get them? They are nomads. Administration is run by a person who is there. These people come for three, four months. When they are not there, who will run the administration of the area? We cannot import people to come and administer the area.
You are also suggesting that we should give them one third of the administration of the Abyei [state]. It is not even practical. If these people were settled in this area, they would definitely be part of the administration. There is no way you can exclude them. But they have their own administration, they have their own parliament, everything they have [in northern Sudan]. Now how do you explain giving them one third of the administration of the Abyei area?"
He said, "But what about the fact that now the administration [of Abyei] is shared?"
We told him that the administration, now, we share between SPLM and the National Congress [as part of the earlier compromise on interim administration prior to a referendum]. The deputy chief administrator of Abyei is from Messiriya , that's true - but he is representing the National Congress. He doesn't live in Abyei. His family is in the north. He is living alone. And then you have three Messiriya in the local council, whose families are not there also. They live in the north. So every week they take their cars and they drive.
This is a shared administration between two political parties [the SPLM from the south and the National Congress from the north]. It was agreed that you can bring your representatives from anywhere. So these people are not representing the Messiriya They are representing the National Congress. And we didn't mind when they brought them, because that was a partner bringing their representative to the administration.
But the SPLM continues to guarantee that the Messiriya would retain the rights to graze in Abyei, as they have - ?
Oh yes. We said the Messiriya will continue to have rights to graze. Not only that, during their stay, three to four months in the area, they will have access to all other benefits. If somebody wants to take his or her children to school, that person should have that right. They should have access to all health services, access to anything, just like any other people in the area. Only they cannot participate in is the administration. Other than that, they would have access to everything, services, just like anybody else.
What do you think is the most dangerous challenge right now that you face, and what can the international community do to help avert the danger?
The international community should really press President Bashir to accept the role of the international tribunal [at The Hague]. Apart from violation of the international ruling [on Abyei], not accepting that compromise could trigger violence between the south and the north any time - maybe after the referendum. That is a bad beginning for neighbours that are supposed to be cooperating.
You know, the National Congress, the government in Khartoum, will need a lot from SPLM, from Southern Sudan, the new state in Southern Sudan. They have been complaining to other heads of state in Africa. They have also been saying this to Gration, that after the secession of the south, the north will be economically very, very, very vulnerable. Therefore they would like the new state in Southern Sudan to be convinced by General Gration, and some African leaders, to give them a certain share from the oil so that they are a viable state, economically viable for some time. So if they want economic cooperation, economic support, then I think it is better that they also cooperate and accept to implement the remaining issues [of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement], and particularly Abyei.
They also complain that the new independent state of Southern Sudan is going to pose a threat, a political threat to them - that [the SPLM] may support the Darfurian rebels and Darfurian movements and may support the opposition in northern Sudan. They [are concerned about the dangers of this] because they know the Sudanese Islamic movement is not popular in the region, is not popular in the Sudan. And the new government in Southern Sudan can mobilize [opponents] to fight them.
And not only that - they [the ruling National Congress Party] fear that the western world may use Southern Sudan as a springboard to get rid of the Islamic regime in Khartoum. Bashir has said that particularly the Americans, they may even transfer the headquarters of their Africom to Southern Sudan. So they have a lot of imagination! We say, "Ah, these people are giving us ideas we never thought of!" [laughs]
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Mo Ibrahim, the Sudanese cellular telephone pioneer, has expressed support for the right of the Southern Sudanese to separate. But the Mo Ibrahim Foundation last month gathered opinion leaders from across Africa to discuss "regional integration" - the need for Africa to move towards unity and cooperation. John Garang, the [late] SPLM founder, held to the vision of a united, democratic Sudan as the ultimate goal. Now, though, the SPLM supports separation - you're going the other direction, towards a smaller state. While you're preoccupied with the present, what are you thinking about the longer future?
Yes, we are preoccupied by the present, but the future is important. Mo Ibrahim is somebody I know very well, and I respect him because he has very good ideas. Sudan, since independence in 1956, has been unlucky, because there has never been a good government for this country that could come up with a global vision for the whole country. That's why this country has been witnessing political instability, military coups, sometimes very short-lived democracies. Even these democracies, sometimes they come up with some very strange priorities - creating an Islamic Arab country, things that do not reflect the reality of the Sudan. Arabism does not reflect the whole reality of the Sudan. Islam does not do that. So we have been unstable for half a century.
The Sudanese - I'm sure I agree with Mo Ibrahaim - could come together after some time - if not in our political lifetime, then in the next generation. Because, you know, the region is moving towards economic integration. Economic integration can facilitate political integration for the community.
There are two regional organizations we have: East African Community [Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi] and we have Igad [the Interim Governmental Authority on Development: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda]. These are two communities, and with time, this will encourage the integration of these countries into one economic zone. Southern Sudan is going to be part of it, and northern Sudan. There is no way they cannot be part of this. And having once been one people and one country, I think Sudan will find it much easier to come together, north and south.
This is what we are saying, as SPLM. When we are discussing the issue of citizenship, after the secession of the south, our approach is very reasonable. We are saying, you give the Sudanese people the right of choice. Let them choose, after the secession, where do they want to belong - as individuals? Some individuals from the north may choose to come to the south, and we will have no problem with them. And if some southern Sudanese want to choose to, as individuals, to be in the northern state, they should also be given that right.
But they [the National Congress] are saying no. They are saying anybody who is eligible to vote in the southern referendum shall automatically lose his or her Sudanese citizenship. Meaning even northern Sudanese who are here - and we have many of them who are eligible to vote in the referendum and who have already registered.
So you're not excluding anyone who lives here in the south from voting, even if they come from the north?
No, we are not excluding anyone. But they are saying these northern Sudanese who are eligible to vote in the south shall immediately lose their Sudanese citizenship. We said, "But are they not Sudanese like you? What gives you the right to deny them Sudanese citizenship?" They said no, [they won't relent].
There are also people in the north, but of southern origin, who have been for over 100 years in northern Sudan. They were taken by the Turks and by the Egyptians as slaves during those days, and they lost contact and touch with the groups that they came from.
They [the National Congress] said these people also shall immediately lose their Sudanese citizenship. We told them, "But these were the people who established Sudanese institutions - Sudanese armies, Sudanese security organs, Sudanese civil service. It is these ex-slaves. When the British came, when the Condominium Government came, they were the people settled around the towns, and their children were the first to be taken to school. They were the first to be recruited into the army and into the police. They became established in the civil service. At that time, you were maybe herding some goats or something!
The interview stops suddenly at this point, with a quick apology and handshake. It's Cabinet Meeting day, and Southern Sudanese President Salva Kir - who is also, under the terms of the CPA, Vice President of Sudan - has arrived to preside.
