How has Mugabe retained power for so long and what are the chances of ZANU-PF peacefully giving it up in the event that they lose the upcoming election?
The recent arbitrary arrests of prominent human rights lawyer, Beatrice Mtetwa and senior officials of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), coupled with sporadic state attacks on civilians and the civil society, have been interpreted by some - including the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai - as the last kicks of a dying horse.
Lovemore Madhuku, who heads the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an omnipotent civic organisation when it comes to constitutional and democracy matters in Zimbabwe, echoed the same sentiment, explaining that the moves were borne out of ZANU-PF's fear that they may lose the upcoming elections.
However, lost amongst all this ridiculing are two unmistakable facts. First, ZANU-PF's election preparation is already well underway, and intimidation of civilians and violence, are simply part of its unconventional strategy. Second, this is not the first time that predictions have been made anticipating the stark decline of ZANU-PF.
Indeed, in the run-up to the 2002 and 2008 elections, with mounting national debt, food shortages, disease outbreaks, rampant unemployment, and high levels of inflation, many were sceptical about their chances. But ZANU-PF has proved to be a survivor, and is the dominant actor in a shaky coalition government with two MDC formations.
Why has ZANU-PF stayed in power for so long?
There is no doubt that ZANU-PF has relied on its underhand approach to retain power. Alongside the manipulation of votes, intimidation and violence have also been at the heart of ZANU-PF tactics. Indeed, even a cursory look at post-independence elections will reveal that they have been characterised by violence.
In the run-up to the 1985 parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF government unleashed the infamous Gukurahundi policy against the supporters of Zimbabwe African People's Union - Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF), resulting in thousands of deaths.
In 1990, Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), a party that provided a formidable challenge to ZANU-PF, was also met with violence; and in the 1996 elections, the two main opposition parties, Abel Muzorewa's United Parties (UP) and Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-Ndonga), withdrew from the elections due to 'irregularities' and intimidation of their supporters.
When the MDC emerged in 1999, it seemed to have a genuine chance of unseating ZANU-PF. But President Mugabe's party again resorted to physical force. And so today, it should not come as a surprise if this year's elections are similarly brutal.
These obvious forms of repression have been complemented by more subtle ones. The party has created a vastly unequal political playing field, which has always given it an upper hand in past electoral contests.
For example, the media in Zimbabwe has always been muzzled. There are very few privately-owned newspapers and radio stations. Public information remains under the firm grip of ZANU-PF, which uses state-owned media to skew public opinion in its favour and employs hate speech against opposition parties.
Repressive laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act have been used to severely curtail basic rights through vague defamation clauses and draconian penalties.
To date, ZANU-PF have showed total disregard to calls by the opposition, civil society, regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the international community to allow other political players the room to manoeuvre.
ZANU-PF has had an overwhelming share of Zimbabwe's most talented politicians. Amongst others, contemporaries include Patrick Chinamasa, Jonathan Moyo, and Herbert Murerwa.
This vanguard of elite politicians, who have masterminded ZANU-PF's stranglehold on Zimbabwean politics since the 1980s, are not only street smart and academic, they are also ruthless.
This personnel has created an ideology that appears to resonate with a staunchly anti-Western and nationalistic section of Zimbabwean society.
It could be argued that ZANU-PF has a 'permanent' support base of mostly rural peasants that have more or less consistently voted for them since independence. Though the MDC has started to make some inroads into this, historically, it has been difficult for the opposition to claim significant support from this group.
Another ZANU-PF tool has been propaganda. For example, it has repeatedly played the fear card of a return of 'white rule' through the MDC, portraying the opposition as conniving with foreigners to steal Zimbabwe's riches and do harm to the country.
President Mugabe's party also understands the application of history as propaganda, and as a social and political organising force that can help shape national identity. The party has manufactured and popularised many different versions of history in order to justify both its policies - such as land reform, indigenisation and repression.
History has been used to reinforce the centrality of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwean politics and the eternal nature of the 'revolutionary party' versus the ephemeral nature of other parties that have come and gone.
Elite cohesion: enforced loyalty
Despite all of these measures, the cohesion amongst its elite has been ZANU - PF's greatest source of survival. There might be genuine grounds for the opposition's optimism if President Mugabe's party were split down in the middle, or a significant number of party stalwarts were to leave.
What explains this high level of cohesion? First, one might look at what has been termed 'corrupt law practice'. This system is simple - in return for the loyalty of this elite, the ZANU-PF government tolerates corrupt activities by its party officials.
At the same time, the government closely documents this corruption, building evidence that can be used to control these elite officials, particularly those that the party cannot afford to leave or join other parties.
If any of these members undermine party cohesion by, for example, threatening to form a breakaway political party or join a rival party, compromising information is passed to a partisan attorney general, who then pursues them. The disobedient party member either faces prospect of jail or full-scale seizure of their wealth, or both.
This strategy against a number of elite members: James Makamba, Chris Kuruneri, Philip Chiyangwa to name a few. These party stalwarts were jailed, or threatened with jail, and also faced the possibility of being stripped of their wealth. Action against these men has acted as a warning to others in the party: keep in line or face devastating legal consequences.
The very nature of ZANU - PF's corrupt political culture has ensured its survival. The party is dominated by wealthy individuals who have mines, vast tracts of land and control local banks.
Together, these individuals practise a distinctive form of patronage politics that they have used to maintain the party's unity. Public offices are often used by ZANU-PF elites to gain access to state resources, which are then shared amongst party elites in order to retain their loyalty to the party. The resources are used to lure talented members of the intelligentsia and powerful civil society leaders to the party.
The West has aided ZANU-PF survival
Western powers have publicly backed the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change. However, their pronouncements may undermine the very democratic ideals that they seek to uphold.
They played into the hands of President Mugabe as he rallies his core supporters' against these perceived attempts of external interference in Zimbabwean politics. Calls from Washington and Brussels have afforded ZANU-PF the perfect opportunity to frame the MDC as a front for neo-imperialism.
ZANU-PF's Succession Problems
This may seem like an unshakeable hold on the political landscape, however, once Mugabe leaves, all bets on ZANU-PF's political future are off. The 89 year old's presence has so far prevented any potential split in the party.
But even if he does win the elections, the octogenarian leader's health is poor: he may soon pass away or will surely resign before the end of the next period of tenure.
This is evidenced by the fact that ZANU-PF fought so hard for an inclusion of a provision in the sixth schedule of the new constitution, which says that should a president retire or fail to continue in office for any reason, there will be no new elections and the ruling political party can select a successor. This is the clearest indication yet that President Mugabe intends to hand over power to one of the party members. Rumours suggest power wrangling has already started within the party. But who are the contenders, and what are their chances?
The choice of successor, if left to Mugabe, will certainly be someone who commands enough authority to preserve party unity, and who is determined to carry forward his policies (especially land reform and economic indigenisation).
The man who appears to fit the bill is Emerson Mnangagwa, who has long been regarded as the President's blue eyed boy. Having been minister of Justice and Security amongst many, he is not only an experienced administrator, but he probably more than anyone else, he has helped build and maintain Mugabe's post-independence political order.
However, Mnangagwa lacks the charisma of his mentor and combines the worst instincts of patronage politics with a ruthlessly authoritarian temperament.
He is rumoured to be one of the richest Zimbabweans, and has been accused as the man behind the Gukurahundi atrocities committed against civilians in the Matabeleland region in the early 1980s.
Having been in the cabinet since 1980, Mnangagwa is of a similar generation to Mugabe and exudes an atmosphere of elderly exhaustion.
The other contender is current Vice President, Joice Mujuru. However, following the death of her husband, who was known as a "Kingmaker" in ZANU-PF's internal circles, Mujuru's faction has been gravely weakened, and support has since flowed away from her camp. She will need to attract some party stalwarts to stem this flow.
However, the choice of Vice President Mujuru would be a disheartening one given after frequently being implicated in corrupt deals.
A surprise entry in the succession battle has been the emergence of the appropriately-name Saviour Kasukuwere - the young and energetic minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Empowerment, who has been a chief coordinator in President Mugabe's drive to 'indigenise' foreign-owned companies.
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The burly, former intelligence officer is by far the underdog. Kasukuwere's faction, made mainly of young apparatchiks languishes in the wilderness, and emerging on the national scene might prove a step too far.
This is mainly because his camp lacks the elaborate and well-organised patronage networks that the traditional factions of Mnangagwa and Mujuru enjoy. This has long been the primary difference in ZANU-PF's ruthless factional politics. However, the young contender is not necessarily out of the game if he can muster some patrimonial linkages.
Some believe that if President Mugabe were to lose the election, the security chiefs, who have a symbiotic relationship with ZANU-PF, will take over. This is unlikely for two reasons.
First, the army is very much aware that its public image is extremely poor amongst ordinary Zimbabweans. Despite making explicit threats, it is doubtful whether they would want to experiment with actual governance.
Second, the army will also struggle to project legitimacy across Africa. Diplomatic pressure by international leaders - particularly from SADC and South Africa, will certainly not be keen to see the first military rule in this region of Africa - will be too much for them to withstand.
Will ZANU-PF handover power if they were to lose the elections?
Having been encouraged by a peaceful referendum vote, many are beginning to see a scenario where ZANU-PF might voluntarily hand over power in the event of being defeated.
This may be a reckless assumption. Past elections have shown that the party is so distinctly hostile to competitive politics, that it would be naive to think that ZANU-PF is conducting elections in good faith.
The Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, who is considered one of the brains behind ZANU-PF, was recently asked if ZANU - PF were prepared to surrender power peacefully if they lose the upcoming elections.
Chinamasa's response was brazen and evasive: he claimed he would campaign for ZANU-PF to win and did not see his party losing. This reflects ZANU - PF's resolve to not give up power and to retain it at all costs.
Simukai Tinhu has a background in International relations (London School of Economics) and African Politics (University of Oxford and University of Cambridge). His interests are risk analysis with a special focus on African countries.
