Even if it had another decade, the country is unlikely to be ready for elections in a manner that would satisfy most stakeholders.
South Sudan's polls will take place on 22 December 2024, despite objections from several quarters. This will be the country's first election since gaining independence in 2011.
Advocates for postponing the elections argue that South Sudan's political, normative, institutional and security environment cannot support a free, fair and safe election. Some of South Sudan's international allies, including the United Nations, have called for a delay in voting. However, 70% of South Sudanese surveyed this year say they want elections in December. On 5 July, the National Election Commission theoretically settled the debate by announcing the 22 December date.
Even given another decade, it's unlikely South Sudan would be ready in a way that would satisfy most stakeholders. Previous attempts at holding elections in the world's youngest country have failed due to instability and insecurity.
Faced with this reality, a pragmatic decision must be made about how the country exits its endless transition. Factions in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) that have debated whether to postpone elections have motives beyond the strength of their arguments and current conditions in the country.
President Salva Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) started using the election card as a negotiation tactic during the peace process leading up to the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. It remains an asset for him.
Given that the transition period has already been extended, Kiir - with the support of at least one of his vice-presidents - believes it is politically strategic to appear supportive of holding elections. Kiir wants to reduce his administration's need to negotiate with political factions in the TGoNU, especially arch-rival Riek Machar's SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-IO).
Kiir wields significant influence in the TGoNU, so if opposition parties boycott the election, he will gain decision-making power, enabling him to govern with fewer obstacles after the polls. This would also allow Kiir to redirect resources currently used to bankroll the excessive bureaucracy of a power-sharing government.
The political opposition in the TGoNU, led by the SPLM-IO, lacks the institutional infrastructure and financial resources to effectively compete in the polls. The Kiir-dominated TGoNU has also handicapped the opposition's chances by stalling the implementation of constitutional, transitional justice and electoral reforms that would level the playing field. The opposition is understandably apprehensive about losing the election, making them eager to maintain the status quo.
The opposition disapproves of the repressive National Security Service Act passed on 3 July and has offered a different interpretation of the Tumaini Consensus peace initiative signed on 15 July. These are all incentives to boycott the elections, and if the opposition does so, Kiir will be seen as the 'winner' even if an election doesn't occur.
Kiir's apparent endorsement of the election is a deceptive strategy designed to appease various political constituencies. If the opposition boycotts the polls, this could either prolong the transitional period or solidify Kiir's position in government. Both parties could continue to trade accusations of failing to implement the revitalised peace agreement without undermining their political support.
Despite widespread concerns about potential election-related violence, the benefits - for the people of South Sudan - of holding the polls outweigh the drawbacks. Most citizens believe elections would help address many of South Sudan's problems, including corruption, lack of service delivery, and a damaged international image.
Besides this, insecurity in South Sudan is driven by factors beyond elections. While polls could worsen the conflict, the looming economic impact of the Sudan civil war, combined with pre-existing structural challenges and systemic intercommunal violence, is a bigger worry. Current sources of conflict would persist even if the election were postponed. And continuous election delays would trap the country in transition and uncertainty, allowing the elite to take advantage of ongoing peace processes.
No countries in the Horn of Africa have conducted a flawless election. In East Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all held highly contested elections under conditions similar to those in South Sudan. Since 1996, Uganda has conducted several polls while a brutal conflict between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army was ongoing. Ethiopia's 2021 elections occurred during a pandemic and conflicts in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. South Sudan itself held a referendum in 2011 under challenging circumstances.
It is also true that polls don't necessarily prevent further violence. In unstable contexts, clashes can occur after reasonably fair elections. Uganda has experienced election-related violence for decades, and Kenya - often seen as the region's pillar of democracy - faces a violent political crisis partly due to the divisive 2022 elections.
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South Sudan's situation poses inherent risks, regardless of the approach taken. The Presidency's delay in acting on the recommendations of the inter-party dialogue indicates a lack of willingness or ability to prioritise the country's transition. The delay raises anxiety levels in the country and makes it difficult for South Sudan's allies to prepare their support should elections proceed.
Elections in South Sudan can be held based on consensus from the parties to the revitalised peace agreement, and with added safeguards drawn from the experiences of countries like Uganda and Ethiopia. But time is of the essence and further delays will worsen the country's uncertain situation.
The Presidency of South Sudan and the Transitional National Legislative Assembly should seize the momentum created by the Tumaini Consensus, and quickly pass the necessary reforms, most of which can be done with limited resources and political cost.
Moses Chrispus Okello, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa
