Herman J. Cohen
21 January 2002
opinion
Washington, DC — The arrival of the film "Blackhawk Down" in cinemas in the United States and around the world reminded Americans that Somalia has never been far from the center of Washington's national security concerns. This vivid memory of the tragedy that befell American soldiers and Mogadishu fighters on October 3, 1993, comes at a time when Somalia is drawing worldwide attention as a potential hiding place for Al-Qaeda terrorists seeking to escape from U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Starting as far back as the Second World War (1939-1945), the United States paid particular attention to Somalia in its Africa policy. Since Italy was an enemy nation, allied with Nazi Germany and the Axis powers in the Second World War, Italian-controlled Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia were early military targets of the United Nations powers. Thanks to British forces based in Kenya, these territories were among the first to be liberated from Axis control in 1942. This was important to the United States because Mogadishu, Asmara and Djibouti were relay stations for U.S. forces operating in the Middle East.
Even before the end of the Second World War, the problem of Somali irredentism caused some friction between the United States and Britain. In August 1944, the British proposed to consolidate all Somali peoples into one nation, including the Ogaden, Italian Somaliland and French Somaliland, which became Djibouti. (Of course, they conveniently omitted the Somalis living in northeast Kenya, a key British colony..)
The United States objected to the inclusion of the Ogaden in Somaliland because Ethiopia had entered the war as an independent state and as an ally of the United Nations powers. For the same reason, the U.S. acquiesced in the amalgamation of the Italian colony of Eritrea with Ethiopia, without consulting the people of Eritrea.
After the merger of the Italian and British Somalilands into one independent nation in 1960, the United States regarded Mogadishu as an important African country given its strategic location next to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Following the military takeover led by Mohammed Siad Barre in October 1969, and his adoption of "scientific socialism" as Somali state policy, Somalia became a pawn in the Cold War between Washington and Moscow. The country's strategic location made the U.S.-Soviet competition all the more intense.
The essence of Siad Barre's foreign policy was Somali nationalism and irredentism, with a focus on uniting all Somali people under one flag. This policy constituted a major threat to Ethiopia's Ogaden region, where the vast majority of the inhabitants are Somalis. The policy also provided an opening for the Soviets, who had no inhibitions about pouring arms into Somalia in order to menace Ethiopia, America's main ally in the Horn Africa. As part of this process, the Soviets developed an air and naval facility in the port city of Berbera on Somalia's northwest coast.
With a key communications' base in Asmara, the United States countered the Somali arms buildup with a major military assistance program to the Ethiopian regime of Emperor Haile Selassie. Armed clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia took place on a regular basis, mainly in the Ogaden region. It was in this area that the first test of American and Soviet air power took place, with Ethiopian F-5 American-built aircraft demonstrating superiority over the Somali Mig-16s supplied by the Soviets.
In 1975, U.S. policy toward Somalia took an ironic 180-degree turn, when a military coup in Ethiopia overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in favor of a Marxist pro-Soviet group known as the DERGUE, under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Merriam. This gave the Soviets an opening to become close to the Ethiopians in order to further undermine U.S. influence and gain control over the Red Sea lanes leading to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The Soviet aim was to use their friendship with both Ethiopia and Somalia to reconcile the two feuding powers as "Marxist brothers." However, they failed to understand that in the mind of Siad Barre, the friend of their enemy (Ethiopia) could not be simultaneously a friend of Somalia. For Siad Barre, Somali irredentism was much more important than Marxist scientific socialism.
As U.S.-Ethiopian relations cooled in the aftermath of the 1975 Mengistu coup, U.S.-Somali relations warmed. The United State increased military and economic assistance to Somalia, and the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu became one of the biggest American diplomatic missions in Africa. However, the U.S. faced a dilemma in its relations with Somalia because Washington did not want to be responsible for supporting Somali aggression against the Ethiopian Ogaden. Thus, Washington had to walk a fine line between the supply of defensive weapons to the Somali army, while parrying Siad Barre's constant demand for offensive weapons with which to attack Ethiopia.
Using offensive weapons purchased from Italy and other suppliers, Siad Barre attacked Ethiopia in the aftermath of the 1975 Mengistu takeover, hoping to take advantage of the disarray in the Ethiopian military. In order to counter Somalia's initial military successes in the Ogaden in 1977, Ethiopia called for assistance from the Soviet Union, who financed the arrival of 5,000 Cuban troops. The Cubans helped defeat the invading Somali army.
The deployment of Fidel Castro's Cuban troops to both Ethiopia and Angola in the period 1975-1976 was the major cause of the death of the policy of detente between the U.S. and the USSR. The Cold War had flared up again in Africa, and once again, Somalia was deeply involved.
In 1979, U.S. relations with Somalia took another turn after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. U.S. military analysts feared that the invasion was just the beginning of a major Soviet military push into Iran and the Persian Gulf oil producing areas. President Jimmy Carter reacted to this analysis by ordering the State Department to negotiate military base rights and facilities in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states surrounding the Persian Gulf said they wanted American protection from the Soviet threat, but preferred that U.S. military components remain "over the horizon", and out of sight. The logical alternative to bases directly in the Gulf countries was to have facilities in East Africa. Thus, between 1979 and 1980, the U.S. negotiated to take over the former Soviet naval and air facility in the Somali port of Berbera and proceeded to upgrade the runway and docks in a project costing $35 million.
With Berbera becoming a key component of U.S. military planning in the defence of the Persian Gulf region, U.S.-Somali relations became even more important to Washington. This created yet another dilemma for U.S. policy, because the Siad Barre dictatorship became increasingly harsh, repressive and corrupt during the decade of the 1980s. Human rights groups in the U.S. and elsewhere criticized the American policy of providing military support to the Siad Barre regime. There were efforts in Congress to cut off military assistance to Somalia. These succeeded in 1989, so Washington had to maintain relations with Siad Barre solely through the supply of humanitarian and economic assistance.
During the second half of the 1980s, Somalia sank more and more deeply into civil war and lawlessness, as various clan groups armed themselves in opposition to Siad Barre's murderous regime. In 1990, Siad Barre's military had lost control of most of the country and was reduced mainly to defending Mogadishu.
Throughout this period, the United States continued to maintain good relations with Siad Barre because of the overriding imperative of maintaining military access to Berbera. In mid-1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, setting off a major security crisis in the Persian Gulf. It was for such a contingency that the U.S. had maintained strong ties with Siad Barre, despite his invasions of Ethiopia and his despicable human rights record. But in an irony of ironies, the American military suddenly found itself welcomed to the Persian Gulf and was able to base its fighting units inside Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in preparation for the fight to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Thus, the United States did not need Berbera in the Gulf War, and the reason for the friendship with Siad Barre fell away.
By early 1991, Siad Barre had been driven out of office and out of Somalia by his clan enemies, the Cold War had formally ended, and the Dergue regime in Ethiopia had been defeated and replaced by Tigrayan and Eritrean guerrilla armies. Unlike Ethiopia, where a new government was able to restore order and take control expeditiously, Somalia fell into a state of anarchy after Siad Barre's departure. Mogadishu was especially hit by clan warfare, lawlessness and banditry. The newly constructed U.S. Embassy was invaded by bandits, with the entire American staff and diplomats from other nations escaping on helicopters sent by the American military operating in the nearby Gulf war. Thus, in January 1991, it looked as if the United States had reached the point of forgetting about Somalia, which in strategic terms had reverted to being just another troubled backwater.
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