An international observer group on Guinea has recommended setting up an international commission of inquiry into last month's crackdown that news reports say claimed more than 150 lives. Leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) are expected to meet on Saturday to discuss the Guinea crisis. They have called on Guinea's ruler, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, to step aside and hold elections. He seized power last December.
Dr. Herschelle Challenor, former dean of the Graduate School of International Affairs at Clark University, served as the team leader for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Guinea from 2004 to 2006. She is also a former staff director of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa. She spoke with AllAfrica's Cindy Shiner about recent developments and prospects for peace in the country.
Do you think African leaders, West African leaders in particular, have done enough to try to stem the crisis in Guinea?
The African Union and Ecowas were the first to condemn the military coup of December 23, 2008. They have been persistent. These two organizations co-chair what is called the International Contact Group on Guinea, which has met virtually every month since March. Right after [the crackdown last month] the peace and security council of the African Union approved additional sanctions on the president and the military government. That was to impose travel restrictions and to freeze bank accounts, but with the caveat that these would not go into effect for a month, hoping that would be an incentive for President Camara to say that neither he nor any members of the ruling [National Council for Democracy and Development] would be candidates in the forthcoming elections in 2010.
So they have done as much as they can except deploy a peacekeeping force, which Guinea's civil society has asked for. Ecowas has talked about that. I gather there has been some talk at the United Nations about a peacekeeping force. I don't think anything else will make a difference.
What do you think of the Ecowas appointment of Blaise Compaore, the leader of Burkina Faso, as mediator on Guinea?
Blaise Compaore in my mind is not the best candidate. He led a military coup in his own country in 1987. He has remained in power. He has been the negotiator in Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. I don't think that his record for mediation has led to a democratic path either in Togo or in Cote d'Ivoire and I don't think he himself is in a neutral position. Other people might have been better. The Forces Vives [opposition coalition] have said they would prefer the former president of Mali and the first president of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konare, who is an extraordinary human being and a democrat. I have thought about Nicephore Soglo, the former president of Benin, who in 1990 led the whole national conference movement that led to democracy in many French-speaking African countries.
Who are these groups who are opposed to Guinea's military rulers?
There are four main traditional opposition parties and there are a couple of new ones. The people Camara is most concerned about are Sidya Toure, who is a former prime minister under [former president Lansana] Conte; Cellou Dalein Diallo, a former prime minister; Alpha Conde, who ran against Conte and was imprisoned at least once; and a young man called Mouctar Diallo.
The Forces Vives is a coalition of opposition political parties and some of the rather independent political parties, the two labor unions that have led the four main strikes in Guinea, religious leaders, business leaders, non-governmental organizations, women, youths and human rights organizations. The anchor of the umbrella group is the National Council of Civil Society Organizations in Guinea. They have structures in the eight administrative regions of Guinea. It's probably the best-organized group, even better organized than most political parties.
And what about Camara and the rest of the country's military leaders?
When he came to power Moussa Dadis Camara said he would not stay in power forever, that he would respect human rights, that he wanted a civilian government. He broke all of those commitments and it just goes on: violence and stealing, multiple arrests, mainly by the presidential guard, the red berets and other military men. When you're arrested or detained they steal your money and your cell phone. People have to buy the release of any relative or friend that is under arrest.
This is a man who doesn't like opposition. He has been a professional soldier all his life and when he sees a threat to his perceived interests his response is to fight it. He always wears a red beret and he said the red beret is to signify blood. This is a man who has only known authoritarianism. He takes unilateral decisions and I don't think he knows anything else. You cannot get him to step down through dialogue.
You've got division in the army. He apparently cannot control the army. He is, after all, just a captain. One of the first things he did was to retire all of the generals. Then he arrested 11 or 12 of them. At least 10 of the cabinet ministers are military men and they hold the most strategic portfolios: defense, security, economy, finance, communications, commerce, mines and several others. In July he started hiring more of [former] president Conte's former henchmen to work closely with him. So I think all of these things are a factor of deep concern for a certain group of the military.
Why should the United States and other members of the international community be particularly concerned about the crisis in Guinea?
Since about 2006 there have been a plethora of military coups in francophone Africa. First you had Togo, then Mauritania, Guinea, Niger. And these leaders have stayed in power. [The United States] is concerned with the resumption of the military coup d'etat … a renewed trend toward military leadership.
The Americans used to always say Guinea was the island of stability during the civil wars in the region [in the 1990s]. What the United States and other countries do not want is for Guinea to become unstable because it could again destabilize that particular sub-region of West Africa. That is Liberia , Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.
The second reason is out of basic humanitarian concerns. There's been a constant predatory relationship between each post-independence government in Guinea and its people. The predation is done not only by the government but by the military, security forces and police.
The third reason is that if there is a civil war in Guinea they recognize that they would have to mop it up and pay for humanitarian assistance. At the high point of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea had over a million refugees. The United States and other donor countries have put a lot of money – mainly through the United Nations - to support refugee camps. It's very costly.
So how best can the international community help?
First of all they should pay attention to the Forces Vives. They have said they will not participate in a coalition government that Camara called for after September 28. Their precondition to accept any negotiated settlement is that he has to step down. That is the first thing.
I think it is really time for the United Nations to look at the continuation of similar predatory acts of the government, the military and security forces against the Guinean people. Then decide on building a peacekeeping force to put the military back in their camps and hold them there while the civil society negotiates to set up a transitional government to prepare a new constitution and to hold presidential and legislative elections.
The second thing is there ought to be a U.N. civil administration. They had one in Namibia before independence but I think Guinea needs this. Changing the president is not going change the way in which Guinea functions. Most of your civil servants really don't know how to work because, first of all, they've had poor managers. But secondly they've been socialized - because of the tyrannical governments they've had - not to take any initiative.
I have gone into ministries and seen a minister with a clear desk with a television watching a soccer game. They really don't know how to work. You need to train an entirely new army – set a code of conduct, set standards. There are many in the existing military who would keep those. So take the [soldiers] who are willing to perform according to modern democratic standards. But you have to train them and it just can't be one-off training.
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That's why I talk about a civil administration that has to last a minimum of two years. Work with Guineans. I'm not saying a lot of Americans, Canadians or French or Japanese need to run Guinea. But they need to have sign-off authority on decisions while you have Guinean leaders running it. And even though Guineans have always said – and it's a carryover from post-independence leader Sekou Toure – 'we don't need help, we have nothing to learn from anybody', I think there are many Guineans who recognize the need for this kind of training and would be very willing to work under a cooperative relationship.
There are people in Senegal or Benin who are well-trained civil servants who could assist with such training. They need not all be westerners. I think the African Union would want to participate and I think it's important that they do. Ecowas, since they are the closest neighbors, have a direct interest in stability and growth and development in Guinea.
The final thing is there needs to be a truth and reconciliation commission. Guineans have been traumatized [under years of authoritarian rule]. You need to have this to clear the air.
The Guineans have no recourse. There is no rule of law. There is nothing to protect them. I tried to get a rule of law program by USAID in Guinea in 2006. I was present at the continuation of a longstanding effort by USAID to help mobilize Guinean civil society. I feel that since we have encouraged civil society advocacy, I think it's unconscionable to get people to demonstrate and not do anything to protect them when they are brutally assaulted by their government. That's what I think is the U.S.'s special responsibility.
What do you think is next?
I think this meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea in Abuja is critical. There have been condemnations and calls for dialogue and even threats for sanctions now for eight months and Camara has only become more bold. Maybe it's time to try another strategy. They say if you keep doing things the way you've been doing them you're going to get the same results.
