Charles Cobb, Jr.
18 January 2007
interview
Washington, D.C. — U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, who has been leading the Bush administration's peace efforts in Somalia and Sudan, discussed the situation in both countries - as well as plans to create an 'African Command' for the U.S. military and current developments in Liberia, Guinea and Zimbabwe - in the following interview with AllAfrica's Charles Cobb:
You were very critical yesterday of the decision by Somalia's parliament to kick out its speaker, Sharif Hassan Shekih Adan. Why?
I think that if you are going to have a spirit of reconciliation, which they've all been talking about, a national dialogue, then everyone should be part of that process. Especially the leadership of the federal transitional institutions. And it seems to me that a move to immediately expel or push out the speaker is counter to that spirit. I am not trying to get into the details of the validity of their case against him; my point is that he is part of the institutions and he has a particular perspective in terms of trying to reach out to the Council of Islamic Courts. And whether he has coordinated that with the president, prime minister or others, I can't say, but that's behind you and move forward. And so I think as a symbol to the rest of the country, it was important to reach out to him and not try and push him over. I was also critical of him [the speaker]—of the statements that he has also been making. And I think that the parliament and the speaker bear responsibility for continuing to the transitional federal institution.
Of course the speaker opposed Ethiopian intervention and he was encouraging discussion with the Council of Islamic Courts.
He did oppose Ethiopia's intervention and his call for reaching out for dialogue with the Council of Islamic Courts is the same call we all had prior to Ethiopia's counter offensive. We were all pushing for credible and serious dialogue. So those are what I consider policy differences that should be able to be accommodated within the context of reconciliation and national dialogue. And yes, he continued to oppose Ethiopia's presence in Somalia, but as I told him when I was in Nairobi that's behind us now.
Is it the position of the Bush administration with respect to the Ethiopian intervention that Ethiopia was threatened by the Islamic Courts and that the Islamic Courts were essentially an al-Qaeda front?
On the first, we would say that "yes" that both Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government were threatened by the Council of Islamic Courts and the statements that they made. In their own rhetoric they were talking about reuniting all Somalis—the whole five stars of Somalia notion which would include [as a single nation] the Ogaden [of Ethiopia], northeast Kenya, Djbouti—the old irredentist movement and that's a threat in and of itself. Secondly, we saw evidence that they were infiltrating trainers into various areas.…
Of Ethiopia?
There is some evidence of infiltration into the Ogaden as well. And of planning of infiltration into Kenya and other places—into Somaliland. Now how far those operations went, I don't have that evidence. Secondly, Ethiopia said it was in Baidoa to train transitional federal government troops and there were skirmishes with Islamic Courts militias attacking an Ethiopian convoy here and there. Then these escalated with the Council of Islamic Courts pushing toward Baidoa in a clear offensive against the government. Yes. We did see a threat to Ethiopia.
And it required in your view a military response by Ethiopia?
Not necessarily…
Because you seemed reluctant about supporting intervention in the beginning, in December. Then the U.S. attitude seems to shift over two weeks.
What happened is we have always counseled Ethiopia from the first time the Courts were trying to—when I say "the Courts" I mean individuals within the Courts—pull Ethiopia into this conflict, trying to drag it in, we were cautioning them that they should not take the bait and get pulled into this. But what became very evident over time is that—and this goes to your second question, were the Courts a front for al-Qaeda—no, I don't think the Courts were a front for al-Qaeda; I think the Courts were a genuine organic Courts based in communities that had come up almost organically to adjudicate cases and provide basic services; but I believe that the al-Qaeda operatives that were in Somalia, hiding out, eventually took over those Courts. Basically they hijacked the Shura [decision-making body]. I say hijacked because they took over the militia or created and built the militia—the al-shabab—which was very extremist in its orientation. They had key positions in the Shura and there was a split within the Shura between those who wanted to seriously negotiate in Khartoum and those who were continuing to push militarily. And so I think al-Qaeda "hijack" is probably the best way to say it, rather than the Courts were a front for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda didn't create the Courts.
Was there something specific that triggered this assessment?
Well. We have information. We had information on the planning and operations all along. And it became very clear that if they had gone to the negotiating table with the goal of helping govern Somalia, they could have gone to the table and done just that. The Transitional Federal Government is extremely weak. They could have had a major influence within the government if that were the objective. But the continued push militarily suggested that there was a different objective. And their own statement, I think, affirms that, and the call for global Jihad, the call for reuniting all Somalis under the five stars.
Should the U.S. bombing and the attempt to capture the men considered responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania be considered part of the effort against the Courts while strengthening the transitional government or as something separate?
It's obviously part of it, but our effort to get Somalia not to be a safe haven for these terrorists is longstanding. It's been there since 1998. It was before the Courts, during the Courts, and will certainly be after the Courts. It stands independent of an assessment of the Courts themselves. But what certainly these particular three operatives felt more comfortable when the Council of Islamic Courts was in control of Mogadishu. And as a result they came out of hiding. And we were able to pick-em up. I think that's where the relationship goes between the Courts and these three operatives. And then we saw evidence that these operatives—or at least a couple of them—were providing logistics and supplies and support for the al-Shabab militia of the Council of Islamic Courts.
By "pick-em up" I assume you mean identify their location in Somalia.
And their activities.
Was the effort to kill them or capture them?
You mean the C130 strike?
Yes. The operation against those three.
We're not just after those three. Those three are the ones who have been indicted for attacking our embassies, but there is an al-Qaeda cell in Somalia; people like Issa Osman Issa are part of that al-Qaeda cell. He was responsible for the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa. Aden Hashi 'Ayro trained in Afghanistan and is one of the commanders of Council of Islamic Courts militia, the al-Shabab. All of these individuals we would consider to be on the terror list, as extremists who pose a threat to U.S. interests and to the region.
How do you respond to the criticism from Africa about this attack—the U.S. C130 attack. Even Djibouti, which is certainly an ally of the United States, was critical?
Their statements of concern or criticism were based on faulty information that there were multiple attacks and that there were many hundreds of civilians that were killed. None of that is true. I just think that they had bad information, and they were reacting to very bad information.
One of the things you said yesterday was that the past had to be left behind. Much, I think, depends on what kind of government emerges in Somalia. The transitional government seems extremely weak. It wasn't even able to get to Mogadishu without Ethiopian troops. Why should anyone assume that it is a viable government at all?
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